Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
258 lines (199 loc) · 12.6 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

258 lines (199 loc) · 12.6 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for pocoproject/poco

Mitigation Strategy: Strict TLS/SSL Certificate Validation (POCO NetSSL_OpenSSL)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Enforce rigorous validation of server certificates using POCO's NetSSL_OpenSSL features.

  • Description:

    1. Locate HTTPSClientSession and SecureSocket: Find all instances of these POCO classes.
    2. Context Object: Ensure a Poco::Net::Context is created and configured.
    3. Context::VERIFY_STRICT: Set the verification mode to Context::VERIFY_STRICT within the Context. 
      Poco::Net::Context::Ptr pContext = new Poco::Net::Context(
    Poco::Net::Context::CLIENT_USE, // Or SERVER_USE
    "", "", "",
    Poco::Net::Context::VERIFY_STRICT, // <--- KEY
    9, true, "ALL:!ADH:!LOW:!EXP:!MD5:@STRENGTH"
);
    4. (Optional) Certificate Pinning: Implement pinning within a custom verification callback (see next step).
    5. (Optional) Custom Verification Callback: Use Context::setVerificationCallback for fine-grained control, enabling checks like attribute validation, revocation checking, or custom trust store validation. This is a POCO-specific mechanism.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (High Severity)
    • Impersonation Attacks (High Severity)
    • Use of Weak/Expired Certificates (Medium Severity)

  • Impact:

    • MitM Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Impersonation Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Weak/Expired Certificates: Risk eliminated.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Cipher Suite Configuration (POCO NetSSL_OpenSSL)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Explicitly define a strong cipher suite list using POCO's Context::setCipherList.

  • Description:

    1. Identify Context Objects: Locate Poco::Net::Context instances for secure connections.
    2. Context::setCipherList: Use this POCO method to specify allowed ciphers. 
      pContext->setCipherList("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:..."); // Example
//For TLS1.3 use:
//pContext->setCipherList("TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256");
    3. Prioritize Strong Ciphers: Focus on ECDHE, AES-GCM/ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA256/SHA384.
    4. Disable Weak Ciphers: Exclude DES, 3DES, RC4, MD5, static RSA.
    5. Regular Review: Periodically update the list based on recommendations.
    6. Disable insecure protocols: Disable SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. Use TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 using POCO.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Weak Cipher Attacks (Medium to High Severity)
    • Downgrade Attacks (Medium Severity)
    • Lack of Forward Secrecy (Medium Severity)

  • Impact:

    • Weak Cipher Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Downgrade Attacks: Risk reduced.
    • Lack of Forward Secrecy: Risk addressed.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Parameterized Queries (POCO Data)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Exclusively use POCO's Statement class with parameterized queries for all database interactions.

  • Description:

    1. Identify SQL Queries: Find code using POCO's Data framework (Session, Statement).
    2. Replace String Concatenation: Identify and replace any string concatenation used to build SQL queries.
    3. Statement::bind: Use POCO's Statement::bind, use, and into methods for parameterization.
      • Incorrect (Vulnerable): 
        std::string query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '" + username + "'";
Statement select(session);
select << query, now;
      • Correct (Secure): 
        Statement select(session);
select << "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?",
    use(username), // POCO's binding
    now;
    4. Bind All User Input: Ensure all user-derived values are bound using POCO's methods.
    5. Data Type Considerations: Use appropriate POCO binding methods for each data type.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • SQL Injection (Critical Severity)

  • Impact:

    • SQL Injection: Risk eliminated (with correct and consistent use).

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Disable XML External Entities (POCO XML)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Disable external entity and DTD loading using POCO's XML parsing features.

  • Description:

    1. Identify XML Parsing: Locate uses of POCO's DOMParser or SAXParser.
    2. DOMParser::setFeature: Disable external entities and DTDs: 
      Poco::XML::DOMParser parser;
parser.setFeature(Poco::XML::XMLReader::FEATURE_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITIES, false);
parser.setFeature(Poco::XML::XMLReader::FEATURE_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITIES, false);
parser.setFeature(Poco::XML::XMLReader::FEATURE_LOAD_EXTERNAL_DTD, false);
parser.parse(xmlSource);
    3. SAXParser Configuration: Ensure the underlying XMLReader (accessed through SAXParser) is configured similarly.
    4. (Alternative - If DTDs are required): Use a very restrictive configuration, limiting entity expansion and disabling external subsets. This is a last resort and relies on careful POCO configuration.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • XML External Entity (XXE) Attacks (High Severity)
    • XML Bomb (Billion Laughs) Attacks (Medium Severity)

  • Impact:

    • XXE Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
    • XML Bomb Attacks: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Temporary File Handling (POCO TemporaryFile)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Use Poco::TemporaryFile for all temporary file creation.

