Objective: Manipulate XRP Ledger State or Disrupt Consensus
Manipulate XRP Ledger State or Disrupt Consensus
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1. Denial of Service (DoS) 2. Consensus Manipulation
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1.1 Resource 1.2 Network 1.3 Application 2.3 UNL Manipulation [!]
Exhaustion Flooding Layer Attacks
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1.1.1 1.1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3.2 2.3.1 2.3.2
CPU Mem UDP TCP Mal- Poison Compromise
Exh. Exh. Flood Flood formed UNL UNL
Requests
Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS)
- Goal: Prevent legitimate users from accessing the
rippled
server or the XRP Ledger. - 1.1 Resource Exhaustion: Overwhelm the server's resources.
- 1.1.1 CPU Exhaustion:
- Description: Send computationally expensive requests to consume all available CPU cycles.
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium
- 1.1.2 Memory Exhaustion:
- Description: Cause the server to run out of memory, leading to crashes or instability.
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium
- 1.1.1 CPU Exhaustion:
- 1.2 Network Flooding: Saturate the server's network bandwidth.
- 1.2.1 UDP Flood:
- Description: Send a large volume of UDP packets to overwhelm the network interface.
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: High
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Easy
- 1.2.2 TCP Flood:
- Description: Send a large volume of TCP packets (e.g., SYN flood) to exhaust connection resources.
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: High
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Easy
- 1.2.1 UDP Flood:
- 1.3 Application Layer Attacks: Exploit vulnerabilities in how
rippled
handles requests.- 1.3.2 Malformed Requests:
- Description: Send specially crafted requests that trigger errors, unexpected behavior, or resource consumption.
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: High
- Effort: Medium
- Skill Level: Advanced
- Detection Difficulty: Hard
- 1.3.2 Malformed Requests:
Attack Tree Path: 2. Consensus Manipulation
- Goal: Interfere with the consensus process to alter the ledger state or cause a fork.
- 2.3 UNL Manipulation [!] (Critical Node): Tamper with the Unique Node List.
- Description: This is the most critical attack vector. The UNL defines the trusted validators. Compromising it undermines the entire security model.
- 2.3.1 Poison UNL:
- Description: Inject malicious validator entries into the UNL.
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Very High
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Hard
- 2.3.2 Compromise UNL:
- Description: Gain unauthorized access to the UNL configuration and modify it.
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Very High
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Hard