sec-design-deep-analysis.md

Deep Security Analysis of MariaDB Server

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Objective:

The primary objective of this deep security analysis is to thoroughly evaluate the security posture of MariaDB Server, based on the provided security design review document and inferred architecture from the codebase and documentation. This analysis aims to identify potential vulnerabilities, assess associated risks, and propose specific, actionable mitigation strategies to enhance the overall security of MariaDB Server deployments. The focus will be on key components of the server, their interactions, and data flow paths, with a particular emphasis on aspects relevant to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the database system and the data it manages.

Scope:

This analysis is scoped to the MariaDB Server component (mysqld) as described in the provided "Project Design Document: MariaDB Server for Threat Modeling - Improved". The analysis will cover the following key areas:

• Server Architecture and Components: Analyzing the security implications of each component within the mysqld server, including the Connection Manager, Authentication Handler, Authorization Engine, Query Parser, Query Executor, Storage Engine Interface, Storage Engines, and related utilities like Audit Logging and Encryption Modules.
• Data Flow: Examining the data flow paths within the server, identifying security checkpoints, and analyzing potential vulnerabilities at each stage of query processing.
• Technology Stack: Considering the security implications of the underlying technology stack components (C/C++, Operating Systems, OpenSSL/YaSSL/wolfSSL, dependencies, Storage Engines).
• Deployment Environment: Acknowledging the impact of different deployment environments (On-Premise, Cloud, Containers, Embedded Systems) on security considerations.
• Attack Surface and Threat Landscape: Analyzing the attack surface of MariaDB Server and identifying relevant threats based on common database vulnerabilities and the specific characteristics of MariaDB.

This analysis will not cover:

• Detailed code review of the MariaDB Server codebase.
• Specific vulnerability testing or penetration testing of a live MariaDB Server instance.
• Security analysis of client applications interacting with MariaDB Server.
• Comprehensive analysis of all possible deployment scenarios.
• Detailed performance analysis or optimization recommendations.

Methodology:

The methodology for this deep security analysis will involve the following steps:

1. Document Review and Architecture Inference: Thoroughly review the provided "Project Design Document: MariaDB Server for Threat Modeling - Improved" to understand the intended architecture, components, data flow, and security features of MariaDB Server. Infer the detailed architecture and component interactions based on the document and general knowledge of RDBMS systems.
2. Component-Based Security Analysis: Systematically analyze each key component of MariaDB Server identified in the design document. For each component, identify potential security vulnerabilities, considering common attack vectors and weaknesses relevant to its function.
3. Data Flow Analysis for Security Checkpoints: Analyze the data flow diagrams provided in the design document to identify critical security checkpoints. Evaluate the effectiveness of security controls at each checkpoint and identify potential bypasses or weaknesses.
4. Technology Stack Security Assessment: Assess the security implications of the technology stack components used by MariaDB Server. Identify potential vulnerabilities arising from dependencies, libraries, and the underlying operating system.
5. Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment: Based on the component analysis, data flow analysis, and technology stack assessment, identify potential threats and attack scenarios relevant to MariaDB Server. Assess the potential impact and likelihood of these threats to prioritize mitigation efforts.
6. Tailored Mitigation Strategy Development: Develop specific, actionable, and tailored mitigation strategies for the identified threats and vulnerabilities. These strategies will be directly applicable to MariaDB Server and its deployment environments, focusing on practical security enhancements.
7. Documentation and Reporting: Document the findings of the analysis, including identified vulnerabilities, risks, and proposed mitigation strategies in a clear and structured format. This report will serve as a basis for security improvements and further threat modeling exercises.

This methodology will ensure a structured and comprehensive security analysis of MariaDB Server, focusing on actionable insights and tailored recommendations for enhancing its security posture.

2. Deep Analysis of Security Implications of Key Components

This section breaks down the security implications of each key component of MariaDB Server, as outlined in the security design review.

2.1. Connection Manager ('Network Listener') (C):

• Security Implications: As the entry point for all client connections, the Connection Manager is a prime target for attackers.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: Susceptible to SYN flood attacks, connection exhaustion attacks, and brute-force login attempts if not properly configured.
  • Unauthorized Access: If listening on publicly accessible interfaces without proper firewall rules, it can expose the server to unwanted connections.
  • Vulnerabilities in Network Protocol Handling: Potential vulnerabilities in the implementation of TCP/IP or Unix socket handling could be exploited for remote code execution or DoS.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Default Port Exposure: The default port (3306) is well-known and actively scanned. Leaving it open to the public internet significantly increases the attack surface.
  • Connection Limits and Rate Limiting: Insufficiently configured connection limits can lead to DoS. Lack of rate limiting allows for brute-force attacks.
  • Unix Socket Permissions: Improper permissions on Unix sockets can allow local users to bypass network-based access controls.

