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Attack Tree Analysis for ocornut/imgui

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code on Client Machine via ImGui Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code on Client Machine via ImGui Vulnerabilities ├── 1. Input Validation & Sanitization Failures [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1. Buffer Overflows │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Text Input Fields (ImGui::InputText, ImGui::InputTextMultiline) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1. Exploit: Craft overly long string exceeding buffer size, overwriting adjacent memory. [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Other Input Widgets (e.g., custom widgets built on ImGui primitives) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.1. Exploit: Similar to 1.1.1, but targeting custom-implemented input handling. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.3. Drag and Drop (if implemented using ImGui) │ │ └── 1.1.3.1. Exploit: Drop malicious data that triggers a buffer overflow during processing. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2. Format String Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.1. ImGui::Text, ImGui::TextColored, ImGui::TextWrapped, ImGui::TextUnformatted (if user-controlled format strings are used) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.1. Exploit: Inject format string specifiers (%x, %n, etc.) into user-provided input that is then passed to these functions. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.2.2. Custom Widgets using sprintf-like functions [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.2.2.1. Exploit: Similar to 1.2.1, but within custom widget code. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.3. Integer Overflows/Underflows │ │ ├── 1.3.1. ImGui::SliderInt, ImGui::DragInt (if used for calculations leading to memory allocation or indexing) │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.1. Exploit: Manipulate slider/drag values to cause integer overflow/underflow, leading to incorrect memory access. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.3.2 Custom widgets using integer arithmetic. │ │ └── 1.3.2.1 Exploit: Similar to 1.3.1, but within custom widget code. [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Vulnerabilities in ImGui's Internal Implementation │ ├── 2.1. Bugs in ImGui Core │ │ └── 2.1.1. Exploit: Trigger a bug in ImGui's core rendering or input handling code (e.g., a memory corruption bug). [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.2. Vulnerabilities in Backends (e.g., DirectX, OpenGL, Vulkan) │ │ └── 2.2.1. Exploit: Exploit a vulnerability in the graphics backend used by ImGui, potentially through crafted ImGui draw commands. [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.3. Third-Party Integrations/Extensions │ └── 2.3.1. Exploit: Exploit a vulnerability in a third-party library or extension used with ImGui. [CRITICAL]

This is the most critical area to address, as it presents the most readily exploitable vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Buffer Overflows

Attack Vector: The attacker provides an input string that is longer than the buffer allocated by ImGui::InputText or ImGui::InputTextMultiline. This overwrites adjacent memory, potentially allowing the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. Example: If ImGui::InputText("Name", buffer, 32) is used, and the attacker provides a string longer than 31 characters (plus the null terminator), a buffer overflow occurs. Mitigation: * Always use the size parameter of ImGui::InputText and ImGui::InputTextMultiline to specify the maximum buffer size. * Perform additional length checks before passing data to ImGui, especially if the input comes from an untrusted source. * Use safer string handling techniques (e.g., std::string in C++) to avoid manual buffer management.

Attack Vector: The attacker provides an input string that is longer than the buffer allocated by ImGui::InputText or ImGui::InputTextMultiline. This overwrites adjacent memory, potentially allowing the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. Example: If ImGui::InputText("Name", buffer, 32) is used, and the attacker provides a string longer than 31 characters (plus the null terminator), a buffer overflow occurs. Mitigation: * Always use the size parameter of ImGui::InputText and ImGui::InputTextMultiline to specify the maximum buffer size. * Perform additional length checks before passing data to ImGui, especially if the input comes from an untrusted source. * Use safer string handling techniques (e.g., std::string in C++) to avoid manual buffer management.

Attack Vector: The attacker provides an input string that is longer than the buffer allocated by ImGui::InputText or ImGui::InputTextMultiline. This overwrites adjacent memory, potentially allowing the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. Example: If ImGui::InputText("Name", buffer, 32) is used, and the attacker provides a string longer than 31 characters (plus the null terminator), a buffer overflow occurs. Mitigation: * Always use the size parameter of ImGui::InputText and ImGui::InputTextMultiline to specify the maximum buffer size. * Perform additional length checks before passing data to ImGui, especially if the input comes from an untrusted source. * Use safer string handling techniques (e.g., std::string in C++) to avoid manual buffer management.

