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Attack Tree Analysis for open-source-parsers/jsoncpp

Objective: RCE or DoS via jsoncpp

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: RCE or DoS via jsoncpp | └── Exploit Parsing Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] | ├── 1. Stack Exhaustion [HIGH RISK] | | | └── 1a. Deeply Nested Arrays [CRITICAL] | └── 5. Logic Errors in Value Handling | └── 5a. Type Confusion [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Parsing Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

This is the overall high-risk category, focusing on vulnerabilities that occur during the parsing of the JSON data. The core issue is that jsoncpp, like any complex parser, might have undiscovered bugs in its handling of malformed or maliciously crafted input.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Stack Exhaustion [HIGH RISK]

Description: This attack leverages the way recursive descent parsers (which jsoncpp likely uses, at least in part) handle nested structures. By creating a JSON document with extremely deep nesting (e.g., [[[[[[[[...]]]]]]]]]), the attacker can force the parser to consume a large amount of stack space. If the nesting is deep enough, it can exceed the allocated stack size, leading to a stack overflow.

Attack Tree Path: 1a. Deeply Nested Arrays [CRITICAL]

Description: Specifically crafting JSON with a very large number of nested arrays (or objects, as they are handled similarly). The depth required to trigger the overflow depends on the system's stack size and how jsoncpp is compiled/configured.

  • Likelihood: Medium. Applications often don't anticipate or properly validate the depth of JSON nesting.
  • Impact: High (DoS) to Critical (RCE). Guaranteed DoS via application crash. RCE is possible if the attacker can control the stack contents sufficiently to overwrite a return address or function pointer, but this is significantly more difficult.
  • Effort: Low (for DoS). Generating deeply nested JSON is programmatically trivial. Achieving RCE is much harder.
  • Skill Level: Beginner (for DoS), Expert (for RCE).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium. The crash is obvious, but attributing it to malicious JSON requires investigation. IDS might flag excessive nesting, but it's not a reliable indicator.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Logic Errors in Value Handling

Attack Tree Path: 5a. Type Confusion [HIGH RISK]

Description: This attack relies on the application misusing the parsed JSON data. jsoncpp provides methods to check the type of a value (e.g., isString(), isInt()), but if the application assumes a type without checking, it can lead to vulnerabilities. For example, if the application expects a string but receives an integer, and then tries to use that integer as a pointer, it could lead to a crash or arbitrary memory access.

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium. It is dependent on application logic.
  • Impact: Medium to High. Can lead to data leaks, logic errors, and potentially RCE.
  • Effort: Low to Medium. Crafting JSON with unexpected types is easy.
  • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard. Depends on the application logic.