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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for ripple/rippled

Threat: RPC/WebSocket Interface Hijacking

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the rippled server's RPC or WebSocket interface. This could be through credential theft, session hijacking (if sessions are used insecurely), or exploiting a vulnerability in the interface itself. The attacker could then issue commands as if they were the legitimate application.
    • Impact:
      • Complete control over the rippled node's interaction with the XRP Ledger.
      • Submission of fraudulent transactions.
      • Retrieval of sensitive information (account balances, transaction history).
      • Node shutdown or reconfiguration.
      • Denial of service for legitimate users.
    • Affected Component: rippled's RPC server (JSON-RPC over HTTP/HTTPS) and WebSocket server. Specifically, the handlers for administrative commands (e.g., stop, sign, submit, ledger_accept).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong, unique passwords and consider multi-factor authentication if feasible (through a reverse proxy).
      • IP Whitelisting: Strictly limit access to the RPC/WebSocket interface to known, trusted IP addresses using the [ips_fixed] and [ips] configuration sections in rippled.cfg.
      • TLS Encryption: Always use HTTPS (for JSON-RPC) and WSS (for WebSocket) with valid, trusted TLS certificates. Configure rippled to require TLS.
      • Disable Unnecessary Commands: Disable administrative commands (especially admin functions) if they are not absolutely required by the application.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the application side and potentially within rippled (if supported) or via a reverse proxy to prevent brute-force attacks.
      • Regular Audits: Regularly audit the rippled.cfg and any reverse proxy configurations for security misconfigurations.

Threat: Exploitation of rippled Software Vulnerabilities

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the rippled codebase (e.g., a buffer overflow, integer overflow, logic error) to gain unauthorized access or cause a denial of service. This could be a known vulnerability in an outdated version or a zero-day vulnerability.
    • Impact:
      • Complete compromise of the rippled node.
      • Remote code execution.
      • Data breaches.
      • Denial of service.
    • Affected Component: Potentially any component of rippled, depending on the specific vulnerability. This could include the RPC server, WebSocket server, peer-to-peer networking code, transaction processing logic, consensus engine, or any other module.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep rippled Updated: Always run the latest stable release of rippled. Monitor Ripple's official channels for security advisories and updates.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the rippled codebase and its dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
      • Code Audits: Conduct regular security audits of the rippled codebase (if you have the expertise) or rely on audits performed by Ripple and the community.
      • Bug Bounty Programs: Participate in or monitor bug bounty programs related to rippled to stay informed about newly discovered vulnerabilities.

Threat: Validator Key Compromise (if running a validator)

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the validator's secret key. This could be through physical theft, malware infection, or exploiting a vulnerability in the key storage mechanism.
    • Impact:
      • The attacker can impersonate the validator.
      • The attacker can sign invalid proposals or votes, potentially disrupting the consensus process.
      • Loss of trust in the validator.
    • Affected Component: The validator's key management system and the rippled components responsible for signing proposals and votes (related to the consensus engine).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Hardware Security Module (HSM): Store the validator secret key in a secure HSM.
      • Offline Key Generation: Generate the validator key offline in a secure environment.
      • Key Rotation: Regularly rotate the validator key.
      • Multi-Signature (if supported): Consider using a multi-signature scheme for validator keys to increase security.
      • Strict Access Control: Limit physical and logical access to the validator server and key material.

Threat: Ledger Data Corruption (highly unlikely, but severe)

  • Description: An attacker manages to corrupt the ledger data stored by the rippled node. This is extremely difficult due to the decentralized nature of the XRP Ledger and the cryptographic integrity checks, but theoretically possible through a sophisticated attack targeting the node's storage or a critical bug in the ledger handling code.
    • Impact:
      • Loss of data integrity.
      • Inconsistent view of the ledger.
      • Potential for double-spending or other fraudulent activities.
      • Node failure.
    • Affected Component: rippled's ledger storage and retrieval mechanisms (database interaction, data validation). The NodeStore and related components are critical.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (but extremely low probability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Data Backups: Regularly back up the rippled node's data to a secure location.
      • Data Integrity Checks: Implement additional data integrity checks on the application side (if feasible) to verify the consistency of data retrieved from rippled.
      • Redundancy: Run multiple rippled nodes and compare their ledger data to detect any discrepancies.
      • Run a validated ledger: Use ledger_cleaner to ensure that your node is storing a validated copy of the ledger.

Threat: Denial-of-Service (DoS) via Peer Protocol Overload

  • Description: An attacker floods the rippled node with a large number of connection requests or specially crafted messages via the peer-to-peer protocol. This overwhelms the node's resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth), making it unresponsive to legitimate requests.
    • Impact:
      • rippled node becomes unavailable.
      • Application functionality that depends on rippled is disrupted.
      • Potential disruption of the XRP Ledger if the node is a validator.
    • Affected Component: rippled's peer-to-peer networking component, including connection management, message parsing, and validation logic. The overlay module is a key area.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Resource Limits: Configure appropriate resource limits (CPU, memory, file descriptors, network connections) for the rippled process using operating system tools.
      • Network Firewalls: Use a firewall to restrict incoming connections to the rippled node to known and trusted peers.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS): Deploy an IDS/IPS to detect and block malicious network traffic.
      • rippled.cfg Tuning: Adjust rippled.cfg parameters related to peer connections (e.g., peer_connect_max, peer_private) to limit the impact of DoS attacks.
      • Rate Limiting (Network Level): Implement network-level rate limiting to prevent excessive connection attempts.