Attack Vector: Similar to text input fields, custom widgets that handle user input may have buffer overflow vulnerabilities if they don't properly validate input lengths. Mitigation: * Thoroughly validate all inputs in custom widgets, regardless of how they are presented to the user. * Use safe string handling and memory management practices.

Attack Vector: Similar to text input fields, custom widgets that handle user input may have buffer overflow vulnerabilities if they don't properly validate input lengths. Mitigation: * Thoroughly validate all inputs in custom widgets, regardless of how they are presented to the user. * Use safe string handling and memory management practices.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Drag and Drop

Attack Vector: If drag-and-drop functionality is implemented using ImGui, an attacker could drop a malicious file or data that, when processed, triggers a buffer overflow. Mitigation: * Validate the size and type of dropped data before processing it. Do not assume the dropped data is safe.

Attack Vector: If drag-and-drop functionality is implemented using ImGui, an attacker could drop a malicious file or data that, when processed, triggers a buffer overflow. Mitigation: * Validate the size and type of dropped data before processing it. Do not assume the dropped data is safe.

Attack Vector: The attacker injects format string specifiers (like %x, %n, %s) into user-provided input that is then passed to functions like ImGui::Text, ImGui::TextColored, ImGui::TextWrapped, or ImGui::TextUnformatted. This can allow the attacker to read from or write to arbitrary memory locations, leading to information disclosure or code execution. Example: If ImGui::Text(userInput.c_str()) is used, and userInput contains %x, the attacker can read values from the stack. Mitigation: * Never allow user input to directly control the format string. * Use ImGui::TextUnformatted if you don't need formatting. * If you need formatting, construct the format string safely and sanitize user input before inserting it into the format string. For example: ImGui::Text("User input: %s", Sanitize(userInput).c_str()); where Sanitize removes or escapes any format string specifiers.

Attack Vector: The attacker injects format string specifiers (like %x, %n, %s) into user-provided input that is then passed to functions like ImGui::Text, ImGui::TextColored, ImGui::TextWrapped, or ImGui::TextUnformatted. This can allow the attacker to read from or write to arbitrary memory locations, leading to information disclosure or code execution. Example: If ImGui::Text(userInput.c_str()) is used, and userInput contains %x, the attacker can read values from the stack. Mitigation: * Never allow user input to directly control the format string. * Use ImGui::TextUnformatted if you don't need formatting. * If you need formatting, construct the format string safely and sanitize user input before inserting it into the format string. For example: ImGui::Text("User input: %s", Sanitize(userInput).c_str()); where Sanitize removes or escapes any format string specifiers.

Attack Vector: The attacker injects format string specifiers (like %x, %n, %s) into user-provided input that is then passed to functions like ImGui::Text, ImGui::TextColored, ImGui::TextWrapped, or ImGui::TextUnformatted. This can allow the attacker to read from or write to arbitrary memory locations, leading to information disclosure or code execution. Example: If ImGui::Text(userInput.c_str()) is used, and userInput contains %x, the attacker can read values from the stack. Mitigation: * Never allow user input to directly control the format string. * Use ImGui::TextUnformatted if you don't need formatting. * If you need formatting, construct the format string safely and sanitize user input before inserting it into the format string. For example: ImGui::Text("User input: %s", Sanitize(userInput).c_str()); where Sanitize removes or escapes any format string specifiers.

Attack Vector: Similar to the above, but the vulnerability exists within the custom widget's code, using functions like sprintf, snprintf, etc., with user-controlled format strings. Mitigation: * Avoid using sprintf-like functions with user-controlled format strings. * Use safer alternatives, such as string streams or carefully constructed format strings with proper sanitization.

