Attack Surface: 1. Injection Attacks (NoSQL & Server-Side JavaScript)
Description: Attackers manipulate application queries by injecting malicious code or commands into user-supplied data, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, or execution of arbitrary code.
* How MongoDB Contributes: MongoDB's flexible query language (especially with features like $where and server-side JavaScript) can be exploited if user input is not properly sanitized. The Go driver is the conduit for these queries.
* Example:
* NoSQL Injection: A user input field for searching is directly used in a bson.M filter: filter := bson.M{"name": userInput}. If userInput is {$ne: null}, the query returns all documents.
* Server-Side JavaScript Injection: User input in a $where clause: bson.M{"\$where": "this.name == '" + userInput + "'"} . If userInput is ' || true || ', the clause always evaluates to true.
* Impact:
* Data breach (unauthorized access).
* Data modification/deletion.
* Arbitrary code execution (server-side JavaScript).
* Denial of service.
* Risk Severity: Critical
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Parameterized Queries: Always use the Go driver's bson.D, bson.M, and builder methods. Never concatenate user input directly.
* Input Validation: Strictly validate and sanitize all user input. Use whitelisting.
* Avoid Server-Side JavaScript: Minimize or eliminate its use. If unavoidable, apply extremely rigorous input validation.
* Principle of Least Privilege: Database users should have minimal permissions.
Attack Surface: 2. Connection String Exposure/Injection
Description: Attackers gain access to or manipulate the connection string, allowing unauthorized database access or redirection to a malicious server. * How MongoDB Contributes: The connection string contains all information to connect to a MongoDB instance, including credentials. The Go driver uses this string. * Example: * Exposure: Hardcoded connection string in publicly accessible source code. * Injection: User input directly used to construct part of the connection string without validation. * Impact: * Unauthorized database access. * Data breach, modification, or deletion. * Connection to a malicious server. * Risk Severity: Critical * Mitigation Strategies: * Secure Storage: Never hardcode connection strings. Use environment variables, secure configuration files, or a secrets management service. * Secure Transmission: Use TLS/SSL for all connections. * Input Validation (if applicable): If any part of the connection string is influenced by user input, strictly validate it. Use the driver's connection option builders. * Principle of Least Privilege: Use database users with minimal permissions.
Attack Surface: 3. Unencrypted Connections (Missing TLS/SSL)
Description: Data transmitted between the application and MongoDB is unencrypted, vulnerable to eavesdropping.
* How MongoDB Contributes: MongoDB supports both encrypted and unencrypted connections. The Go driver's configuration determines which is used.
* Example: The connection string omits tls=true, and the server doesn't enforce TLS/SSL.
* Impact:
* Data breach (sensitive data intercepted).
* Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.
* Risk Severity: High
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Enforce TLS/SSL: Always use TLS/SSL. Configure the MongoDB server to require it.
* Connection String: Use tls=true (or equivalent).
* Certificate Verification: Configure the Go driver to verify the server's certificate.
* Strong Ciphers: Use strong, modern TLS/SSL ciphers and protocols (TLS 1.2 or 1.3).
Attack Surface: 4. Denial of Service (DoS)
Description: Attackers overwhelm the MongoDB server or the application's connection pool, preventing legitimate access.
* How MongoDB Contributes: MongoDB is susceptible to resource exhaustion. The Go driver's connection pooling and query execution are potential targets.
* Example:
* Connection Exhaustion: Repeatedly opening connections without closing them.
* Resource-Intensive Queries: Complex, unindexed queries consuming excessive resources.
* Impact:
* Application unavailability.
* Service disruption.
* Risk Severity: High
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Connection Pooling: Configure the Go driver's connection pool appropriately. Set maximum connection limits.
* Query Timeouts: Use $maxTimeMS and driver timeouts.
* Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the application side.
* Input Validation: Prevent excessively long/complex queries.
* Indexing: Optimize queries with indexes.
* Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resources and set alerts.
* MongoDB Server Configuration: Limit resource consumption (e.g., maxConns).
Attack Surface: 5. Data Exposure (Insufficient Field-Level Encryption)
Description: Sensitive data is stored unencrypted at rest, vulnerable if the database is compromised. * How MongoDB Contributes: MongoDB doesn't automatically encrypt data at rest (except MongoDB Enterprise with encryption at rest). The Go driver supports Client-Side Field Level Encryption (CSFLE). * Example: PII stored in plain text. * Impact: * Data breach. * Compliance violations. * Risk Severity: High * Mitigation Strategies: * Client-Side Field Level Encryption (CSFLE): Use the Go driver's CSFLE to encrypt sensitive fields before sending them to the server. * MongoDB Enterprise Encryption at Rest: If using Enterprise, enable encryption at rest. * Data Minimization: Store only essential data. * Tokenization: Replace sensitive data with tokens.