threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for pocoproject/poco

Threat: Buffer Overflow in String Handling

Description: An attacker sends overly long strings or data to the application. If the application uses Poco string handling functions without proper bounds checking, the attacker can overwrite memory beyond the allocated buffer. This can lead to application crashes, denial of service, or potentially arbitrary code execution if the attacker can control the overwritten memory.

Impact: Application crash, Denial of Service, Potential Remote Code Execution.

Poco Component: Poco::String, Poco::Dynamic::Var, Poco::Net::HTTPRequest, Poco::Net::HTTPResponse, Poco::XML::SAXParser, Poco::JSON::Parser, and other components handling string or binary data. Specifically functions like string concatenation, copying, and parsing within these components.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Validate input string lengths and data sizes before processing.
• Use safe string manipulation functions with bounds checking (e.g., std::string methods, Poco::Dynamic::Var with type and size checks).
• Implement robust error handling to catch exceptions and prevent crashes.
• Use memory sanitizers during development and testing.

Threat: Format String Vulnerability

Description: An attacker provides malicious input that is used as a format string in logging or formatting functions. By crafting specific format specifiers within the input, the attacker can read from arbitrary memory locations (information disclosure) or write to arbitrary memory locations (potentially leading to code execution).

Impact: Information Disclosure, Potential Remote Code Execution.

Poco Component: Poco::Logger, Poco::FormattingChannel, and potentially custom logging or formatting code using Poco string functions like Poco::format. Specifically functions like Poco::Logger::information, Poco::Logger::warning, Poco::format.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Never use user-controlled input directly as a format string.
• Use parameterized logging or formatting where the format string is fixed and user input is passed as arguments.
• Sanitize or escape user input before including it in log messages if absolutely necessary.

Threat: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

Description: An attacker crafts a malicious XML document that includes external entity declarations. If the application parses this XML using Poco's XML parser without disabling external entity processing, the parser will attempt to resolve these entities. This can allow the attacker to read local files, access internal network resources, or potentially trigger denial of service or code execution depending on the parser configuration and system setup.

Impact: Information Disclosure (local file access), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Potential Remote Code Execution.

Poco Component: Poco::XML::SAXParser, Poco::XML::DOMParser. Specifically the parsing functions within these components when processing XML documents.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Disable external entity processing in Poco's XML parsers. Configure the parser to ignore or reject external entities.
• If external entities are absolutely necessary, implement strict input validation and sanitization of XML documents.
• Consider using a less feature-rich XML parser if external entity processing is not required.

Threat: Weak SSL/TLS Configuration

Description: An attacker exploits weaknesses in the SSL/TLS configuration used by the application's Poco networking components. This could involve downgrading the connection to a weaker TLS version, exploiting weak cipher suites, or bypassing certificate validation. Successful exploitation can lead to man-in-the-middle attacks, data interception, and weakened encryption.

Impact: Information Disclosure, Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, Data Manipulation.

Poco Component: Poco::Net::HTTPSClientSession, Poco::Net::HTTPServer, Poco::Net::SecureServerSocket, Poco::Net::Context. Specifically the configuration and usage of Poco::Net::Context and related classes for setting up secure connections.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Enforce strong TLS versions (TLS 1.2 or higher).
• Use strong and secure cipher suites. Disable weak or deprecated ciphers.
• Properly configure certificate validation, including verifying certificate chains and hostname verification.
• Regularly update Poco and OpenSSL (or the underlying TLS library).
• Use tools to audit SSL/TLS configurations.

Threat: HTTP Request Smuggling

Description: An attacker crafts HTTP requests that are interpreted differently by the application's Poco HTTP server and intermediary proxies or firewalls. This discrepancy can be exploited to "smuggle" malicious requests past security controls, bypass authentication, or poison caches.

Impact: Authentication Bypass, Authorization Bypass, Cache Poisoning, Potential Remote Code Execution (depending on application logic).

Poco Component: Poco::Net::HTTPServer, Poco::Net::HTTPRequestHandler, Poco::Net::HTTPRequest, Poco::Net::HTTPResponse. Specifically the request parsing and handling logic within these components.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Strictly adhere to HTTP standards in request parsing and handling.
• Normalize and validate HTTP headers, especially Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding.
• Ensure consistent interpretation of HTTP requests across all components.
• Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to detect and prevent HTTP smuggling attacks.

Threat: Path Traversal

Description: An attacker provides malicious input that is used to construct file paths for file system operations using Poco's file system components. By manipulating the path (e.g., using "../" sequences), the attacker can access files outside of the intended directory, potentially reading sensitive files or overwriting critical system files.

Impact: Information Disclosure (sensitive file access), Data Manipulation, Potential System Compromise.

Poco Component: Poco::File, Poco::Path, Poco::FileInputStream, Poco::FileOutputStream. Specifically functions related to file path construction and file access within these components.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Never directly use user-provided input to construct file paths.
• Use canonicalization and validation to ensure file paths are within expected boundaries.
• Implement access control mechanisms to restrict file system access.
• Consider using chroot environments or containerization.

Threat: Command Injection

Description: An attacker provides malicious input that is used in system commands executed by the application using Poco's process management components. By injecting shell commands into the input, the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server with the privileges of the application.

Impact: Remote Code Execution, System Compromise.

Poco Component: Poco::Process, Poco::System. Specifically functions like Poco::Process::launch, Poco::System::exec.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

• Avoid using system calls or external commands whenever possible.
• If system calls are necessary, never directly use user-provided input as part of the command string.
• Sanitize and validate user input rigorously before using it in system commands.
• Use parameterized commands or safer alternatives to system calls.
• Implement least privilege principles for processes.

Threat: Vulnerable Poco Library or Dependencies

Description: The Poco library itself or its dependencies (e.g., OpenSSL, Expat) may contain undiscovered or unpatched security vulnerabilities. If the application uses a vulnerable version, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise the application or the underlying system.

Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, can range from Information Disclosure to Remote Code Execution and System Compromise.

Poco Component: Entire Poco library and its dependencies.

Risk Severity: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, can be Critical to High.

Mitigation Strategies:

• Keep Poco and all dependencies up-to-date with the latest stable versions and security patches.
• Regularly monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases.
• Use dependency management tools to track and update library versions.
• Implement a process for quickly patching vulnerabilities.