Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
58 lines (50 loc) · 6.33 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

58 lines (50 loc) · 6.33 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for microsoft/cntk

Objective: Compromise Application Using CNTK by Exploiting CNTK-Specific Weaknesses (High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using CNTK
├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.0] Exploit Vulnerabilities in CNTK Library [CRITICAL NODE: CNTK Library Vulnerabilities]
│   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.1] Malicious Model Loading [CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Model Loading]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.1.1] Deserialization Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE: Deserialization Vulnerabilities]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.1.1.1] Code Execution via Crafted Model File [CRITICAL NODE: Code Execution via Crafted Model File]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.1.2] Buffer Overflow in Model Parsing [CRITICAL NODE: Buffer Overflow in Model Parsing]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.1.2.1] Code Execution via Overflow [CRITICAL NODE: Code Execution via Overflow]
│   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.3] Exploiting Vulnerabilities in CNTK Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE: Dependency Vulnerabilities]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.3.1] Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Libraries (e.g., protobuf, boost) [CRITICAL NODE: Third-Party Library Vulnerabilities]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.3.1.1] Code Execution via Dependency Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE: Code Execution via Dependency Vulnerability]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.3.2] Supply Chain Attacks on Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE: Supply Chain Attacks]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [1.3.2.1] Compromised Dependency Leading to Backdoor [CRITICAL NODE: Backdoor via Compromised Dependency]
├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.0] Exploit Application's Misuse of CNTK [CRITICAL NODE: Application Misuse of CNTK]
│   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1] Insecure Model Handling [CRITICAL NODE: Insecure Model Handling]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.1] Loading Untrusted Models Directly [CRITICAL NODE: Loading Untrusted Models]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.1.1] Attacker Provides Malicious Model to Application [CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Model Provided by Attacker]
│   │   │       └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.1.1.a] Exploit Model Loading Vulnerabilities (1.1) [CRITICAL NODE: Exploit Model Loading Vulns via App Misuse]
│   │   ├───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.2] Insufficient Model Validation [CRITICAL NODE: Insufficient Model Validation]
│   │   │   └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.2.1] Application Loads Model Without Security Checks [CRITICAL NODE: No Security Checks on Model Loading]
│   │   │       └───[HIGH-RISK PATH] [2.1.2.1.a] Allows Loading of Malicious Models [CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Model Loading Allowed]

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Vulnerabilities in CNTK Library [CRITICAL NODE: CNTK Library Vulnerabilities]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting inherent security weaknesses within the CNTK library code itself. This assumes vulnerabilities exist in CNTK's codebase.
  • Critical Node Breakdown:
    • CNTK Library Vulnerabilities: Represents the existence of exploitable flaws within CNTK.
    • Malicious Model Loading: Focuses on vulnerabilities triggered during the process of loading and parsing model files.
    • Deserialization Vulnerabilities: Specific flaws related to how CNTK deserializes model data from files.
    • Code Execution via Crafted Model File: The attacker crafts a malicious model file that, when loaded, exploits deserialization flaws to execute arbitrary code on the server.
    • Buffer Overflow in Model Parsing: Vulnerabilities arising from improper handling of buffer sizes during model file parsing.
    • Code Execution via Overflow: Exploiting buffer overflows to overwrite memory and inject malicious code for execution.
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities: Indirect vulnerabilities stemming from weaknesses in third-party libraries used by CNTK.
    • Third-Party Library Vulnerabilities: Specific vulnerabilities present in libraries like protobuf, boost, etc., that CNTK depends on.
    • Code Execution via Dependency Vulnerability: Exploiting vulnerabilities in dependencies to achieve code execution within the CNTK process.
    • Supply Chain Attacks: Compromising the software supply chain of CNTK's dependencies to inject malicious code.
    • Backdoor via Compromised Dependency: The result of a successful supply chain attack, leading to a backdoor within CNTK through a compromised dependency.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Application's Misuse of CNTK [CRITICAL NODE: Application Misuse of CNTK]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from how the application uses CNTK insecurely, even if CNTK itself is relatively secure. This focuses on application-level security flaws in CNTK integration.
  • Critical Node Breakdown:
    • Application Misuse of CNTK: Represents insecure practices in how the application integrates and utilizes CNTK.
    • Insecure Model Handling: Focuses on vulnerabilities related to how the application manages and loads model files.
    • Loading Untrusted Models Directly: The application directly loads model files from untrusted sources without proper validation.
    • Malicious Model Provided by Attacker: The attacker provides a crafted malicious model file to the application, which is then loaded and processed.
    • Exploit Model Loading Vulns via App Misuse: The application's insecure model loading practices enable exploitation of potential vulnerabilities in CNTK's model loading process (as described in Path 1).
    • Insufficient Model Validation: The application fails to implement adequate security checks to validate model files before loading.
    • No Security Checks on Model Loading: Specifically, the application lacks any security measures to verify the integrity or authenticity of model files.
    • Malicious Model Loading Allowed: The consequence of insufficient validation, allowing malicious models to be loaded and potentially executed.