Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Message Size and Depth Limits (Protobuf Parsing)
-
Description:
- Identify Maximums: Determine reasonable maximums for message size (bytes) and nesting depth, based on legitimate use cases.
- Configure Protobuf Parser: Use the protobuf library's configuration options to enforce these limits during parsing. This is crucial; it's not sufficient to check the size after the message has been fully parsed. Examples:
- C++:
CodedInputStream::SetTotalBytesLimit()
andCodedInputStream::SetRecursionLimit()
. - Java:
CodedInputStream.setSizeLimit()
and similar methods. - Python:
google.protobuf.message.SetRecursionLimit()
.
- C++:
- Handle Limit Violations (Protobuf Error): The protobuf parser will return a specific error (e.g., a
DecodeError
in Python, an exception in C++/Java) when a limit is exceeded. Your code must catch this protobuf-specific error and handle it gracefully (reject, log, respond). - Limit Repeated Fields (During Parsing): Within your parsing loop, while processing a
repeated
field, check the number of elements against a predefined maximum. This is done in conjunction with the overall message size limit. - Test with Protobuf: Generate test messages (using protobuf) that are near, at, and above your limits to verify the parser's behavior.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Oversized Message DoS (Severity: High): Prevents attackers from sending huge messages that exhaust server resources during protobuf parsing.
- Protobuf Bomb DoS (Severity: High): Prevents deeply nested messages from causing stack overflows or excessive memory allocation during protobuf parsing.
- Resource Exhaustion (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of resource exhaustion attacks specifically targeting the protobuf parsing stage.
-
Impact:
- Oversized Message DoS: Risk significantly reduced (High to Low).
- Protobuf Bomb DoS: Risk significantly reduced (High to Low).
- Resource Exhaustion: Risk reduced (High to Medium/Low).
-
Currently Implemented: [ Example: Implemented in
ProtobufMessageHandler::parseMessage
usingCodedInputStream
limits. Limits are 1MB and 50 levels. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN -
Missing Implementation: [ Example: Repeated field limits are not enforced during parsing in
src/legacy_parser.cc
. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Keep Protobuf Libraries Updated and Fuzz Test (Protobuf Parser)
-
Description:
- Update Protobuf Components: Regularly update both the protobuf compiler (
protoc
) and the runtime libraries used in your application (C++, Java, Python, etc.). These are distinct components, and both need to be kept current. - Protobuf Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories specifically for the protobuf project (e.g., the GitHub repository, mailing lists).
- Fuzz Protobuf Parser: Integrate fuzz testing that specifically targets the protobuf parsing functionality. The fuzzer should generate binary protobuf data (not text-based
.proto
files). - Fuzz Target (Protobuf Input): Your fuzz target should take a raw byte array as input and attempt to parse it as a protobuf message using the protobuf library's parsing functions.
- Continuous Fuzzing (Protobuf): Ideally, use a platform like OSS-Fuzz for continuous fuzzing of the protobuf parser.
- Triage Protobuf Crashes: Prioritize and fix any crashes or errors reported by the fuzzer that occur within the protobuf library itself.
- Update Protobuf Components: Regularly update both the protobuf compiler (
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Parser Vulnerabilities (Severity: High/Critical): Reduces the risk of exploiting vulnerabilities in the protobuf parser implementation.
- Code Execution (Severity: Critical): Helps prevent vulnerabilities in the protobuf parser that could lead to arbitrary code execution.
- Information Disclosure (Severity: Medium/High): Helps prevent vulnerabilities in the protobuf parser that could leak information.
-
Impact:
- Parser Vulnerabilities: Risk significantly reduced (High/Critical to Low/Medium).
- Code Execution: Risk significantly reduced (Critical to Low).
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduced (Medium/High to Low/Medium).
-
Currently Implemented: [ Example: Protobuf library is updated monthly. Fuzz testing is implemented using
libprotobuf-mutator
and integrated into the CI pipeline. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN -
Missing Implementation: [ Example: Continuous fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz is not yet set up. Fuzzing only covers a subset of message types. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Strict Unknown Field Handling (Protobuf Schema)
-
Description:
- Choose a Protobuf Strategy: Decide how your application will handle "unknown fields" (fields present in the serialized data but not defined in the current
.proto
schema):- Reject (Recommended): Configure the protobuf parser to reject any message containing unknown fields. This is the most secure option.