2.2. Authentication Handler (D):

• Security Implications: The Authentication Handler is critical for verifying user identity and preventing unauthorized access.
  • Weak Authentication Mechanisms: Reliance on weak or outdated authentication methods (like mysql_native_password without strong password policies) makes the server vulnerable to password guessing and credential theft.
  • Authentication Bypass Vulnerabilities: Bugs in the authentication logic or plugin interfaces could lead to authentication bypass, granting access without valid credentials.
  • Credential Stuffing and Brute-Force Attacks: Without proper protection, the server is vulnerable to automated attacks attempting to guess passwords or reuse compromised credentials.
  • Plugin Vulnerabilities: Security flaws in authentication plugins can directly compromise the authentication process.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Default Accounts: Default accounts (like root with default or weak passwords) are major security risks if not properly secured or removed.
  • Password Policies: Weak or non-existent password policies (length, complexity, rotation) lead to easily guessable passwords.
  • PAM Integration: Misconfiguration of PAM can lead to authentication failures or bypasses.
  • Plugin Security: Third-party or custom authentication plugins need rigorous security reviews to prevent vulnerabilities.

2.3. Authorization Engine ('Privilege Manager') (E):

• Security Implications: The Authorization Engine enforces access control and ensures users only have the necessary privileges.
  • Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities: Bugs in the privilege checking logic or SQL syntax parsing could allow users to gain higher privileges than intended.
  • Misconfigured Privileges: Overly permissive privilege grants (e.g., granting SUPER privilege unnecessarily) increase the impact of compromised accounts.
  • Bypass of Access Controls: Vulnerabilities in the authorization engine could allow users to bypass privilege checks and access or modify data they are not authorized to.
  • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Mismanagement: Improperly configured or managed roles can lead to unintended privilege grants or restrictions.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES Usage: Overuse of GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES simplifies management but significantly increases risk.
  • Publicly Accessible Databases: Databases without specific privilege restrictions can be accessed by any authenticated user, potentially exposing sensitive data.
  • Stored Procedure Security: Insecurely written stored procedures can bypass privilege checks or introduce SQL injection vulnerabilities.
  • Row-Level Security Implementation: If row-level security is implemented (via plugins or storage engine features), vulnerabilities in its implementation can lead to data leaks or bypasses.

2.4. Query Parser ('SQL Syntax Analyzer') (F):

• Security Implications: The Query Parser is the first line of defense against SQL injection attacks.
  • SQL Injection Vulnerabilities: Incomplete or flawed parsing logic can fail to detect or prevent SQL injection attacks, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary SQL code.
  • Bypass of Security Checks: Vulnerabilities in the parser could be exploited to bypass security checks and inject malicious SQL constructs.
  • Denial of Service through Malformed Queries: Specially crafted malformed queries could crash the parser or consume excessive resources, leading to DoS.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Complex SQL Syntax: The complexity of SQL syntax makes it challenging to create a parser that is both robust and secure.
  • Parser Bugs: Parser implementations are complex and prone to bugs, some of which can be security-relevant.
  • Character Encoding Issues: Incorrect handling of character encodings can sometimes be exploited for SQL injection.

2.5. Query Optimizer ('Execution Plan Generator') (G):

• Security Implications: While primarily focused on performance, the Query Optimizer has indirect security implications.
  • Resource Exhaustion DoS: Inefficient query plans generated by the optimizer can be exploited to create resource exhaustion DoS attacks by submitting complex or poorly optimized queries.
  • Information Leakage through Query Timing: In some cases, query execution time differences based on data presence or absence could be exploited for information leakage (though less common in modern RDBMS).
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Optimizer Bugs: Bugs in the optimizer could lead to unexpected behavior, including performance degradation that could be exploited for DoS.
  • Query Hints Misuse: If query hints are exposed to users, they could potentially be misused to bypass security checks or degrade performance.

