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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for unetworking/uwebsockets

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Connection Limits

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Connection Limits

  • Description:

    1. Identify Server Capacity: Determine the maximum number of concurrent WebSocket connections your server infrastructure can reliably handle.
    2. Configure uWebSockets maxPayloadLength: Within your uwebsockets server setup (likely in your main server initialization code, e.g., in listen or ws handler setup), set the maxPayloadLength option to a reasonable value. This indirectly helps with connection management by limiting message sizes and potential resource consumption per connection.
    3. Implement Connection Counter (Application Level): Maintain a counter in your application code that tracks active WebSocket connections. Increment on connection open, decrement on close.
    4. Reject New Connections (Application Level): In your uwebsockets connection handler (ws.on('connection', ...)), check the connection counter. If limit reached, reject the new connection by not proceeding with setup or sending a close frame.
    5. Monitor Connection Count (Application Level): Monitor the application-level connection counter to ensure limits are effective and adjust if needed.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • DoS (Denial of Service) via Connection Flooding (High Severity): Attackers can overwhelm the server by opening excessive connections.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Memory, CPU) (Medium Severity): High connection count can lead to resource exhaustion.

  • Impact:

    • DoS via Connection Flooding (High Reduction): Significantly reduces risk by limiting concurrent connections.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Memory, CPU) (Medium Reduction): Helps control resource usage during peak loads.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Partially implemented in server.js with maxPayloadLength in ws handler. Explicit connection counting and rejection logic are missing.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Explicit connection counter and rejection logic in server.js within ws.on('connection', ...) handler.
    • Configuration for the maximum connection limit needs to be externalized.
    • Monitoring of the connection count is not integrated.

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Message Size Limits

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Message Size Limits

  • Description:

    1. Determine Maximum Message Size: Decide on a reasonable maximum size for WebSocket messages based on your application's needs and server capacity.
    2. Configure uWebSockets maxPayloadLength: Set the maxPayloadLength option in your uwebsockets server setup (e.g., in listen or ws handler options). This is a direct uwebsockets configuration to limit incoming message size.
    3. Handle Oversized Messages (uWebsockets will handle): uwebsockets will automatically reject messages exceeding maxPayloadLength and close the connection with a close frame. Ensure your application logs or handles these close events appropriately if needed.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • DoS (Denial of Service) via Large Message Flooding (Medium to High Severity): Attackers can send extremely large messages to consume server bandwidth, memory, and processing power.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Memory) (Medium Severity): Large messages can lead to memory exhaustion if not limited.

  • Impact:

    • DoS via Large Message Flooding (Medium to High Reduction): Prevents attackers from overwhelming the server with oversized messages.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Memory) (Medium Reduction): Limits memory consumption from individual messages.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Partially implemented in server.js. maxPayloadLength is set to 64KB in ws handler options.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Review and potentially adjust maxPayloadLength to a value appropriate for the application's needs.
    • Ensure logging or handling of connection closures due to maxPayloadLength violations if required.

Mitigation Strategy: Keep uWebSockets Library Up-to-Date

Mitigation Strategy: Keep uWebSockets Library Up-to-Date

  • Description:

    1. Regularly Check for Updates: Monitor the unetworking/uwebsockets GitHub repository for new releases and security advisories.
    2. Update uWebSockets Dependency: Use your project's package manager (e.g., npm, yarn if using a wrapper, or manual C++ build process) to update the uwebsockets library to the latest stable version.
    3. Test After Updates: After updating, thoroughly test your application to ensure compatibility and that the update hasn't introduced regressions.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Exploitation of Known uWebSockets Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated libraries may contain known security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit.

  • Impact:

    • Exploitation of Known uWebSockets Vulnerabilities (High Reduction): Significantly reduces the risk of exploitation by patching known vulnerabilities.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Likely depends on project's dependency management and update practices. Needs to be verified.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Establish a process for regularly checking and updating uwebsockets library.
    • Integrate dependency update checks into CI/CD pipeline if possible.

Mitigation Strategy: Properly Handle WebSocket Close Frames

Mitigation Strategy: Properly Handle WebSocket Close Frames

  • Description:

    1. Implement ws.on('close', ...) Handler: Ensure you have a close event handler defined in your uwebsockets WebSocket setup (ws.on('close', ...)).
    2. Graceful Connection Closure: Within the close handler, perform any necessary cleanup tasks, such as releasing resources associated with the connection (e.g., removing connection from active user lists, closing database connections if tied to the WebSocket connection).
    3. Log Connection Closures: Log WebSocket connection closure events, including the close code and reason (if provided). This aids in debugging and security auditing.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Resource Leaks (Medium Severity): Improperly handled connection closures can lead to resource leaks if resources are not released when connections terminate.
    • Unexpected Application State (Medium Severity): Incorrect handling of close events can lead to inconsistent application state if connection termination is not properly managed.

  • Impact:

    • Resource Leaks (Medium Reduction): Reduces the risk of resource leaks by ensuring proper cleanup on connection closure.
    • Unexpected Application State (Medium Reduction): Improves application stability and predictability by handling connection termination gracefully.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Partially implemented in server.js. A basic ws.on('close', ...) handler exists, but resource cleanup and detailed logging might be missing or incomplete.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Review and enhance the ws.on('close', ...) handler in server.js to ensure comprehensive resource cleanup and logging.
    • Document the resource cleanup procedures performed in the close handler.