- Log: Log the presence and content of unknown fields.
- Ignore (with extreme caution): Only if you are absolutely certain your code never interacts with unknown fields.
- Protobuf Parser Configuration: Use the protobuf library's configuration options to enforce your chosen strategy. This is a setting within the protobuf parsing API. Examples:
- C++: Use
FailoverInputStream
andset_require_parse_success(true)
to reject. - Java: Use
JsonFormat.Parser.ignoringUnknownFields()
(for JSON format) or similar options for binary format. - Python: The default behavior is to preserve unknown fields, but you can iterate over
_unknown_fields
and raise an exception.
- C++: Use
- Schema Evolution (Protobuf): Follow strict
.proto
schema evolution best practices:- Never Reuse Field Numbers: This is a fundamental rule of protobuf schema evolution.
- Use
reserved
: When removing fields, mark their field numbers and names asreserved
in the.proto
file. This prevents accidental reuse.
- Test with Protobuf: Generate test messages (using protobuf) that include unknown fields to verify your parser's behavior.
- Choose a Protobuf Strategy: Decide how your application will handle "unknown fields" (fields present in the serialized data but not defined in the current
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Injection via Unknown Fields (Severity: Medium/High): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious data into unknown fields that might be inadvertently processed. This is a protobuf-specific threat.
- Logic Bugs (Severity: Medium): Reduces the risk of unexpected behavior caused by unknown fields interacting with application logic.
- Compatibility Issues (Severity: Low/Medium): Helps maintain compatibility between different versions of your application using protobuf.
-
Impact:
- Data Injection: Risk significantly reduced (Medium/High to Low, if rejecting).
- Logic Bugs: Risk reduced (Medium to Low).
- Compatibility Issues: Risk reduced (Low/Medium to Low).
-
Currently Implemented: [ Example: The application currently ignores unknown fields. The
.proto
files use thereserved
keyword correctly. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN -
Missing Implementation: [ Example: The application should be configured to reject messages with unknown fields. This requires changes to the protobuf parsing logic. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Overflow Checks (Post-Protobuf Parsing)
-
Description:
- Post-Parsing Validation: After successfully parsing a protobuf message using the protobuf library, implement additional validation logic. The
.proto
schema is not sufficient for full validation. - Data Type Checks: Verify that values are within the expected range for their protobuf data type (e.g., a
uint32
is actually non-negative). - Overflow Checks (After Protobuf Decode): For integer fields, perform explicit overflow checks after the protobuf library has decoded the value. The variable-length encoding of protobuf integers can lead to subtle overflow issues if not handled carefully.
// Example: Checking for overflow with a uint64_t from protobuf uint64_t value = my_message.some_uint64_field(); if (value > MAX_ALLOWED_VALUE) { // MAX_ALLOWED_VALUE is your application-specific limit // Handle the overflow }
- Business Rules: Enforce application-specific business rules that go beyond the basic data types defined in the
.proto
file. - Test with Valid and Invalid Protobuf: Test your validation logic with both valid and invalid protobuf messages (generated using protobuf) to ensure it catches all expected errors.
- Post-Parsing Validation: After successfully parsing a protobuf message using the protobuf library, implement additional validation logic. The
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Integer Overflow (Severity: High): Prevents attackers from exploiting integer overflow vulnerabilities after protobuf decoding.
- Logic Bugs (Severity: Medium/High): Reduces the risk of unexpected behavior caused by invalid data that is structurally valid according to the
.proto
schema. - Data Corruption (Severity: Medium/High): Prevents invalid data from being stored or processed after it has been parsed by the protobuf library.
-
Impact:
- Integer Overflow: Risk significantly reduced (High to Low).
- Logic Bugs: Risk reduced (Medium/High to Low/Medium).
- Data Corruption: Risk reduced (Medium/High to Low/Medium).
-
Currently Implemented: [ Example: Basic range checks are performed on some integer fields after protobuf parsing, but not all. Overflow checks are inconsistent. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
-
Missing Implementation: [ Example: Comprehensive input validation and overflow checks need to be implemented for all message fields after protobuf parsing, especially in the financial transaction module. ] <-- YOU FILL THIS IN