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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for mariadb/server

Threat: Authentication Bypass via Plugin Vulnerability

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a loaded authentication plugin (e.g., a custom PAM module, a flawed implementation of a standard authentication method) to bypass authentication entirely or authenticate as a different user without valid credentials. The attacker might send crafted authentication packets or exploit a buffer overflow in the plugin.
  • Impact: Complete database compromise. The attacker gains unauthorized access with potentially full privileges, allowing data theft, modification, or deletion.
  • Affected Component: Authentication plugins (e.g., auth_socket, mysql_native_password, PAM plugins, custom plugins). Specifically, the code within the plugin that handles authentication requests and responses.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use only well-vetted and actively maintained authentication plugins from trusted sources.
    • Regularly update MariaDB and all installed plugins to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • If using custom plugins, conduct thorough security audits and penetration testing.
    • Minimize the use of custom authentication plugins if standard, well-tested options are available.
    • Monitor plugin loading and configuration for unauthorized changes.
    • Implement strict input validation within custom authentication plugins.

Threat: Privilege Escalation via User-Defined Function (UDF)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a User-Defined Function (UDF) to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the MariaDB server process. This could involve a buffer overflow, format string vulnerability, or other code injection flaw within the UDF.
  • Impact: Complete server compromise. The attacker gains control of the operating system running the MariaDB server, potentially leading to access to other systems on the network.
  • Affected Component: User-Defined Functions (UDFs), specifically the compiled code of the UDF. The mysql.func table, which stores UDF information, is also relevant.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable UDFs if they are not absolutely necessary.
    • If UDFs are required, use only UDFs from trusted sources and ensure they are thoroughly vetted and regularly updated.
    • Conduct security audits and penetration testing of any custom UDFs.
    • Restrict the privileges of the MariaDB server process itself (e.g., run MariaDB as a non-root user).
    • Use a secure compilation environment for UDFs and implement strong compiler security flags.
    • Implement file system permissions to prevent unauthorized modification of UDF libraries.

Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Exhaustion

  • Description: An attacker floods the MariaDB server with connection requests, exceeding the configured maximum number of connections (max_connections). This prevents legitimate users from connecting to the database.
  • Impact: Database unavailability. Legitimate users cannot access the database, causing service disruption.
  • Affected Component: The connection handling mechanism within MariaDB (network listener, thread pool). The max_connections and max_user_connections system variables are directly relevant.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configure max_connections to a reasonable value based on expected load and server resources.
    • Configure max_user_connections to limit the number of connections per user, preventing a single compromised account from exhausting all connections.
    • Use a firewall to restrict connections to trusted IP addresses.
    • Implement connection pooling on the application side to reuse existing connections and reduce the overhead of establishing new connections.
    • Monitor connection counts and implement alerting for unusual spikes.
    • Consider using a load balancer to distribute connections across multiple MariaDB servers.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource-Intensive Queries

  • Description: An attacker submits complex, poorly optimized, or intentionally malicious queries that consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory, I/O), slowing down or crashing the server. This could involve queries with large joins, full table scans, or complex regular expressions.
  • Impact: Database slowdown or unavailability. Legitimate users experience poor performance or are unable to access the database.
  • Affected Component: The query optimizer, query executor, storage engine (e.g., InnoDB, MyISAM), and the server's resource management mechanisms. System variables like max_statement_time, innodb_buffer_pool_size, and tmp_table_size are relevant.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement query timeouts (max_statement_time).
    • Monitor slow queries using the slow query log and optimize them.
    • Use appropriate indexes to improve query performance.
    • Limit the size of temporary tables (tmp_table_size, max_heap_table_size).
    • Tune the server's configuration parameters (e.g., buffer pool size, thread cache size) for optimal performance.
    • Restrict the privileges of database users to prevent them from executing potentially harmful queries (e.g., SELECT BENCHMARK()).
    • Use resource limits (e.g., cgroups on Linux) to constrain the resources available to the MariaDB process.
    • Consider using a query analysis tool to identify and prevent resource-intensive queries.

Threat: Information Disclosure via Unencrypted Connections

  • Description: An attacker eavesdrops on unencrypted network traffic between a client and the MariaDB server, capturing sensitive data such as usernames, passwords, and query results.
  • Impact: Data breach. Sensitive information is exposed to the attacker.
  • Affected Component: The network communication layer of MariaDB. The TLS/SSL implementation and configuration are critical.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all client connections.
    • Use strong TLS/SSL ciphers and protocols.
    • Configure clients to require encrypted connections and to verify the server's certificate.
    • Use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) for server certificates.
    • Regularly update MariaDB and OpenSSL (or the TLS library used) to address known vulnerabilities.
    • Disable support for older, insecure TLS/SSL protocols (e.g., SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1).

Threat: Configuration File Tampering

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the MariaDB configuration file (e.g., my.cnf) and modifies it to weaken security, enable unauthorized access, or alter server behavior. For example, they might disable TLS, enable skip-grant-tables, or change the bind-address.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the specific changes made, but can range from minor information disclosure to complete database compromise.
  • Affected Component: The MariaDB configuration file (my.cnf or similar) and the server's configuration parsing and loading mechanism.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict file system access to the MariaDB configuration file using appropriate permissions.
    • Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect unauthorized changes to the configuration file.
    • Regularly audit the server configuration for unauthorized changes.
    • Use a configuration management system (e.g., Ansible, Puppet, Chef) to enforce a known-good configuration.
    • Back up the configuration file to a secure location.