Attack Surface: Simulation Definition Language (SDL) and Model Input Files
Critical vulnerabilities arising from the parsing and processing of SDL files and model input files, which are core to defining Trick simulations. Maliciously crafted SDL can directly compromise the simulation environment.
Trick's fundamental architecture relies on SDL for simulation definition. Vulnerabilities in Trick's SDL parser or insecure handling of SDL loading directly expose this attack surface.
An attacker crafts a malicious SDL file containing embedded code within a seemingly benign simulation definition. When Trick parses this SDL, it triggers a buffer overflow in the SDL parser, leading to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the Trick simulation process.
Arbitrary code execution, complete system compromise, data breach, denial of service, loss of control over the simulation environment.
Critical
- SDL File Origin Control: Strictly control the source of SDL files. Only load SDL from trusted, verified, and internally managed repositories. Implement strong access controls to prevent unauthorized modification.
- Secure SDL Parsing Practices (Trick Development Team Responsibility): The Trick development team should ensure the SDL parser is rigorously tested for vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, format string bugs). Employ secure coding practices in SDL parser development.
- Input Validation and Sanitization (for Programmatic SDL Generation): If SDL is generated programmatically, rigorously validate and sanitize all inputs used in SDL generation to prevent injection of malicious SDL constructs.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Run the Trick simulation process with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of potential SDL parsing exploits.
Attack Surface: Input Parameter Injection via External Interfaces
High severity vulnerabilities stemming from insufficient validation and sanitization of input parameters provided to Trick simulations through external interfaces like command-line arguments or configuration files.
Trick's design allows for flexible configuration and control via external inputs. If Trick's core input handling mechanisms lack robust validation, they become susceptible to injection attacks.
An attacker exploits a command-line argument parsing vulnerability in Trick. By providing a specially crafted argument containing shell metacharacters, they can inject and execute arbitrary shell commands on the system when the Trick simulation is launched.
Arbitrary code execution, system compromise, denial of service, unauthorized modification of simulation behavior.
High
- Robust Input Validation and Sanitization (Trick Development Team & Users): Trick's input handling code (and user-developed input processing) must rigorously validate and sanitize all external inputs. Use whitelisting, input type checking, and escape special characters.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Run the Trick simulation process with minimal privileges to contain the damage from successful injection attacks.
- Secure Configuration Management: Store configuration files securely and restrict write access to authorized users only. Avoid storing sensitive information directly in configuration files if possible.
- Avoid Dynamic Command Execution (in Trick Core and User Code): Minimize or eliminate the use of dynamic command execution based on external inputs within Trick and any custom code interacting with Trick.
Attack Surface: Simulation Control Protocol (if enabled and exposed)
High severity vulnerabilities arising from unauthorized access and manipulation of a Trick simulation via its network-based control protocol, if enabled without strong security measures.
Trick offers optional features for remote control and monitoring through network protocols. Enabling these features without proper authentication, authorization, and encryption directly introduces a high-risk attack surface.
An attacker exploits a lack of authentication in Trick's control protocol. They connect to the exposed control port and send commands to remotely halt the simulation, modify critical simulation parameters in real-time, or extract sensitive simulation data being monitored by the protocol.
Unauthorized control of simulation execution, denial of service, data breach (exposure of simulation data), manipulation of simulation results leading to incorrect conclusions.
High
- Strong Authentication and Authorization: Implement robust authentication mechanisms for the control protocol (e.g., strong passwords, API keys, certificate-based authentication). Enforce authorization to restrict control actions based on authenticated user roles.
- Encryption (TLS/SSL): Mandatory encryption of all communication channels for the control protocol using TLS/SSL to protect sensitive data transmitted over the network.
- Network Segmentation and Access Control: Isolate the simulation environment and control protocol network from public networks. Use firewalls to restrict access to the control protocol port to only authorized IP addresses or networks.
- Disable Unnecessary Features: If remote control is not a required feature, disable the simulation control protocol entirely to eliminate this significant attack surface.
Attack Surface: Custom Code Integration and Simulation Models
High to Critical vulnerabilities introduced by the integration of custom C/C++ code for simulation models within Trick. While the vulnerabilities are in user-provided code, Trick's architecture facilitates this integration, making it a relevant attack surface.
Trick's extensibility and modular design encourage the development and integration of custom simulation models. If developers introduce vulnerabilities in their custom code, this becomes a direct attack surface for applications using Trick.
A developer creates a custom simulation model in C++ that contains a classic buffer overflow vulnerability when processing certain simulation inputs. An attacker crafts specific input data that triggers this buffer overflow within the custom model, allowing them to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Trick simulation process.
Arbitrary code execution, system compromise, manipulation of simulation results, denial of service, data corruption within the simulation.
High to Critical (depending on the nature and exploitability of vulnerabilities in custom code)
- Mandatory Secure Coding Practices for Custom Models: Developers of custom simulation models must adhere to rigorous secure coding practices (e.g., input validation, buffer overflow prevention, secure memory management, least privilege).
- Thorough Code Reviews and Security Audits: Conduct mandatory and in-depth code reviews and security audits of all custom simulation models before integration into Trick simulations.
- Static and Dynamic Analysis Tools: Utilize static and dynamic analysis tools to automatically detect potential vulnerabilities in custom code. Integrate these tools into the development and testing workflow.
- Sandboxing/Isolation (Advanced): For highly sensitive simulations, consider running custom simulation models in sandboxed or isolated environments to limit the potential impact of exploits within custom code on the overall system.