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Attack Tree Analysis for unetworking/uwebsockets

Objective: To cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server application utilizing uWebSockets, or to manipulate WebSocket connections to leak information or impersonate other users.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Compromise Application using uWebSockets
                                                    |
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                               |                                               |
   Denial of Service (DoS)                       Remote Code Execution (RCE)                 WebSocket Connection Manipulation
        |                                               |                                               |
-----------------------------               -----------------------------               -----------------------------
|                           |               |                           |               |                           |
Resource Exhaustion      (Omitted)     (Omitted)     Logic Errors     Hijack Existing         Establish Fake
(Memory, CPU, FD)                          in App using uWS  Connection             Connection
        |                                               |               |                           |
-----------------       -----------------       -----------------       -----------------       -----------------
|       |       |                               |       |               |                           |
Slowloris  Rapid   Sending Large                   Improper  Missing      Man-in-the-             Spoof
-Style   Connect/ Payloads                      Validation Auth/       Middle                   Client
Attacks  Disconnect                                         AuthZ      (MITM)                   IP/ID
[HIGH RISK]  [HIGH RISK] [HIGH RISK]                   [HIGH RISK]  [HIGH RISK]      [HIGH RISK]              [HIGH RISK]
                                                    {CRITICAL} {CRITICAL}

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) - Resource Exhaustion - Slowloris-Style Attacks [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker establishes multiple WebSocket connections but sends data very slowly, or not at all after the initial handshake. This keeps the connections open, consuming server resources (memory, threads, file descriptors). Even though uWebSockets has idle timeouts, overly generous configurations or bugs in the timeout handling could make this attack successful.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Service unavailability)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring connection states and durations)

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) - Resource Exhaustion - Rapid Connect/Disconnect Cycles [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker repeatedly establishes and tears down WebSocket connections at a high rate. This consumes CPU and potentially file descriptors, even if individual connections are short-lived.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Performance degradation, potential unavailability)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring connection establishment rates)

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) - Resource Exhaustion - Sending Large Payloads [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}

  • Description: The attacker sends extremely large WebSocket messages. If the application or uWebSockets doesn't properly handle message fragmentation or buffering, this can exhaust memory, leading to crashes or instability.
  • Likelihood: High (If application lacks input validation)
  • Impact: High (Memory exhaustion, crashes)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Large payloads are easily visible in network traffic)

Attack Tree Path: Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Logic Errors in App using uWS - Improper Validation [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}

  • Description: The application using uWebSockets fails to properly validate data received from WebSocket clients. This allows an attacker to inject malicious code (e.g., shell commands, SQL queries, JavaScript) that is then executed by the server. This is the most likely path to RCE.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on application code quality)
  • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Depends on the nature of the injected code; some attacks might be obvious, others stealthy)

Attack Tree Path: Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Logic Errors in App using uWS - Missing Auth/AuthZ [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}

  • Description: The application lacks proper authentication (verifying user identity) or authorization (checking user permissions) for WebSocket connections. This allows an attacker to send messages or perform actions that should only be allowed for authorized users.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on application design)
  • Impact: High (Data breaches, unauthorized actions, potential RCE)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Unauthorized actions should be logged)

Attack Tree Path: WebSocket Connection Manipulation - Hijack Existing Connection - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker intercepts the communication between the client and the server. This requires the attacker to be on the same network or to compromise a network device. If the connection is not secured with WSS (WebSocket Secure) using valid certificates, the attacker can read and modify the data being exchanged, potentially hijacking the WebSocket connection.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires network compromise or lack of WSS)
  • Impact: High (Data theft, impersonation, potential RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires network monitoring and intrusion detection)

Attack Tree Path: WebSocket Connection Manipulation - Establish Fake Connection - Spoof Client IP/ID [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker attempts to forge the client's IP address or other identifying information to bypass access controls or impersonate a legitimate client. The effectiveness of this attack depends heavily on the application's authentication and authorization mechanisms.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on authentication strength)
  • Impact: Medium (Potential for unauthorized access, but strong authentication should mitigate this)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires logging and anomaly detection)