Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
55 lines (44 loc) · 4.74 KB

File metadata and controls

55 lines (44 loc) · 4.74 KB

Threat Model Analysis for sqlcipher/sqlcipher

  • Description: An attacker obtains the encrypted database and uses automated tools to guess the passphrase. While the application chooses the KDF parameters, the effectiveness of those parameters is a direct property of SQLCipher's KDF implementation. A weak KDF, even if chosen by the application, is a SQLCipher-related weakness.
    • Impact: Complete database compromise; attacker gains full access.
    • SQLCipher Component Affected: Key Derivation Function (KDF) implementation (e.g., PBKDF2, Argon2, scrypt).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SQLCipher should be configured to use a strong KDF (Argon2id is generally recommended) with a high work factor. The application must choose these parameters, but SQLCipher must provide robust options.
      • Regularly review and update the recommended KDF and parameters based on current cryptographic best practices.
  • Description: An attacker monitors the timing of SQLCipher's cryptographic operations to extract information about the key or data. This is a direct attack on SQLCipher's implementation.
    • Impact: Partial or complete key recovery, leading to database decryption.
    • SQLCipher Component Affected: Core cryptographic functions (AES, HMAC, etc.).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SQLCipher developers must continuously improve the resistance of core cryptographic functions to timing attacks by using constant-time algorithms and other countermeasures.
      • Users should keep SQLCipher updated to benefit from these improvements.
  • Description: An attacker exploits a discovered vulnerability within SQLCipher itself (e.g., a buffer overflow, logic error, or cryptographic flaw) to bypass security mechanisms.
    • Impact: Varies, but could include complete database compromise, arbitrary code execution, or denial of service.
    • SQLCipher Component Affected: Any part of SQLCipher, depending on the specific vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if a remote code execution or decryption vulnerability exists), High (for other vulnerabilities)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SQLCipher developers must conduct thorough security audits and testing.
      • Users must promptly apply security updates released by the SQLCipher project.
      • Implement a robust vulnerability disclosure and patching process.
  • Description: While the application sets the configuration, SQLCipher allows for insecure configurations. This threat focuses on SQLCipher providing options that weaken its inherent security. For example, allowing a deprecated cipher or an extremely low KDF iteration count.
    • Impact: Weakened security, making the database vulnerable to attacks.
    • SQLCipher Component Affected: Configuration options and their enforcement (PRAGMA statements).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SQLCipher should deprecate and eventually remove support for weak ciphers and KDFs.
      • SQLCipher should enforce minimum security requirements for KDF parameters (e.g., a minimum iteration count).
      • Provide clear warnings and documentation about the security implications of different configuration choices.
      • Consider a "secure by default" configuration that requires explicit action to weaken security.
  • Description: The database becomes corrupted, and SQLCipher's own integrity checks (HMAC) fail to detect the corruption. This highlights a failure in SQLCipher's core functionality.
    • Impact: Data loss, application malfunction.
    • SQLCipher Component Affected: Integrity checking mechanisms (HMAC implementation).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
    • SQLCipher developers must ensure the HMAC implementation is robust and resistant to subtle corruption that could bypass detection.
    • Regularly test the integrity check functionality with various corruption scenarios.