Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
98 lines (67 loc) · 8.62 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

98 lines (67 loc) · 8.62 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for nasa/trick

Objective: To gain unauthorized control over the application and/or the simulation environment by exploiting vulnerabilities within Trick, leading to data manipulation, denial of service, or unauthorized access to sensitive information related to the simulation or the application.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • [CRITICAL NODE] 1. Exploit Trick Vulnerabilities Directly

    • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1 Input Validation Flaws in Trick
      • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.1 Malicious S_params Input
        • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.1.1 Buffer Overflow in S_params Parsing
          • Action: Execute arbitrary code on Trick server
          • Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.2 Malicious DR_params Input
        • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.2.1 Buffer Overflow in DR_params Parsing
          • Action: Execute arbitrary code on Trick server
          • Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.4.1 Code Injection via Malicious Model
        • Action: Execute arbitrary code within Trick simulation context
        • Likelihood: Medium-High, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium-High
    • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.2 Memory Safety Vulnerabilities in Trick Core
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.1 Buffer Overflows in Simulation Engine
        • Action: Execute arbitrary code, DoS
        • Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium-High, Skill Level: Medium-High, Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.2 Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities
        • Action: Execute arbitrary code, DoS
        • Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium-High, Skill Level: Medium-High, Detection Difficulty: Medium-High
    • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.6 Vulnerabilities in Trick's Dependencies
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.6.1 Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries used by Trick
        • Action: Depends on the vulnerability in the dependency (code execution, DoS, etc.)
        • Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low-Medium, Skill Level: Low-Medium, Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium

  • [CRITICAL NODE] 2. Exploit Application's Interaction with Trick

    • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1 Insecure API Usage of Trick by Application
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.1.1 Improper Input Sanitization before Passing to Trick API
        • Action: Trigger Trick vulnerabilities (e.g., input validation flaws in Trick)
        • Likelihood: Medium-High, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.3 Injection Attacks via Application Input to Trick
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.3.1 Application Accepts User Input and Passes it Directly to Trick (e.g., S_params)
        • Action: Trigger Trick input validation vulnerabilities via application input
        • Likelihood: Medium-High, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Trick Vulnerabilities Directly (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: This path encompasses directly targeting vulnerabilities within the Trick simulation environment itself. This is a high-risk area because successful exploitation here can grant the attacker significant control over the simulation and potentially the application relying on it.

Focus Areas: Input validation flaws, memory safety issues, and vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies are the primary concerns within this path.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Input Validation Flaws in Trick (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: Trick relies on parsing various input parameters (like S_params and DR_params) and potentially external data files. Insufficient validation of these inputs can lead to vulnerabilities.

Specific Examples:

  • 1.1.1 Malicious S_params Input (Critical Node & High-Risk Path): Exploiting vulnerabilities in how Trick parses and processes S_params.
    • 1.1.1.1 Buffer Overflow in S_params Parsing (High-Risk Path): Sending overly long or crafted S_params to overflow buffers in Trick's parsing code, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution on the Trick server.
  • 1.1.2 Malicious DR_params Input (Critical Node & High-Risk Path): Exploiting vulnerabilities in how Trick parses and processes DR_params.
    • 1.1.2.1 Buffer Overflow in DR_params Parsing (High-Risk Path): Similar to S_params, crafting malicious DR_params to cause buffer overflows and achieve code execution.
  • 1.1.4.1 Code Injection via Malicious Model (High-Risk Path): If Trick allows users to provide custom simulation models, a malicious model could be injected to execute arbitrary code within the Trick simulation environment. This is especially risky if model loading is not properly sandboxed.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Memory Safety Vulnerabilities in Trick Core (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: Trick is written in C/C++, languages known for memory management complexities. Memory safety vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, use-after-free, and double-free errors can be exploited.

Specific Examples:

  • 1.2.1 Buffer Overflows in Simulation Engine (High-Risk Path): Exploiting buffer overflows within the core simulation engine code of Trick. This could be triggered by specific simulation parameters or conditions, leading to code execution or denial of service.
  • 1.2.2 Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path): Exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities, where memory is accessed after it has been freed. This can lead to memory corruption and potentially code execution.

Attack Tree Path: 1.6 Vulnerabilities in Trick's Dependencies (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: Trick relies on external libraries and dependencies. Known vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited to compromise Trick.

Specific Examples:

  • 1.6.1 Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries used by Trick (High-Risk Path): Attackers can scan Trick's dependencies for publicly known vulnerabilities (e.g., using vulnerability databases or scanners). If vulnerable libraries are found, readily available exploits can be used to compromise Trick.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application's Interaction with Trick (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: This path focuses on vulnerabilities arising from how the application uses Trick, rather than vulnerabilities within Trick itself. Insecure integration can create attack vectors.

Focus Areas: Improper handling of user input before passing it to Trick's API and injection vulnerabilities through application inputs are key concerns.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Insecure API Usage of Trick by Application (Critical Node & High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: The application interacts with Trick through an API. If the application doesn't use this API securely, it can indirectly expose Trick to vulnerabilities.

Specific Examples:

  • 2.1.1 Improper Input Sanitization before Passing to Trick API (High-Risk Path): If the application takes user input and directly passes it to the Trick API without proper sanitization or validation, it can inadvertently trigger input validation vulnerabilities within Trick (like those described in 1.1).

Attack Tree Path: 2.3 Injection Attacks via Application Input to Trick (High-Risk Path)

Attack Vectors: If the application directly exposes Trick's input parameters (like S_params) to users, it creates a direct injection point.

Specific Examples:

  • 2.3.1 Application Accepts User Input and Passes it Directly to Trick (e.g., S_params) (High-Risk Path): If the application allows users to directly modify or provide S_params (or other Trick input parameters) and then passes these directly to Trick, attackers can inject malicious inputs designed to exploit Trick's input validation flaws (as described in 1.1).