attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for ossrs/srs

Objective: Compromise Application using SRS Media Server

Attack Tree Visualization

**[CRITICAL NODE]** Compromise Application using SRS Media Server **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 1. Exploit SRS Ingest Functionality **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   └── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 1.1.3. Overload Ingest Resources **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│       └── Send excessive streams to exhaust server resources (DoS)
├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 2. Exploit SRS Control Plane (API/Management) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 2.1. API Vulnerabilities **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.1.1. Authentication Bypass (API) **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   └── Exploit vulnerabilities in API authentication to gain unauthorized access
│   │   ├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 2.1.3. Injection Vulnerabilities (API) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.1.3.1. Command Injection **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └── Inject malicious commands via API parameters to execute arbitrary code on the server
│   │   │   └── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.1.3.3. Other Injection Types **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │       └── Explore other potential injection points (e.g., SQL injection if SRS uses a database for configuration - less likely in core SRS, but possible in extensions)
│   ├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 2.2. Configuration Vulnerabilities **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.2.1. Insecure Default Configuration **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       └── Exploit vulnerabilities arising from default configurations (e.g., default passwords, exposed ports, insecure settings)
│   └── 2.3. Management Interface Vulnerabilities (if enabled/exposed)
│       └── 2.3.2. Command Line Interface Exploits (if remotely accessible)
│           └── **[CRITICAL NODE]** Impact: High **[CRITICAL NODE]** (Full server compromise)
├── 3. Exploit Server Software Vulnerabilities
│   ├── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3.1. Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3.1.1. Buffer Overflows **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   └── Exploit buffer overflows in SRS code (e.g., in protocol parsing, data handling) to gain control of execution flow
│   │   ├── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3.1.2. Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   └── Exploit use-after-free vulnerabilities in SRS code to cause crashes or potentially gain code execution
│   └── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 3.4. Dependency Vulnerabilities (SRS Libraries) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│       └── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 3.4.1. Vulnerable Libraries **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│           └── Exploit known vulnerabilities in libraries used by SRS (e.g., networking libraries, codec libraries, etc.)
└── 4. Exploit Deployment Environment
    ├── 4.1. Operating System Vulnerabilities
    │   └── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 4.1.1. OS Kernel Exploits **[CRITICAL NODE]**
    │       └── Exploit vulnerabilities in the underlying operating system kernel where SRS is running
    ├── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 4.2. Network Infrastructure Vulnerabilities **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   └── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 4.2.1. Network Sniffing **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │       └── Intercept network traffic to capture sensitive data (e.g., stream content, API credentials if transmitted insecurely)
    └── 4.3. Physical Access (if applicable)
        └── **[CRITICAL NODE]** 4.3.1. Direct Server Access **[CRITICAL NODE]**
            └── Gain physical access to the server to directly manipulate the system or extract sensitive information

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit SRS Ingest Functionality -> Overload Ingest Resources (1.1.3)

