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Attack Tree Analysis for microsoft/vcpkg

Objective: Compromise Application via vcpkg Exploitation (High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application (Root Goal) [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (via vcpkg) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise vcpkg Registry/Repository [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Official vcpkg Registry [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Malicious Package Injection/Substitution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Compromise Custom/Private vcpkg Registry (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Account Compromise of Custom Registry Maintainers [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Malicious Package Injection/Substitution in Custom Registry [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Compromise Upstream Library Source (via vcpkg) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Compromise Upstream Git Repository (e.g., GitHub, GitLab) │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Account Compromise of Upstream Library Maintainers [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit vcpkg Portfile Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Malicious Code Injection in Portfile [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Compromised Custom/Private Registry Portfile [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Command Injection in Portfile Scripts [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Unsafe use of shell commands in portfile configure_cmake, build, install scripts. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit vcpkg Build Process Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Compiler Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Local Environment Exploitation (Abuse of vcpkg Execution Environment) │ ├───[AND]─ Dependency Confusion (Local vs. vcpkg Managed) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Application accidentally linking against system libraries instead of vcpkg managed libraries due to misconfiguration or environment issues. [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (via vcpkg)

  • Attack Vector: Compromising the supply chain of libraries managed by vcpkg. This is a high-impact attack as it can affect many applications relying on these libraries.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • Compromise vcpkg Registry/Repository
    • Compromise Official vcpkg Registry
    • Malicious Package Injection/Substitution
    • Compromise Custom/Private vcpkg Registry
    • Malicious Package Injection/Substitution in Custom Registry
    • Compromise Upstream Library Source (via vcpkg)
  • Specific Attack Scenarios:
    • Compromise Official vcpkg Registry:
      • Malicious Package Injection/Substitution: Attacker gains unauthorized access to the official vcpkg registry and injects or substitutes a legitimate package with a malicious one. When developers use vcpkg to install this library, they unknowingly download and integrate the compromised version into their application.
    • Compromise Custom/Private vcpkg Registry:
      • Account Compromise of Custom Registry Maintainers: Attacker compromises the account of a maintainer of a custom vcpkg registry. This allows them to modify the registry's content.
      • Malicious Package Injection/Substitution in Custom Registry: Using compromised maintainer access, or other vulnerabilities, the attacker injects or substitutes packages in the custom registry, affecting applications using this registry.
    • Compromise Upstream Library Source (via vcpkg):
      • Account Compromise of Upstream Library Maintainers: Attacker compromises the account of a maintainer of an upstream library repository (e.g., on GitHub). This allows them to push malicious code changes to the library's source code. When vcpkg fetches this library for building, it will use the compromised source.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit vcpkg Portfile Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities within vcpkg portfiles, which are scripts used to build and install libraries. These vulnerabilities can lead to arbitrary code execution during the build process.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • Exploit vcpkg Portfile Vulnerabilities
    • Malicious Code Injection in Portfile
    • Compromised Custom/Private Registry Portfile
    • Command Injection in Portfile Scripts
    • Unsafe use of shell commands in portfile configure_cmake, build, install scripts.
  • Specific Attack Scenarios:
    • Malicious Code Injection in Portfile:
      • Compromised Custom/Private Registry Portfile: Attacker modifies a portfile in a custom registry to include malicious code. When vcpkg processes this portfile during library installation, the malicious code is executed on the developer's build system.
    • Command Injection in Portfile Scripts:
      • Unsafe use of shell commands in portfile configure_cmake, build, install scripts: Portfiles often use shell commands to perform build steps. If these commands are constructed unsafely (e.g., by directly incorporating user-controlled inputs without sanitization), an attacker can inject malicious commands that will be executed by the shell during the build process.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit vcpkg Build Process Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the tools used by vcpkg during the build process, such as compilers.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • Exploit vcpkg Build Process Vulnerabilities
    • Compiler Exploitation
  • Specific Attack Scenarios:
    • Compiler Exploitation:
      • Attacker leverages known vulnerabilities in the compiler (e.g., GCC, Clang, MSVC) used by vcpkg. By crafting specific inputs or conditions during the build process (potentially through malicious portfile modifications or compromised source code), the attacker can trigger these compiler vulnerabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution or other malicious outcomes on the build system.

Attack Tree Path: Local Environment Exploitation (Dependency Confusion - Local vs. vcpkg Managed)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations or vulnerabilities in the local development environment that lead to the application unintentionally linking against system libraries instead of the intended vcpkg-managed libraries. This can be used to introduce malicious system libraries.
  • High-Risk Path:
    • Local Environment Exploitation -> Dependency Confusion (Local vs. vcpkg Managed) -> Application accidentally linking against system libraries instead of vcpkg managed libraries due to misconfiguration or environment issues.
  • Specific Attack Scenarios:
    • Application accidentally linking against system libraries:
      • Misconfiguration or environment issues: Due to incorrect build system configuration, improperly set environment variables (like PATH or library search paths), or other environment-related problems, the application's build process might inadvertently pick up and link against libraries present in the system's default library paths instead of the libraries managed and provided by vcpkg. If an attacker has placed malicious libraries in these system paths (or compromised existing system libraries), the application will then be linked against and potentially execute this malicious code.

This detailed breakdown provides a clearer understanding of the high-risk attack vectors associated with using vcpkg and emphasizes the importance of focusing security efforts on these critical areas.