attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for oracle/node-oracledb

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to data or functionality by exploiting node-oracledb vulnerabilities, focusing on high-risk areas.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via node-oracledb [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND] Exploit Vulnerabilities in node-oracledb or its Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] Exploit node-oracledb Specific Vulnerabilities │ │ ├───[AND] Code Injection Vulnerabilities in node-oracledb [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[OR] SQL Injection via node-oracledb API flaws [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ │ ├───[AND] Parameter Manipulation leading to Unsafe Query Construction [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ │ ├───[Action] Inject malicious SQL through input parameters (e.g., bind variables, query strings) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Execute arbitrary SQL queries, bypass authentication, data exfiltration, data manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND] Denial of Service (DoS) via node-oracledb [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[OR] Resource Exhaustion through Connection Leaks [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ ├───[Action] Send a large number of requests that open database connections but don't close them properly [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Exhaust database connection pool or server resources, leading to application unavailability. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[OR] CPU or Memory Exhaustion via Malicious Queries [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ ├───[Action] Send crafted queries that consume excessive CPU or memory on the database server (e.g., Cartesian products, large sorts, recursive queries if applicable) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Overload the database server, leading to slow performance or denial of service for all applications using the database. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] Exploit Vulnerabilities in Oracle Client Libraries (Dependency of node-oracledb) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND] Vulnerabilities in Oracle Client Libraries (OCI, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[Action] If vulnerable version is found, attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, remote code execution) targeting the Oracle Client Libraries through node-oracledb interactions [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Arbitrary code execution on the server, data exfiltration, denial of service, depending on the specific vulnerability. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR] Insecure Configuration or Usage of node-oracledb in Application [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND] Insecure Connection String Management [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR] Hardcoded Credentials in Application Code [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[Action] Analyze application code and configuration files for hardcoded database credentials (username, password) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Direct access to the database with compromised credentials. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR] Credentials Stored in Plain Text Configuration Files [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[Action] Check configuration files (e.g., .env, config.json, etc.) for database connection strings and credentials stored in plain text [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Exposure of credentials if configuration files are accessible (e.g., via misconfigured web server, directory traversal, or source code repository exposure). [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND] Excessive Database Privileges Granted to Application User [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[Outcome] If application is compromised (via SQL injection or other means), attacker can leverage excessive privileges to perform broader damage (e.g., access sensitive data beyond application scope, modify database schema, escalate privileges). [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND] Insecure Logging Practices │ │ ├───[OR] Logging Sensitive Data (e.g., SQL queries with sensitive data, connection strings, user credentials) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[Action] Analyze application logs for sensitive information being logged by node-oracledb or application code interacting with it [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Outcome] Exposure of sensitive data in logs, potentially accessible to unauthorized users if logs are not properly secured. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Code Injection Vulnerabilities -> SQL Injection via node-oracledb API flaws

• Attack Vectors:
  • Parameter Manipulation leading to Unsafe Query Construction:
    • Attacker identifies API endpoints that use node-oracledb to interact with the database.
    • Attacker analyzes application code to find instances of dynamic SQL query construction where user-controlled input is directly embedded into SQL queries without proper sanitization or parameterization.
    • Attacker crafts malicious input (e.g., through web forms, API requests, query parameters) containing SQL injection payloads.
    • These payloads are injected into the dynamically constructed SQL queries executed by node-oracledb.
  • Outcome: Execute Arbitrary SQL Queries:
    • Successful SQL injection allows the attacker to bypass intended application logic and directly interact with the database.
    • Attackers can perform actions such as:
      • Data Exfiltration: Stealing sensitive data from database tables.
      • Data Manipulation: Modifying or deleting data in the database.
      • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing application authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access.
      • Privilege Escalation: Potentially gaining higher database privileges if the application user has excessive permissions.
      • Denial of Service: Crafting queries that overload the database server.

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) via node-oracledb

• Attack Vectors:
  • Resource Exhaustion through Connection Leaks:
    • Attacker analyzes application code to understand how node-oracledb connections are managed.
    • Attacker identifies scenarios where connections might not be properly closed or released (e.g., in error handling paths, asynchronous operations, or due to application logic flaws).
    • Attacker sends a large volume of requests to the application that trigger the connection opening logic but intentionally avoid the connection closing logic.
    • This leads to a rapid consumption of database connection pool resources.
    • Eventually, the database server or application server runs out of available connections.
  • CPU or Memory Exhaustion via Malicious Queries:
    • Attacker identifies API endpoints that allow the application to execute database queries, especially those that might involve complex operations or user-controlled query parameters.
    • Attacker crafts and sends malicious SQL queries designed to consume excessive database server resources (CPU, memory, I/O). Examples include:
      • Cartesian Product Queries: Queries that join large tables without proper filtering, resulting in massive result sets.
      • Large Sort Operations: Queries that require sorting extremely large datasets.
      • Recursive Queries (if applicable): Queries that can run indefinitely or consume excessive resources if not properly controlled.
    • Execution of these malicious queries overloads the database server, causing slow performance or complete denial of service for the application and potentially other applications sharing the same database.
  • Outcome: Application Unavailability / Database Overload:
    • DoS attacks can render the application unusable for legitimate users.
    • In severe cases, they can crash the database server or impact other applications relying on the same database infrastructure.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Oracle Client Libraries (Dependency of node-oracledb)

