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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for ripple/rippled

Attack Surface: Admin RPC/WebSocket Unauthorized Access

  • Description: Attackers gaining control of the administrative interface, allowing them to execute privileged commands.
  • How rippled Contributes: rippled provides an administrative RPC/WebSocket interface for node management. This interface offers powerful commands (e.g., stop, feature, ledger_accept, potentially even transaction signing if misconfigured) that are inherently dangerous if exposed. The existence of this interface and its command set is the direct contribution.
  • Example: An attacker gains access due to a weak secret or exposed port and issues the stop command, or enables a malicious amendment via the feature command.
  • Impact: Complete node compromise, data loss/corruption, manipulation of the node's ledger view, potential for fraudulent transactions.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Design the admin interface with least privilege.
      • Provide clear documentation on securing the admin interface.
      • Consider implementing RBAC.
      • Regularly audit the admin API.
    • Users:
      • Strictly limit access via firewall rules and rippled's configuration ([ips_fixed], [ips]). Never expose it publicly.
      • Use strong, unique secrets.
      • Regularly audit the IP whitelist.
      • Use a VPN or SSH tunnel for all remote access.
      • Monitor access logs.
      • Disable unnecessary admin commands.

Attack Surface: Eclipse Attack (P2P Network Isolation)

  • Description: An attacker isolates a rippled node from the legitimate network, feeding it false information.
  • How rippled Contributes: rippled's P2P networking code and peer selection logic are directly responsible for maintaining connections to the XRP Ledger. Vulnerabilities or weaknesses in this code, or insufficient safeguards against malicious peers, directly contribute to the risk of an eclipse attack. The core consensus mechanism relies on this P2P layer.
  • Example: An attacker floods the network with malicious nodes, replacing a target node's legitimate peer connections. The attacker then feeds the isolated node a false ledger.
  • Impact: Loss of synchronization, potential double-spending, node disruption, financial loss.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Continuously improve peer selection algorithms.
      • Implement robust anomaly detection for peer connections.
      • Research defenses against Sybil attacks.
      • Provide tools for users to monitor peer connections.
    • Users:
      • Connect to diverse, reputable validators and nodes ([peers] section).
      • Use [peer_private] to prevent unknown inbound connections.
      • Monitor peer connections (peers RPC command).
      • Use a geographically diverse set of peers.
      • Stay informed about best practices.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via RPC/WebSocket Flooding

  • Description: Attackers overwhelm the node with requests, making it unresponsive.
  • How rippled Contributes: rippled's RPC and WebSocket handling code is directly responsible for processing incoming requests. Insufficient rate limiting, resource management, or input validation within this code directly contributes to the DoS vulnerability. The exposed API endpoints themselves are the attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker sends a flood of ledger_data requests, exhausting CPU and memory.
  • Impact: Node unavailability, service disruption, potential financial loss.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Implement robust, adaptive rate limiting.
      • Implement resource quotas.
      • Tune timeouts.
      • Implement circuit breakers.
      • Optimize expensive API calls.
    • Users:
      • Use a reverse proxy (Nginx, HAProxy) with DoS protection.
      • Configure rate limits in the reverse proxy.
      • Monitor server resource usage.
      • Consider a WAF.

Attack Surface: Validator Key Compromise (Validators Only)

  • Description: Attackers gain access to the validator's private key.
  • How rippled Contributes: rippled, when configured as a validator, requires a private key to sign validations. While rippled doesn't store the key insecurely by default, the requirement for a key, and the fact that rippled uses this key for critical operations, is the direct contribution to the attack surface. The signing logic within rippled is the critical component.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the server and steals the key file, signing invalid validations.
  • Impact: Consensus disruption, reputation damage, network instability, loss of trust.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Provide guidance on secure key storage.
      • Support and encourage HSMs.
      • Explore multi-signature schemes.
    • Users:
      • Never store the key on a public server.
      • Use an HSM (strongly recommended).
      • If no HSM, use a secure, air-gapped system.
      • Implement strict access controls and MFA.
      • Regularly audit key security.
      • Monitor for unauthorized access.