• Attack Vector:
  • Attacker sends a large number of stream requests to the SRS server.
  • These requests can be legitimate stream publishing requests or crafted to maximize resource consumption.
  • The goal is to overwhelm the server's capacity to ingest and process streams.
• Impact:
  • Denial of Service (DoS) - The SRS server becomes unresponsive or crashes, disrupting media streaming services.
  • Legitimate users are unable to publish or consume streams.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement rate limiting on stream ingest requests.
  • Configure resource limits for stream processing (e.g., maximum streams, bandwidth limits).
  • Monitor server resource utilization (CPU, memory, network) and set up alerts for anomalies.
  • Use a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to distribute load and absorb some of the attack traffic.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit SRS Control Plane (API/Management) -> API Vulnerabilities -> Authentication Bypass (2.1.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • Attacker attempts to bypass the authentication mechanisms protecting the SRS API.
  • This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in the authentication logic itself (e.g., flaws in token validation, session management).
  • It could also involve exploiting default or weak credentials if they are used for API access.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized access to the SRS control plane.
  • Attacker can perform administrative actions, such as:
    • Modifying server configuration.
    • Stopping or restarting services.
    • Accessing sensitive data exposed through the API.
    • Potentially gaining code execution on the server depending on API functionality.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement strong and secure authentication mechanisms for the API (e.g., API keys, OAuth 2.0).
  • Enforce strong password policies and avoid default credentials.
  • Regularly audit and test API authentication logic for vulnerabilities.
  • Use HTTPS to encrypt API communication and protect credentials in transit.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit SRS Control Plane (API/Management) -> API Vulnerabilities -> Command Injection (2.1.3.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • Attacker identifies API endpoints that take user-supplied input and use it to construct system commands.
  • By crafting malicious input, the attacker injects arbitrary commands into the system command execution.
  • This allows the attacker to execute commands directly on the SRS server's operating system.
• Impact:
  • Full server compromise.
  • Attacker can:
    • Gain complete control over the SRS server and the underlying operating system.
    • Install malware, backdoors, or rootkits.
    • Steal sensitive data.
    • Disrupt services.
    • Use the compromised server as a launchpad for further attacks.
• Mitigation:
  • Never use user-supplied input directly in system commands.
  • If system commands are absolutely necessary, use secure alternatives to system() or exec(), if available in the programming language.
  • Implement strict input validation and sanitization to prevent command injection.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege - run SRS processes with minimal necessary permissions.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit SRS Control Plane (API/Management) -> API Vulnerabilities -> Other Injection Types (2.1.3.3) - Specifically SQL Injection (if applicable)

• Attack Vector:
  • If SRS or its extensions use a database for configuration or data storage, and the API interacts with this database without proper input sanitization.
  • Attacker crafts malicious SQL queries within API parameters.
  • These malicious queries are injected into the database queries executed by the SRS application.
• Impact:
  • Database compromise.
  • Attacker can:
    • Access, modify, or delete sensitive data stored in the database.
    • Potentially gain control over the SRS application if database access is critical.
    • In some cases, SQL injection can be leveraged to gain code execution on the database server or even the SRS server.
• Mitigation:
  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions. This prevents SQL injection by separating SQL code from user input.
  • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all user-supplied data that is used in database queries.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege - grant database access only to necessary SRS components and with minimal required permissions.
  • Regularly audit and test database interactions for SQL injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit SRS Control Plane (API/Management) -> Configuration Vulnerabilities -> Insecure Default Configuration (2.2.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • SRS is deployed with default configurations that are insecure.
  • Examples include:
    • Default administrative passwords.
    • Exposed management ports or interfaces.
    • Insecure default settings for access control or security features.
  • Attacker exploits these default settings to gain unauthorized access or control.
• Impact:
  • Depending on the insecure default, impact can range from:
    • Unauthorized access to management interfaces.
    • Ability to modify server configuration.
    • Full server compromise if default credentials provide administrative access.
• Mitigation:
  • Immediately change all default passwords upon deployment.
  • Review and harden all default configuration settings.
  • Disable or restrict access to unnecessary features or ports.
  • Regularly review and update security configurations.
  • Use configuration management tools to enforce secure configurations consistently.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Exploit Server Software Vulnerabilities -> Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (3.1) - Buffer Overflows (3.1.1) and Use-After-Free (3.1.2)

• Attack Vector (Buffer Overflow):
  • Attacker sends input to SRS (e.g., via stream metadata, protocol messages, API requests) that exceeds the allocated buffer size.
  • This overwrites adjacent memory regions, potentially corrupting data or control flow.
  • If control flow is overwritten, the attacker can redirect execution to malicious code.
• Attack Vector (Use-After-Free):
  • Attacker triggers a condition where memory that has been freed is accessed again by SRS code.
  • This can lead to crashes, unexpected behavior, or potentially code execution if the freed memory has been reallocated for malicious purposes.
• Impact:
  • Memory corruption vulnerabilities can lead to:
    • Denial of Service (crashes).
    • Code execution - Attacker gains control over the SRS server process.
    • Information disclosure - Memory corruption can sometimes leak sensitive data.
• Mitigation:
  • Employ secure coding practices to prevent memory corruption vulnerabilities:
    • Strict bounds checking for buffer operations.
    • Proper memory management and resource handling.
    • Use memory-safe programming languages or libraries where possible.
  • Conduct thorough code reviews and security audits to identify potential memory corruption vulnerabilities.
  • Use memory sanitizers and fuzzing tools during development and testing to detect memory errors.
  • Apply operating system-level protections like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP).

Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit Server Software Vulnerabilities -> Dependency Vulnerabilities -> Vulnerable Libraries (3.4.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • SRS relies on third-party libraries for various functionalities (e.g., networking, codecs, cryptography).
  • These libraries may contain known vulnerabilities.
  • Attacker exploits these known vulnerabilities in the libraries used by SRS.
  • Exploits for common library vulnerabilities are often publicly available.
• Impact:
  • Impact depends on the specific vulnerability in the library, but can range from:
    • Denial of Service.
    • Information disclosure.
    • Code execution - Leading to server compromise.
• Mitigation:
  • Maintain a comprehensive inventory of all third-party libraries used by SRS.
  • Regularly monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for known vulnerabilities in these libraries.
  • Promptly update vulnerable libraries to patched versions.
  • Use dependency scanning tools to automate vulnerability detection in dependencies.
  • Consider using static analysis tools to identify potential vulnerabilities in library usage within SRS code.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Exploit Deployment Environment -> Operating System Vulnerabilities -> OS Kernel Exploits (4.1.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • The operating system kernel on which SRS is running contains vulnerabilities.
  • Attacker exploits these kernel vulnerabilities to gain elevated privileges or code execution at the kernel level.
  • Kernel exploits are often more complex but provide the highest level of control.
• Impact:
  • Full system compromise.
  • Attacker gains complete control over the entire server, including all processes and data.
  • Can bypass all security measures implemented at the application level.
• Mitigation:
  • Keep the operating system kernel updated with the latest security patches.
  • Harden the operating system configuration according to security best practices.
  • Minimize the attack surface of the OS by disabling unnecessary services and features.
  • Implement security monitoring and intrusion detection at the OS level.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Exploit Deployment Environment -> Network Infrastructure Vulnerabilities -> Network Sniffing (4.2.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • Attacker gains access to the network traffic flowing to and from the SRS server.
  • Using network sniffing tools, the attacker intercepts and captures network packets.
  • If communication is not encrypted, sensitive data within the packets can be extracted.
• Impact:
  • Information disclosure.
  • Attacker can capture:
    • Stream content (audio and video).
    • API credentials if transmitted in plaintext.
    • Other sensitive data exchanged between clients and the SRS server.
• Mitigation:
  • Enforce encryption for all sensitive communication channels.
    • Use HTTPS for API access.
    • Use secure streaming protocols where available (e.g., WebRTC with DTLS/SRTP).
  • Secure the network infrastructure to prevent unauthorized access and sniffing.
  • Implement network segmentation to isolate the SRS server and limit the impact of network compromise.
  • Use network intrusion detection systems to detect suspicious network activity.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Exploit Deployment Environment -> Physical Access (if applicable) -> Direct Server Access (4.3.1)

• Attack Vector:
  • Attacker gains physical access to the server hardware where SRS is running.
  • This could involve unauthorized entry to a data center or server room.
  • Physical access bypasses many software-based security controls.
• Impact:
  • Full system compromise.
  • Attacker can:
    • Directly access data stored on the server.
    • Install malware or backdoors.
    • Modify system configuration.
    • Steal the server hardware itself.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement strong physical security measures for server locations:
    • Access control systems (e.g., key cards, biometrics).
    • Surveillance cameras.
    • Security personnel.
  • Secure server hardware itself (e.g., BIOS passwords, disk encryption).
  • Limit physical access to authorized personnel only.
  • Implement logging and monitoring of physical access events.