2.6. Query Executor ('Data Access Controller') (H):

• Security Implications: The Query Executor is responsible for executing the optimized query plan and enforcing runtime access control.
  • Privilege Check Bypass: Vulnerabilities in the executor could allow bypass of privilege checks during query execution, leading to unauthorized data access or modification.
  • Data Corruption: Bugs in the executor could lead to data corruption during data modification operations.
  • Buffer Overflow/Memory Safety Issues: Vulnerabilities in the executor code (written in C/C++) could lead to buffer overflows or other memory safety issues, potentially enabling remote code execution.
  • Row-Level Security Bypass: If row-level security is implemented, vulnerabilities in the executor's enforcement of these policies could lead to bypasses.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Complex Execution Logic: The complexity of query execution logic increases the likelihood of bugs, some of which could be security-relevant.
  • Interaction with Storage Engines: Vulnerabilities in the interaction between the executor and storage engines could be exploited.

2.7. Storage Engine Interface ('Data Abstraction Layer') (I):

• Security Implications: The Storage Engine Interface provides an abstraction layer, but vulnerabilities here can have broad impact.
  • Interface Vulnerabilities: Bugs in the interface itself could affect all storage engines, potentially leading to data corruption, data breaches, or DoS.
  • Storage Engine Bypass: Vulnerabilities in the interface could potentially be exploited to bypass storage engine security features.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Abstraction Complexity: Maintaining a secure and robust abstraction layer across diverse storage engines is challenging.
  • API Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in the API exposed by the interface to storage engines could be exploited.

2.8. Storage Engine (e.g., InnoDB, MyISAM) - 'Data Storage & Retrieval' (J):

• Security Implications: Storage Engines are responsible for data at rest and have significant security implications.
  • Data-at-Rest Encryption Weaknesses: If storage engine encryption is used, weaknesses in the encryption implementation, key management, or access control to encryption keys can compromise data confidentiality.
  • Storage Engine Vulnerabilities: Bugs in the storage engine code could lead to data corruption, data breaches, or DoS.
  • Access Control within Storage Engine: Storage engines may have their own internal access control mechanisms, and vulnerabilities in these can lead to bypasses.
  • Physical File Access: If physical access to data files is not properly controlled, attackers can bypass all server-level security and directly access or modify data.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Storage Engine Choice: Different storage engines have different security features and vulnerabilities. Choosing an appropriate storage engine based on security requirements is important. InnoDB is generally preferred for transactional integrity and security features.
  • Encryption Key Management: Securely managing encryption keys for data-at-rest encryption is crucial.
  • Storage Engine Specific Bugs: Each storage engine has its own history of vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through patching.

2.9. Data Files & Logs ('Persistent Storage') (K):

• Security Implications: Physical security of data files and logs is paramount.
  • Unauthorized Physical Access: If attackers gain physical access to the server or storage media, they can directly access data files and backups, bypassing all logical security controls.
  • Data Theft from Backups: Unsecured backups are a prime target for data theft.
  • Log Tampering: If audit logs are not securely stored and protected from modification, attackers can erase their tracks.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • File System Permissions: Restrict file system permissions on data files, log files, and backup files to only the necessary users and processes.
  • Backup Security: Encrypt backups and store them in a secure location with restricted access.
  • Log Rotation and Archiving: Implement secure log rotation and archiving to prevent log files from filling up disk space and to ensure long-term audit trails.

2.10. Cache & Buffers ('Memory Management') (L):

• Security Implications: Data cached in memory can be vulnerable to memory-based attacks.
  • Memory Dumping/Cold Boot Attacks: If the server's memory is dumped (e.g., through physical access or a memory leak vulnerability), cached data, including potentially sensitive information, could be exposed.
  • Cache Poisoning: In some cases, attackers might attempt to "poison" caches to influence query results or performance in a malicious way (less common in database systems).
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Memory Protection: Operating system-level memory protection mechanisms help mitigate some memory-based attacks.
  • Sensitive Data in Cache: Minimize the caching of highly sensitive data in memory if possible, or ensure it is appropriately protected (e.g., encrypted in memory).

2.11. Metadata Manager ('Schema & Object Definitions') (M):

• Security Implications: Metadata is sensitive information that can be exploited if compromised.
  • Metadata Manipulation: Unauthorized modification of metadata (e.g., table definitions, user privileges) can have severe security consequences, potentially leading to data breaches or privilege escalation.
  • Information Leakage through Metadata: Exposure of metadata (e.g., table names, column names) can provide attackers with valuable information about the database schema and potential targets.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Access Control to Metadata: Restrict access to metadata management operations to only authorized administrators.
  • Metadata Integrity: Ensure the integrity of metadata to prevent unauthorized modifications.

