Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
48 lines (41 loc) · 4.16 KB

File metadata and controls

48 lines (41 loc) · 4.16 KB

Threat Model Analysis for open-source-parsers/jsoncpp

Description: An attacker sends a maliciously crafted JSON payload with excessively large strings or deeply nested structures. JsonCpp's parser, when processing this input, attempts to write beyond the allocated buffer, potentially overwriting adjacent memory regions. This could be triggered by manipulating string lengths in the JSON or by creating deeply nested objects/arrays that exhaust stack or heap space during parsing. Impact: * Denial of Service (application crash due to memory corruption) * Memory corruption leading to unpredictable application behavior * In severe cases, potential for arbitrary code execution if the overflow overwrites critical program data or code pointers. JsonCpp Component Affected: * Parser (specifically string parsing and object/array construction logic within the parser module) * Memory allocation routines used by the parser. Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on exploitability for code execution) Mitigation Strategies: * Keep JsonCpp updated to the latest version. * Implement input size limits on JSON payloads before parsing. * Utilize compiler-level memory safety tools (ASan, MSan) during development and testing. * Consider using JsonCpp's streaming parsing API if applicable to limit memory usage for large documents.

Description: An attacker sends extremely large JSON payloads (gigabytes in size) or payloads with deeply nested structures (thousands of levels deep). Parsing these payloads consumes excessive CPU and memory resources, potentially exhausting server resources and making the application unresponsive to legitimate users. The attacker aims to overload the parsing process itself. Impact: * Denial of Service (application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to resource exhaustion) * Resource exhaustion on the server infrastructure. JsonCpp Component Affected: * Parser (core parsing logic, resource consumption during parsing) * Memory management within JsonCpp during parsing. Risk Severity: Medium to High (depending on application's resource limits and resilience - considered High in scenarios where DoS is a critical concern) Mitigation Strategies: * Implement strict input size limits on JSON payloads. * Set timeouts for JSON parsing operations to prevent indefinite resource consumption. * Implement resource monitoring and request throttling/rate limiting to protect against resource exhaustion attacks. * Consider using JsonCpp's streaming parsing API for very large documents to reduce memory footprint (though CPU exhaustion might still be a concern for complex structures).

Description: An attacker exploits known security vulnerabilities present in older, unpatched versions of JsonCpp. These vulnerabilities could range from buffer overflows to other memory corruption issues or logic flaws that allow for various attacks. Attackers rely on applications using outdated versions of the library. Impact: * Depends on the specific vulnerability. Could range from Denial of Service to Remote Code Execution, Information Disclosure, or other security breaches. JsonCpp Component Affected: * Varies depending on the specific vulnerability. Could affect any part of the JsonCpp library. Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical, High, Medium, or Low depending on the specific vulnerability - considered High to Critical for known exploitable vulnerabilities) Mitigation Strategies: * Regularly update JsonCpp to the latest stable version. This is the most critical mitigation. * Implement vulnerability scanning as part of the development and deployment process to detect outdated dependencies. * Subscribe to security advisories and monitor JsonCpp project releases for security announcements.