• Attack Vectors:
  • Vulnerabilities in Oracle Client Libraries (OCI, etc.):
    • Attacker identifies the specific version of Oracle Client Libraries used by the node-oracledb application (often through server fingerprinting, error messages, or by analyzing application dependencies).
    • Attacker researches known vulnerabilities (CVEs) associated with the identified Oracle Client Libraries version using public vulnerability databases and Oracle Security Alerts (Critical Patch Updates - CPUs).
    • If vulnerable versions are found, attacker attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Common vulnerability types in native libraries include:
      • Buffer Overflows: Exploiting memory corruption flaws to overwrite memory and potentially gain control of program execution.
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Exploiting vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code on the server.
      • Denial of Service: Triggering crashes or resource exhaustion in the Oracle Client Libraries.
    • Exploitation is often achieved by sending specially crafted data or requests through node-oracledb that are processed by the vulnerable Oracle Client Libraries.
  • Outcome: Arbitrary Code Execution / Data Exfiltration / Denial of Service:
    • Successful exploitation of Oracle Client Library vulnerabilities can have severe consequences:
      • Arbitrary Code Execution: Attacker gains complete control of the server, allowing them to install malware, steal data, or perform any other malicious action.
      • Data Exfiltration: Attacker can directly access and steal sensitive data from the database or the server's file system.
      • Denial of Service: Attacker can crash the application or the database server.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Configuration or Usage of node-oracledb in Application -> Insecure Connection String Management (Hardcoded/Plain Text Credentials)

• Attack Vectors:
  • Hardcoded Credentials in Application Code:
    • Attacker analyzes application source code (if accessible through source code repositories, misconfigured web servers, or decompilation).
    • Attacker searches for hardcoded database credentials (usernames, passwords) directly embedded within the code (e.g., in connection strings, configuration variables, or database connection functions).
  • Credentials Stored in Plain Text Configuration Files:
    • Attacker attempts to access application configuration files (e.g., .env files, config.json, .ini files) that are often used to store database connection settings.
    • Access can be gained through:
      • Misconfigured Web Servers: Web servers incorrectly configured to serve configuration files directly.
      • Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities: Exploiting vulnerabilities to access files outside the web root.
      • Source Code Repository Exposure: Accidental or intentional exposure of .git or other repository directories.
  • Outcome: Direct Access to Database / Credential Exposure:
    • Compromised database credentials allow the attacker to directly connect to the database using those credentials, bypassing application security controls.
    • Attackers can then perform any action authorized for the compromised database user, including data access, modification, deletion, and potentially more depending on the user's privileges.

Attack Tree Path: Excessive Database Privileges Granted to Application User

• Attack Vectors:
  • Excessive Privileges Amplifying Other Vulnerabilities:
    • This is not a direct attack vector itself, but rather a condition that significantly increases the impact of other vulnerabilities (like SQL injection).
    • If the database user used by the node-oracledb application is granted overly broad privileges (e.g., DBA role, SELECT ANY TABLE, CREATE TABLE when not needed), an attacker who successfully exploits another vulnerability (like SQL injection) can leverage these excessive privileges to:
      • Access Sensitive Data Beyond Application Scope: Access data in database tables that are not intended for the application to access.
      • Modify Database Schema: Alter database tables, views, or procedures, potentially disrupting the application or other systems.
      • Escalate Privileges: Potentially create new database users with higher privileges or grant themselves more privileges within the database.
  • Outcome: Amplified Impact of Compromise:
    • Excessive privileges dramatically increase the potential damage from a successful application compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Logging Practices -> Logging Sensitive Data

• Attack Vectors:
  • Logging Sensitive Data:
    • Developers may inadvertently or intentionally log sensitive information in application logs for debugging or monitoring purposes. Examples include:
      • SQL Queries with Sensitive Data: Logging full SQL queries that contain sensitive data from user inputs or database tables.
      • Connection Strings: Logging database connection strings that may contain usernames and passwords (even if masked, they can sometimes be reversed).
      • User Credentials: Accidentally logging user passwords or API keys.
    • If these logs are not properly secured, attackers can gain access to them through:
      • Log File Access: Compromising the server or application to access log files directly.
      • Log Management System Vulnerabilities: Exploiting vulnerabilities in centralized logging systems.
      • Accidental Exposure: Logs being stored in publicly accessible locations.
  • Outcome: Exposure of Sensitive Data in Logs:
    • Compromised logs can reveal sensitive information that attackers can use for further attacks, such as:
      • Credential Theft: Using exposed credentials to gain unauthorized access to the database or other systems.
      • Data Breach: Accessing and stealing sensitive data logged in the application logs.
      • Reconnaissance: Gaining insights into application logic, database schema, or internal systems from log data.