attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for zeromq/libzmq

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Sub-Tree:

Compromise Application via libzmq [CRITICAL NODE]

• [OR] Exploit libzmq Software Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [OR] Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (C/C++ Bugs) [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [AND] Buffer Overflow in Message Handling [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send oversized message exceeding buffer limits [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Trigger vulnerable message processing path [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Integer Overflow/Underflow [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send crafted message with large size parameters [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Trigger integer overflow in size calculations leading to memory errors [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • [OR] Security Feature Bypass (CurveZMQ if used) [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [AND] Weak Key Generation/Management (if application handles keys) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Predictable key generation [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Insecure key storage leading to compromise [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Configuration Errors in CurveZMQ [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Using weak ciphers or no encryption when expected [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Improperly configured authentication mechanisms [HIGH RISK PATH]
• [OR] Exploit Application Logic via libzmq Misuse [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [OR] Message Injection/Spoofing [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [AND] Lack of Message Authentication/Integrity [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send forged messages to application sockets [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Application processes messages without verifying origin or integrity [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Insecure Deserialization of Messages [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send malicious serialized data in messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Application deserializes data without proper validation, leading to code execution or data manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Command Injection via Message Content [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send messages containing commands intended for execution by the application [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Application processes message content and executes commands without sanitization [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • [OR] Denial of Service (DoS) via Message Flooding [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [AND] Unbounded Message Queue Growth [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Send a flood of messages to a socket [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Application or libzmq queues messages indefinitely, exhausting memory [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] CPU Exhaustion via Message Processing [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Send messages that trigger computationally expensive operations in the application [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Overload application CPU by sending a high volume of such messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Socket Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Rapidly create and destroy connections/sockets [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Exhaust system resources (file descriptors, memory) by overwhelming libzmq's socket management [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • [OR] Information Disclosure via Message Interception [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [AND] Lack of Encryption in Communication [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Communicate over unencrypted transports (TCP without CurveZMQ, IPC if permissions are weak) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Attacker intercepts network traffic or accesses IPC channels to read messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [AND] Logging Sensitive Message Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Application logs full messages including sensitive information [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Attacker gains access to logs to retrieve sensitive data [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (C/C++ Bugs) [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Buffer Overflow in Message Handling [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send oversized message exceeding buffer limits [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker crafts messages that are larger than the expected buffer size in libzmq's message processing routines. This can overwrite adjacent memory regions, leading to crashes, unexpected behavior, or potentially code execution. * Trigger vulnerable message processing path [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker sends specific message types or sequences that trigger vulnerable code paths within libzmq's message handling logic, leading to buffer overflows even with seemingly normal message sizes. * Integer Overflow/Underflow [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send crafted message with large size parameters [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker crafts messages with intentionally large size parameters (e.g., message length, number of parts). These large values can cause integer overflows or underflows during size calculations within libzmq. * Trigger integer overflow in size calculations leading to memory errors [HIGH RISK PATH]: The integer overflow/underflow can result in incorrect memory allocation sizes or buffer boundary checks, leading to buffer overflows, heap corruption, or other memory safety issues.

Attack Tree Path: Security Feature Bypass (CurveZMQ if used) [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Weak Key Generation/Management (if application handles keys) [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Predictable key generation [HIGH RISK PATH]: If the application is responsible for generating CurveZMQ keys and uses weak or predictable methods (e.g., insufficient randomness, hardcoded seeds), attackers can predict the keys. * Insecure key storage leading to compromise [HIGH RISK PATH]: If keys are stored insecurely (e.g., in plaintext files, easily accessible locations), attackers can gain access to them. * Configuration Errors in CurveZMQ [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Using weak ciphers or no encryption when expected [HIGH RISK PATH]: Application might be configured to use weak or outdated ciphers, or even disable encryption entirely when it's intended to be used. This weakens or eliminates the security provided by CurveZMQ. * Improperly configured authentication mechanisms [HIGH RISK PATH]: If CurveZMQ's authentication mechanisms (e.g., certificate verification) are not correctly configured or are bypassed, attackers can impersonate legitimate parties or gain unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: Message Injection/Spoofing [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Lack of Message Authentication/Integrity [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send forged messages to application sockets [HIGH RISK PATH]: If the application does not implement any mechanism to verify the origin or integrity of messages received via libzmq, attackers can send crafted messages that appear to be legitimate. * Application processes messages without verifying origin or integrity [HIGH RISK PATH]: The application logic blindly trusts incoming messages without checking if they are from a trusted source or if they have been tampered with. * Insecure Deserialization of Messages [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send malicious serialized data in messages [HIGH RISK PATH]: If messages contain serialized data (e.g., JSON, Protocol Buffers) and the application deserializes this data, attackers can embed malicious payloads within the serialized data. * Application deserializes data without proper validation, leading to code execution or data manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]: The application's deserialization process is vulnerable to exploits (e.g., injection attacks, code execution) because it doesn't properly validate the incoming serialized data. * Command Injection via Message Content [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send messages containing commands intended for execution by the application [HIGH RISK PATH]: If the application interprets parts of the message content as commands to be executed on the system or within the application, attackers can inject malicious commands. * Application processes message content and executes commands without sanitization [HIGH RISK PATH]: The application fails to sanitize or validate the message content before executing it as a command, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary commands.

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) via Message Flooding [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Unbounded Message Queue Growth [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Send a flood of messages to a socket [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker sends a large volume of messages to a libzmq socket at a rate faster than the application can process them. * Application or libzmq queues messages indefinitely, exhausting memory [HIGH RISK PATH]: If the application or libzmq is configured without limits on message queue sizes, the incoming messages will be queued indefinitely, eventually exhausting server memory and causing a denial of service. * CPU Exhaustion via Message Processing [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Send messages that trigger computationally expensive operations in the application [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker crafts messages that, when processed by the application, trigger computationally intensive operations (e.g., complex calculations, database queries). * Overload application CPU by sending a high volume of such messages [HIGH RISK PATH]: By sending a high volume of these computationally expensive messages, the attacker can overload the application's CPU, making it unresponsive and causing a denial of service. * Socket Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Rapidly create and destroy connections/sockets [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attacker rapidly establishes and closes libzmq connections or creates and destroys sockets at a high rate. * Exhaust system resources (file descriptors, memory) by overwhelming libzmq's socket management [HIGH RISK PATH]: This rapid connection/socket churn can exhaust system resources like file descriptors, memory, or thread limits, leading to a denial of service by preventing the application from accepting new connections or processing messages.

Attack Tree Path: Information Disclosure via Message Interception [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Lack of Encryption in Communication [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * Communicate over unencrypted transports (TCP without CurveZMQ, IPC if permissions are weak) [HIGH RISK PATH]: The application uses unencrypted communication channels, such as plain TCP without CurveZMQ or IPC with weak file system permissions. * Attacker intercepts network traffic or accesses IPC channels to read messages [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers can eavesdrop on network traffic (e.g., using network sniffing tools) or gain access to IPC channels (e.g., by exploiting file system vulnerabilities) to intercept and read the messages being exchanged, potentially exposing sensitive information. * Logging Sensitive Message Data [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Application logs full messages including sensitive information [HIGH RISK PATH]: The application logs complete messages, including sensitive data (e.g., user credentials, personal information, API keys), for debugging or auditing purposes. * Attacker gains access to logs to retrieve sensitive data [HIGH RISK PATH]: If the application's logs are not properly secured (e.g., weak access controls, stored in easily accessible locations), attackers can gain access to these logs and retrieve the sensitive information contained within the logged messages.