Attack Vector: Similar to the above, but the vulnerability exists within the custom widget's code, using functions like sprintf, snprintf, etc., with user-controlled format strings. Mitigation: * Avoid using sprintf-like functions with user-controlled format strings. * Use safer alternatives, such as string streams or carefully constructed format strings with proper sanitization.

Attack Vector: The attacker manipulates the values of ImGui::SliderInt or ImGui::DragInt to cause integer overflows or underflows in calculations that are subsequently used for memory allocation or array indexing. This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. Example: If a slider controls the size of an array, and the attacker sets the slider to a very large value, an integer overflow might occur when calculating the array size, leading to a smaller-than-expected allocation and a subsequent buffer overflow. Mitigation: * Validate the results of all calculations involving slider/drag values before using them for memory operations. * Use checked arithmetic (e.g., libraries that detect integer overflows) if available.

Attack Vector: The attacker manipulates the values of ImGui::SliderInt or ImGui::DragInt to cause integer overflows or underflows in calculations that are subsequently used for memory allocation or array indexing. This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. Example: If a slider controls the size of an array, and the attacker sets the slider to a very large value, an integer overflow might occur when calculating the array size, leading to a smaller-than-expected allocation and a subsequent buffer overflow. Mitigation: * Validate the results of all calculations involving slider/drag values before using them for memory operations. * Use checked arithmetic (e.g., libraries that detect integer overflows) if available.

Attack Vector: The attacker manipulates the values of ImGui::SliderInt or ImGui::DragInt to cause integer overflows or underflows in calculations that are subsequently used for memory allocation or array indexing. This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. Example: If a slider controls the size of an array, and the attacker sets the slider to a very large value, an integer overflow might occur when calculating the array size, leading to a smaller-than-expected allocation and a subsequent buffer overflow. Mitigation: * Validate the results of all calculations involving slider/drag values before using them for memory operations. * Use checked arithmetic (e.g., libraries that detect integer overflows) if available.

Attack Vector: Similar to the above, but the vulnerability is within the custom widget's code. Mitigation: * Use checked arithmetic or carefully validate integer ranges before using them in calculations that affect memory allocation or access.

Attack Vector: Similar to the above, but the vulnerability is within the custom widget's code. Mitigation: * Use checked arithmetic or carefully validate integer ranges before using them in calculations that affect memory allocation or access.

These are harder to exploit but can have a high impact.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Bugs in ImGui Core

Attack Vector: A bug in ImGui's core rendering or input handling code (e.g., a memory corruption bug) is triggered by specific user interactions or crafted data. This is a "zero-day" vulnerability if it's not publicly known. Mitigation: * Keep ImGui up-to-date. This is the most important mitigation. * Monitor for security advisories and CVEs related to ImGui. * Consider fuzz testing ImGui itself to potentially discover new vulnerabilities.

Attack Vector: A bug in ImGui's core rendering or input handling code (e.g., a memory corruption bug) is triggered by specific user interactions or crafted data. This is a "zero-day" vulnerability if it's not publicly known. Mitigation: * Keep ImGui up-to-date. This is the most important mitigation. * Monitor for security advisories and CVEs related to ImGui. * Consider fuzz testing ImGui itself to potentially discover new vulnerabilities.

Attack Vector: A vulnerability in the graphics backend (DirectX, OpenGL, Vulkan) used by ImGui is exploited, potentially through specially crafted ImGui draw commands. Mitigation: * Keep graphics drivers and backend libraries up-to-date.

Attack Vector: A vulnerability in the graphics backend (DirectX, OpenGL, Vulkan) used by ImGui is exploited, potentially through specially crafted ImGui draw commands. Mitigation: * Keep graphics drivers and backend libraries up-to-date.

Attack Vector: A vulnerability in a third-party library or extension used with ImGui is exploited. Mitigation: * Carefully vet any third-party code used with ImGui. * Keep third-party libraries up-to-date.

Attack Vector: A vulnerability in a third-party library or extension used with ImGui is exploited. Mitigation: * Carefully vet any third-party code used with ImGui. * Keep third-party libraries up-to-date.