2.12. Replication Threads ('Data Synchronization') (N):

• Security Implications: Replication channels need to be secured to prevent attacks on data synchronization.
  • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks on Replication: Unencrypted replication channels are vulnerable to MitM attacks, allowing attackers to intercept or modify replicated data.
  • Unauthorized Data Injection into Replicas: If replication is not properly authenticated and authorized, attackers could potentially inject malicious data into replica servers.
  • Replication Protocol Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in the replication protocol implementation could be exploited for DoS or remote code execution.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Encryption for Replication: Always use TLS/SSL encryption for replication channels to protect data in transit.
  • Replication Authentication and Authorization: Implement strong authentication and authorization for replication connections to prevent unauthorized servers from joining the replication setup.

2.13. Backup & Restore Utilities ('Data Protection') (O):

• Security Implications: Backup utilities handle sensitive data and must be secured.
  • Backup Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in backup utilities could be exploited to gain access to backup data or to disrupt backup operations.
  • Unauthorized Access to Backups: Unsecured backups are a major data breach risk.
  • Backup Integrity: Compromised backup utilities could create corrupted backups, hindering disaster recovery.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Secure Backup Storage: Store backups in a secure location with restricted access and encryption.
  • Backup Utility Security: Ensure backup utilities are regularly updated and patched to address vulnerabilities.
  • Backup Integrity Checks: Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity of backups to ensure they can be reliably restored.

2.14. Admin Tools (e.g., mysqladmin, mariadb-admin) - 'Administrative Access' (P):

• Security Implications: Admin tools provide privileged access and are high-value targets.
  • Admin Tool Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in admin tools could lead to complete server compromise.
  • Weak Authentication for Admin Tools: If admin tools use weak authentication or are accessible without proper authentication, they can be exploited.
  • Abuse of Administrative Privileges: Compromised admin accounts or insider threats can misuse admin tools to perform malicious actions.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Secure Access to Admin Tools: Restrict access to admin tools to only authorized administrators and use strong authentication methods.
  • Auditing of Admin Actions: Thoroughly audit all administrative actions performed through admin tools.
  • Minimize Admin Tool Exposure: Limit the network exposure of admin tools and consider using secure channels (e.g., SSH tunnels) for remote administration.

2.15. Audit Logging System ('Activity Tracking') (Q):

• Security Implications: Audit logs are crucial for security monitoring and incident response.
  • Log Tampering/Deletion: If audit logs are not securely stored and protected, attackers can tamper with or delete logs to hide their activities.
  • Log Storage Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in the audit logging system or log storage mechanisms could lead to log data loss or compromise.
  • Insufficient Logging: If audit logging is not comprehensive enough, it may not capture critical security events.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Secure Log Storage: Store audit logs in a secure location with restricted access and integrity protection (e.g., using write-once storage or digital signatures).
  • Log Rotation and Archiving: Implement secure log rotation and archiving to manage log volume and ensure long-term retention.
  • Comprehensive Logging Configuration: Configure audit logging to capture all relevant security events, including authentication attempts, privilege changes, data access, and administrative actions.

2.16. Encryption Modules (SSL/TLS, Storage Engine Encryption) - 'Data Protection' (R):

• Security Implications: Encryption modules are essential for protecting data confidentiality and integrity.
  • Weak Encryption Configurations: Using weak or outdated encryption algorithms or protocols (e.g., SSLv3, weak ciphers) can compromise encryption effectiveness.
  • Vulnerabilities in Encryption Libraries: Vulnerabilities in underlying encryption libraries (OpenSSL/YaSSL/wolfSSL) can directly compromise encryption.
  • Key Management Issues: Insecure key generation, storage, or rotation can undermine encryption security.
  • Bypass of Encryption: Vulnerabilities in the implementation of encryption modules could potentially allow attackers to bypass encryption.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Strong TLS/SSL Configuration: Enforce strong TLS/SSL configurations, including using TLS 1.2 or higher, disabling weak ciphers, and using strong key exchange algorithms.
  • Regular Updates of Encryption Libraries: Keep encryption libraries (OpenSSL/YaSSL/wolfSSL) up-to-date with security patches.
  • Secure Key Management Practices: Implement secure key generation, storage, rotation, and access control for encryption keys.

