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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for nasa/trick

Attack Surface: 1. Malicious Input Files

  • Description: Attackers craft malicious input files (S_define, simulation input files) to exploit parsing vulnerabilities within Trick's core parsing logic.
    • How Trick Contributes: Trick's fundamental operation requires parsing these files to define and execute the simulation. The complexity of this parsing process, often involving custom formats and logic, is a primary source of vulnerabilities.
    • Example: An attacker provides an input file with a deliberately malformed string that overflows a buffer in Trick's parser, leading to arbitrary code execution. Another example: a crafted input file could inject commands if Trick uses the input data to construct system calls without proper sanitization.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, denial-of-service, data corruption, complete system compromise (due to Trick's potential for privileged operations).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Implement extremely robust input validation and sanitization immediately upon parsing. Use a secure parser (potentially a parser generator like ANTLR) with a strong security history. Fuzz test the parsers extensively with a wide range of malformed and boundary-case inputs. Enforce strict length limits and data type checks for all input fields. Avoid using input file data directly in system calls or other sensitive operations; always sanitize and escape it first.
      • Users: Never use untrusted input files. If external input files are unavoidable, perform manual inspection (though this is not a reliable defense). Keep Trick updated.

Attack Surface: 2. Vulnerable User-Provided Code

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in custom C++ code (user models, Variable Server extensions) that is integrated directly into the Trick simulation environment.
    • How Trick Contributes: Trick explicitly allows users to extend its functionality with custom code, which executes within the Trick process and has significant privileges, including access to simulation data and potentially Trick's internal functions.
    • Example: A user-written model contains a buffer overflow in a function that processes data received from the Variable Server. An attacker sends crafted data to the Variable Server, triggering the overflow and gaining control of the Trick process. Another example: a use-after-free vulnerability in a user model allows an attacker to corrupt Trick's memory and potentially execute arbitrary code within the Trick context.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution (within the Trick process), denial-of-service, data corruption, privilege escalation (potentially affecting the entire simulation).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Enforce mandatory code review and static analysis (using tools like Clang Static Analyzer, Coverity) for all user-provided code. Provide a highly restricted and secure API for user code, minimizing access to sensitive Trick functions and data. Strongly consider sandboxing or containerization of user code (this is the most effective, but also the most technically challenging, mitigation). Provide comprehensive documentation and examples of secure coding practices specifically for Trick extensions.
      • Users: Adhere strictly to secure coding practices when developing user models. Avoid unsafe C/C++ functions. Use memory safety tools (AddressSanitizer, Valgrind) during development and testing. Thoroughly test user code with a wide range of inputs, including invalid and edge-case data.

Attack Surface: 3. Insecure Variable Server Communication

  • Description: Attackers intercept, modify, or inject data transmitted through Trick's Variable Server, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of simulation data.
    • How Trick Contributes: The Variable Server is a core component of Trick, acting as a central communication hub for data exchange between different parts of the simulation. Its security is directly tied to the security of the entire simulation.
    • Example: If the Variable Server uses unencrypted communication, an attacker could eavesdrop on sensitive simulation data. If input validation is insufficient, an attacker could send malformed messages to the Variable Server, causing a denial-of-service or triggering vulnerabilities in components that receive the corrupted data.
    • Impact: Data leakage, data modification, denial-of-service, potentially arbitrary code execution (if vulnerabilities are triggered in receiving components due to the compromised Variable Server data).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Mandate the use of secure communication mechanisms for the Variable Server. If sockets are used, always employ TLS with strong ciphers and proper certificate validation. If shared memory is used, ensure strict access controls are enforced. Implement robust input validation and sanitization at both the sending and receiving ends of all Variable Server communication. Implement rate limiting to prevent denial-of-service attacks targeting the Variable Server.
      • Users: Configure Trick to use the most secure communication options available. Avoid running Trick simulations on untrusted networks without additional security measures (e.g., a VPN).

Attack Surface: 4. Unsecured Distributed Simulation Communication

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the network communication between distributed Trick instances, compromising the entire distributed simulation.
    • How Trick Contributes: Trick's support for distributed simulations inherently introduces a network-based attack surface. The security of this communication is critical for the integrity and confidentiality of the distributed simulation.
    • Example: An attacker intercepts communication between Trick instances, modifying data to alter simulation results or cause crashes. A replay attack could resend old messages, disrupting the simulation's state.
    • Impact: Data leakage, data modification, denial-of-service, complete disruption of the distributed simulation's integrity.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Require the use of TLS with strong authentication (mutual TLS is highly recommended) for all communication between distributed Trick instances. Implement message integrity checks (HMACs or digital signatures) to detect any tampering with transmitted data. Use a well-vetted and secure communication library.
      • Users: Run distributed simulations only on secure networks (e.g., VPNs or physically isolated networks). Configure Trick to use the strongest available security settings for network communication.

Attack Surface: 5. Vulnerabilities in Trick's Core (Scheduler, Memory Management)

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities within Trick's fundamental core components, such as the scheduler or memory management routines, leading to system-level compromise.
    • How Trick Contributes: These components are essential for Trick's operation, and vulnerabilities here have a direct and significant impact on the entire system.
    • Example: A vulnerability in Trick's memory allocator allows an attacker to cause a heap overflow, leading to arbitrary code execution within the Trick process. A flaw in the scheduler allows manipulation of job execution, creating exploitable race conditions.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution (within the Trick process and potentially the host system), denial-of-service, data corruption, complete system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Conduct rigorous code reviews and extensive testing (including fuzzing) of all core components. Utilize modern C++ memory management best practices (e.g., smart pointers, RAII). Employ memory safety tools (AddressSanitizer, Valgrind) throughout the development and testing lifecycle. Adhere to the principle of least privilege, minimizing the privileges of core components. Regularly audit the codebase for security vulnerabilities.
      • Users: Keep Trick updated to the latest version to receive security patches.