  • Description:

    1. Identify Temporary File Usage: Find code creating temporary files.
    2. Replace with Poco::TemporaryFile: 
      #include <Poco/TemporaryFile.h>
Poco::TemporaryFile tempFile; // Creates a secure temporary file
std::ofstream out(tempFile.path().toString());
// ... use the file ...
// File is deleted when tempFile goes out of scope.
    3. Customize (if needed): Use POCO's options for prefixes, suffixes, specific directories, or keeping the file (use keep() or keepUntilExit() carefully).
    4. Explicit Deletion (if keep() is used): If you keep the file, delete it with Poco::File::remove().
    5. Set secure permissions: Ensure that temporary files are created with appropriate permissions, restricting access to only the necessary users or processes.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Temporary File Race Conditions (Medium Severity)
    • Information Disclosure (Low to Medium Severity)
    • Insecure Temporary File Locations (Low Severity)

  • Impact:

    • Race Conditions: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Information Disclosure: Risk reduced.
    • Insecure Locations: Risk addressed.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Limit Request/Response Sizes (POCO HTTPServerParams)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Use POCO's HTTPServerParams to limit request and response sizes.

  • Description:

    1. Identify HTTPServer Usage: Locate code using POCO's HTTPServer.
    2. Set Size Limits: Use HTTPServerParams::setMaxRequestSize and HTTPServerParams::setMaxResponseSize. 
      Poco::Net::HTTPServerParams* pParams = new Poco::Net::HTTPServerParams;
pParams->setMaxRequestSize(1024 * 1024); // 1MB request limit
pParams->setMaxResponseSize(2 * 1024 * 1024); // 2MB response limit
Poco::Net::HTTPServer server(..., pParams);

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Buffer Overflows (High Severity) - By limiting sizes.
    • Denial-of-Service (DoS) (Medium Severity) - By preventing resource exhaustion.

  • Impact:

    • Buffer Overflows: Risk significantly reduced.
    • DoS: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure JSON Deserialization (POCO JSON::Parser)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Validate JSON structure and types using Poco::JSON::Parser and Poco::Dynamic::Var.

  • Description:

    1. Identify JSON Parsing: Find uses of Poco::JSON::Parser.
    2. Parse into Poco::Dynamic::Var: Use this POCO class for flexible type checking.
    3. Validate Structure: Check for required keys and nested objects using POCO's API.
    4. Validate Types: Use Poco::Dynamic::Var::type(), isString(), isInteger(), etc., to verify data types. 
      Poco::JSON::Parser parser;
Poco::Dynamic::Var result = parser.parse(jsonString);
Poco::JSON::Object::Ptr object = result.extract<Poco::JSON::Object::Ptr>();

if (object->has("username") && object->isString("username")) {
    std::string username = object->getValue<std::string>("username");
} // ... handle errors ...
    5. Handle Errors: Implement robust error handling for invalid JSON.
    6. Input Size Limits: Limit the size of JSON documents that your application will accept using POCO.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Unsafe Deserialization (Medium to High Severity)
    • Type Confusion (Medium Severity)
    • Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium Severity)

  • Impact:

    • Unsafe Deserialization: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Type Confusion: Risk reduced.
    • DoS: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]

Mitigation Strategy: Strong Cryptography and Key Management (POCO Crypto)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Use strong algorithms and secure key generation provided by POCO's Crypto module. Key management itself is largely outside of POCO's scope, but key generation is within it.

  • Description:

    1. Identify Cryptographic Operations: Find uses of POCO's Crypto module.
    2. Use Strong Algorithms:
      • Symmetric: AES-256/AES-128 (GCM/CCM). Avoid ECB.
      • Asymmetric: RSA (>= 2048-bit) or ECC.
      • Hashing: SHA-256/SHA-384/SHA-512. Avoid MD5/SHA-1.
      • Key Derivation: PBKDF2, scrypt, Argon2 (if available).
    3. Secure Key Generation (POCO-Specific): Use Poco::Crypto::RandomInputStream or Poco::Random: 
      #include <Poco/Crypto/RandomInputStream.h>

Poco::Crypto::RandomInputStream randomStream;
unsigned char key[32]; // For AES-256
randomStream.read(key, sizeof(key));
    4. Proper IV Handling (POCO-Specific): When using block ciphers needing an IV (CBC, GCM), use a unique, unpredictable IV for each operation. POCO's Cipher class provides methods for setting the IV, and you should use RandomInputStream to generate it. Never reuse an IV with the same key.
    5. Avoid custom cryptography: Use well-vetted cryptographic libraries and avoid implementing your own cryptographic algorithms or protocols.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Weak Cryptography (High Severity)
    • Key Compromise (High Severity) - Specifically related to weak key generation.
    • Replay Attacks (Medium Severity) - Through proper IV handling.

  • Impact:

    • Weak Cryptography: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Key Compromise (Generation): Risk reduced.
    • Replay Attacks: Risk addressed.

  • Currently Implemented: [ Placeholder ]

  • Missing Implementation: [ Placeholder ]