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Threat Model Analysis for lizardbyte/sunshine

Threat: Authentication Bypass in Pairing Process

  • Threat: Authentication Bypass in Pairing Process

    • Description: An attacker could exploit a vulnerability in Sunshine's pairing process (e.g., a race condition, improper validation of PINs, or a flaw in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange) to bypass authentication and connect a malicious client without a valid PIN or authorization. The attacker might use a modified Moonlight client or custom tools to interact with the pairing protocol directly. This is a direct flaw in Sunshine's pairing logic.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to the host system's video/audio stream and input, allowing the attacker to control applications, view sensitive data, or potentially launch further attacks.
    • Affected Component: Sunshine::Server::PairingHandler, specifically the functions related to PIN validation, key exchange, and client registration. Also potentially the network protocol implementation used for pairing.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Thoroughly review and audit the PairingHandler code for race conditions, logic errors, and cryptographic weaknesses.
        • Implement robust input validation for PINs and other pairing data.
        • Use established and well-vetted cryptographic libraries for key exchange and ensure they are used correctly.
        • Implement unit and integration tests specifically targeting the pairing process.
        • Consider using a formal verification approach to prove the correctness of the pairing protocol implementation.
      • Users:
        • Use strong, randomly generated PINs.
        • Ensure the network is secure during the pairing process (avoid public Wi-Fi).
        • Keep Sunshine updated to the latest version.

Threat: Input Injection via Malformed Input Events

  • Threat: Input Injection via Malformed Input Events

    • Description: An attacker with a compromised or malicious Moonlight client could send crafted input events (keyboard, mouse, gamepad) to Sunshine that exploit vulnerabilities in the input handling logic. This could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. For example, a specially crafted sequence of keyboard events might trigger a buffer overflow or format string vulnerability in Sunshine's input processing code. This is a direct vulnerability in Sunshine's input handling.
    • Impact: Remote code execution on the host system, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
    • Affected Component: Sunshine::Input::InputManager, and potentially specific input device handlers (e.g., KeyboardHandler, MouseHandler, GamepadHandler). The specific functions responsible for parsing and processing input events are most vulnerable.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all input events.
        • Use memory-safe programming techniques (e.g., bounds checking, avoiding unsafe string functions) in the input handling code.
        • Fuzz test the input handling components with a variety of malformed input data.
        • Consider using a sandboxed environment for processing input events.
      • Users:
        • Keep Sunshine updated to the latest version.

Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Flooding

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Flooding

    • Description: An attacker sends a large number of connection requests to Sunshine's control port (typically 47989, 47984, 48010, 47998, 47999, 48000), overwhelming the server and preventing legitimate clients from connecting. This could be achieved using readily available network tools. This targets Sunshine's network service directly.
    • Impact: Legitimate users are unable to connect to Sunshine and stream games or applications.
    • Affected Component: Sunshine::Server::NetworkService, specifically the code responsible for handling incoming connections and managing the connection pool.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Implement rate limiting on incoming connections, limiting the number of connections allowed from a single IP address within a given time period.
        • Use a connection queue with a reasonable size limit to handle bursts of legitimate traffic.
        • Optimize the connection handling code for performance and efficiency.
      • Users:
        • Use a firewall to restrict access to Sunshine's ports to only authorized IP addresses or networks.
        • Consider using a reverse proxy with DoS protection capabilities.

Threat: Video/Audio Stream Eavesdropping

  • Threat: Video/Audio Stream Eavesdropping

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in Sunshine's implementation of the RTSP/RTP streaming protocols or the encryption used to protect the stream. This allows them to intercept and view the video and audio data being transmitted between Sunshine and the Moonlight client. This is not a generic network eavesdropping attack, but a flaw within Sunshine's handling of the encrypted stream, its implementation of the protocols, or its key management.
    • Impact: Loss of confidentiality of the streamed content. Sensitive information displayed on the screen or audio played could be exposed to the attacker.
    • Affected Component: Sunshine::Stream::StreamManager, Sunshine::Encoder::* (various encoder components), and the network protocol implementation related to RTSP/RTP and encryption (e.g., DTLS).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Ensure that strong encryption (e.g., AES-GCM) is used for the video and audio streams.
        • Use well-vetted cryptographic libraries and ensure they are used correctly.
        • Regularly audit the streaming and encryption code for vulnerabilities.
        • Implement proper key management procedures.
        • Ensure that the implementation adheres to the latest security recommendations for RTSP/RTP and DTLS.
      • Users:
        • Keep Sunshine updated to the latest version.
        • Use a secure network connection (avoid public Wi-Fi).

Threat: Configuration File Tampering (If Sunshine handles validation poorly)

  • Threat: Configuration File Tampering (If Sunshine handles validation poorly)

    • Description: While accessing the configuration file requires prior system access, how Sunshine handles the configuration is a direct threat. If Sunshine does not properly validate or sanitize configuration values loaded from the file, an attacker who has modified the file (having gained prior access) could inject malicious commands or settings. This is about Sunshine's lack of input validation on its own configuration.
    • Impact: Compromised security settings, potential execution of malicious applications (if application launch paths are not validated), or redirection of streaming data (if addresses are not validated).
    • Affected Component: Sunshine::Config::ConfigManager and any component that uses configuration values without further validation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all configuration values loaded from files. Treat configuration files as untrusted input.
        • Use a schema to define allowed configuration values and types.
        • Implement integrity checks (checksums, digital signatures) to detect unauthorized modifications, even if the attacker has file access.
      • Users:
        • Run Sunshine with least privileges.
        • Use file integrity monitoring (FIM).