2.17. Plugin Framework ('Extensibility & Custom Security') (S):

• Security Implications: Plugins extend functionality but can also introduce security risks.
  • Plugin Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in plugins, especially third-party or custom plugins, can compromise the server's security.
  • Plugin Compatibility Issues: Incompatible or poorly written plugins can destabilize the server or introduce security flaws.
  • Plugin Privilege Escalation: Plugins might inadvertently or intentionally introduce privilege escalation vulnerabilities.
• Specific Security Considerations:
  • Plugin Security Audits: Thoroughly audit the security of plugins before deployment, especially third-party or custom plugins.
  • Plugin Source Verification: Verify the source and integrity of plugins to prevent supply chain attacks.
  • Plugin Privilege Management: Carefully manage the privileges granted to plugins to minimize the potential impact of plugin vulnerabilities.
  • Regular Plugin Updates: Keep plugins up-to-date with security patches.

3. Specific and Actionable Mitigation Strategies

Based on the component analysis and identified security implications, here are specific and actionable mitigation strategies tailored to MariaDB Server:

3.1. Connection Manager ('Network Listener') (C) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Network Segmentation and Firewalling: Deploy MariaDB Server in a private network segment, isolated from direct internet access. Use firewalls to restrict access to the MariaDB port (3306) only from authorized client IP addresses or networks.
  • Specific Action: Configure firewall rules to allow inbound connections to port 3306 only from application servers or specific trusted networks.
• Action 2: Configure Connection Limits and Rate Limiting: Set appropriate max_connections and max_user_connections limits to prevent connection exhaustion DoS attacks. Implement connection rate limiting using firewall rules or connection control plugins if available.
  • Specific Action: Set max_connections based on expected concurrent connections and system resources. Implement rate limiting at the firewall level to restrict connection attempts per source IP within a time window.
• Action 3: Secure Unix Socket Permissions: If using Unix sockets for local connections, ensure proper file permissions are set to restrict access to authorized local users only.
  • Specific Action: Verify and set Unix socket file permissions to 0770 or more restrictive, ensuring only the MariaDB server process and authorized local users can access it.

3.2. Authentication Handler (D) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Enforce Strong Authentication Methods: Deprecate mysql_native_password and enforce stronger authentication plugins like caching_sha2_password or ed25519_password. Consider using PAM or plugin-based authentication for integration with enterprise authentication systems.
  • Specific Action: Set default_authentication_plugin=caching_sha2_password in my.cnf. Migrate existing users to use caching_sha2_password.
• Action 2: Implement Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong password policies including minimum length, complexity requirements (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, symbols), and password rotation. Utilize password validation plugins if available to enforce these policies.
  • Specific Action: Use the validate_password plugin to enforce password complexity and length requirements. Configure password expiration policies.
• Action 3: Disable Default Accounts and Secure Root Account: Remove or rename default accounts like anonymous users. Set a strong, randomly generated password for the root account and restrict remote access for root.
  • Specific Action: Run mysql_secure_installation script to remove anonymous users and secure the root account. Disable remote root login by binding bind-address to 127.0.0.1 for local admin connections and using separate admin accounts for remote management via secure channels (SSH tunneling).
• Action 4: Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for Privileged Accounts: Consider implementing MFA for highly privileged accounts (e.g., root, administrators) using authentication plugins that support MFA or by integrating with external authentication services.
  • Specific Action: Explore and implement MFA plugins or PAM modules for MariaDB to add a second factor of authentication for administrative accounts.

3.3. Authorization Engine ('Privilege Manager') (E) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Apply Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the minimum necessary privileges required for their tasks. Avoid using GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES and instead grant specific privileges on databases, tables, or columns as needed. Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to manage privileges efficiently.
  • Specific Action: Review existing privilege grants and revoke overly permissive privileges. Create roles based on job functions and assign users to roles with specific privileges.
• Action 2: Regularly Review and Audit Privilege Grants: Periodically review user privileges and role assignments to ensure they are still appropriate and aligned with the principle of least privilege. Audit privilege changes and access control modifications.
  • Specific Action: Schedule regular audits of user privileges and role assignments. Use audit logging to track privilege changes and review logs for suspicious activity.
• Action 3: Secure Stored Procedures and Functions: Carefully review and secure stored procedures and functions to prevent SQL injection vulnerabilities and privilege escalation. Grant EXECUTE privileges on stored procedures selectively.
  • Specific Action: Conduct security code reviews of stored procedures and functions. Use parameterized queries within stored procedures to prevent SQL injection. Grant EXECUTE privileges only to users who need to execute specific procedures.

3.4. Query Parser ('SQL Syntax Analyzer') (F) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Use Parameterized Queries or Prepared Statements: In application code, always use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead of dynamically constructing SQL queries by concatenating user input. This is the most effective way to prevent SQL injection attacks.
  • Specific Action: Educate developers on secure coding practices and enforce the use of parameterized queries in all application code interacting with MariaDB.
• Action 2: Input Validation and Sanitization: Implement input validation and sanitization on the application side to filter out potentially malicious characters or patterns before passing data to SQL queries. However, this should be considered a secondary defense and not a replacement for parameterized queries.
  • Specific Action: Validate input data types, lengths, and formats on the application side. Sanitize input to remove or escape potentially harmful characters before using it in SQL queries (as a secondary measure).
• Action 3: Keep MariaDB Server Updated: Regularly update MariaDB Server to the latest stable version to benefit from security patches that address parser vulnerabilities and other security issues.
  • Specific Action: Establish a regular patching schedule for MariaDB Server and apply security updates promptly.

3.5. Query Optimizer ('Execution Plan Generator') (G) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Monitor Query Performance and Resource Usage: Monitor query performance and resource usage to detect and address inefficient queries that could be exploited for resource exhaustion DoS attacks.
  • Specific Action: Use performance monitoring tools to track query execution times, resource consumption (CPU, memory, I/O). Identify and optimize slow or resource-intensive queries.
• Action 2: Limit Query Complexity and Execution Time: Implement query complexity limits and maximum execution time limits to prevent resource exhaustion from overly complex or long-running queries.
  • Specific Action: Configure max_statement_time to limit the maximum execution time for queries. Consider using query rewrite plugins or application-level query filtering to limit query complexity.

3.6. Query Executor ('Data Access Controller') (H) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Implement Row-Level Security (if applicable): If row-level security is required, implement it using storage engine features or plugins. Ensure the implementation is thoroughly tested and secure to prevent bypasses.
  • Specific Action: If using InnoDB, explore and implement row-level security features if needed. If using plugins, carefully evaluate and test the security of the chosen plugin.
• Action 2: Regular Security Audits and Code Reviews: Conduct regular security audits and code reviews of MariaDB Server, including the Query Executor component, to identify and address potential vulnerabilities.
  • Specific Action: Participate in or initiate security audits and code reviews of MariaDB Server, focusing on critical components like the Query Executor.

3.7. Storage Engine Interface ('Data Abstraction Layer') (I) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Regular Security Audits and Code Reviews: Conduct regular security audits and code reviews of MariaDB Server, including the Storage Engine Interface, to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in this critical abstraction layer.
  • Specific Action: Participate in or initiate security audits and code reviews of MariaDB Server, focusing on the Storage Engine Interface.

3.8. Storage Engine (e.g., InnoDB, MyISAM) - 'Data Storage & Retrieval' (J) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Choose Secure Storage Engine (InnoDB): Use InnoDB as the default storage engine for its transactional integrity, crash recovery, and security features. Avoid using MyISAM for sensitive data due to its lack of transactional support and row-level locking.
  • Specific Action: Ensure default_storage_engine=InnoDB is set in my.cnf. Migrate existing MyISAM tables to InnoDB if they contain sensitive data.
• Action 2: Implement Data-at-Rest Encryption: Enable storage engine encryption for sensitive data using InnoDB's encryption features or operating system-level encryption (e.g., LUKS, dm-crypt). Securely manage encryption keys using key management systems or operating system-provided key storage.
  • Specific Action: Configure InnoDB encryption by setting innodb_encrypt_tables=ON and configuring key management using innodb_encryption_key_management_plugin. Alternatively, implement OS-level encryption for the data volume.
• Action 3: Secure Physical Access to Data Files: Restrict physical access to the server and storage media where data files are stored. Implement physical security measures to prevent unauthorized access to the server room or data center.
  • Specific Action: Implement physical access controls to the server room or data center. Securely dispose of decommissioned storage media.

3.9. Data Files & Logs ('Persistent Storage') (K) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Restrict File System Permissions: Set restrictive file system permissions on data files, log files, and backup files to limit access to only the MariaDB server process and authorized administrators.
  • Specific Action: Verify and set file system permissions on data directories, log directories, and backup directories to 0700 or more restrictive, ensuring only the MariaDB server user and administrators have access.
• Action 2: Secure Backup Storage and Encryption: Store backups in a secure location, separate from the primary server, with restricted access. Encrypt backups at rest to protect data confidentiality.
  • Specific Action: Store backups in a dedicated backup server or secure cloud storage. Encrypt backups using backup utility encryption features or OS-level encryption.
• Action 3: Implement Log Integrity Protection: Consider using log integrity protection mechanisms, such as digital signatures or write-once storage, to prevent log tampering.
  • Specific Action: Explore and implement log integrity protection features offered by the operating system or third-party logging solutions.

3.10. Audit Logging System ('Activity Tracking') (Q) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Enable Comprehensive Audit Logging: Enable comprehensive audit logging to capture all relevant security events, including connection attempts, authentication events, privilege changes, data access, and administrative actions.
  • Specific Action: Configure the MariaDB Audit Plugin to log all relevant event classes (e.g., connection, authentication, privileges, query, admin).
• Action 2: Secure Audit Log Storage and Rotation: Store audit logs in a secure location with restricted access and integrity protection. Implement secure log rotation and archiving to manage log volume and ensure long-term retention.
  • Specific Action: Store audit logs on a dedicated secure log server or SIEM system. Implement secure log rotation and archiving policies.
• Action 3: Regular Audit Log Monitoring and Analysis: Regularly monitor and analyze audit logs for suspicious activity, security incidents, and compliance monitoring. Integrate audit logs with a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system for automated monitoring and alerting.
  • Specific Action: Implement automated log monitoring and alerting rules in a SIEM system to detect suspicious events. Establish procedures for regular manual review of audit logs.

3.11. Encryption Modules (SSL/TLS, Storage Engine Encryption) (R) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Enforce Strong TLS/SSL Configuration: Configure MariaDB Server to use strong TLS/SSL configurations for client connections and replication. Disable weak ciphers and protocols. Enforce TLS 1.2 or higher.
  • Specific Action: Configure ssl-cert, ssl-key, ssl-ca in my.cnf to enable TLS/SSL. Set ssl-cipher to a strong cipher suite. Disable SSLv3 and TLS 1.0/1.1.
• Action 2: Regularly Update Encryption Libraries: Keep the underlying encryption libraries (OpenSSL/YaSSL/wolfSSL) up-to-date with security patches to address known vulnerabilities.
  • Specific Action: Establish a regular patching schedule for the operating system and MariaDB Server to ensure encryption libraries are updated promptly.
• Action 3: Secure Key Management for Encryption: Implement secure key generation, storage, rotation, and access control for TLS/SSL certificates and storage engine encryption keys.
  • Specific Action: Use strong key generation practices for TLS/SSL keys and storage engine encryption keys. Store keys securely using operating system-provided key storage or dedicated key management systems. Implement key rotation policies.

3.12. Plugin Framework ('Extensibility & Custom Security') (S) Mitigation:

• Action 1: Minimize Plugin Usage and Review Plugins: Minimize the use of plugins and only install necessary plugins from trusted sources. Thoroughly review the security of plugins before deployment, especially third-party or custom plugins.
  • Specific Action: Conduct security code reviews of plugins before deployment. Verify the source and integrity of plugins.
• Action 2: Regularly Update Plugins and Monitor for Vulnerabilities: Keep plugins up-to-date with security patches. Monitor for security advisories and vulnerabilities related to installed plugins.
  • Specific Action: Establish a plugin update schedule and apply security patches promptly. Subscribe to security mailing lists and monitor vulnerability databases for plugin vulnerabilities.
• Action 3: Implement Plugin Privilege Management: Carefully manage the privileges granted to plugins to minimize the potential impact of plugin vulnerabilities. Follow the principle of least privilege for plugin permissions.
  • Specific Action: Review plugin documentation and configure plugin permissions to grant only the necessary privileges.

By implementing these specific and actionable mitigation strategies, the security posture of MariaDB Server deployments can be significantly enhanced, reducing the risk of identified threats and vulnerabilities. Regular security assessments, monitoring, and updates are crucial to maintain a strong security posture over time.