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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for abpframework/abp

Threat: Module Impersonation

  • Description: An attacker creates a malicious module with the same name as a legitimate ABP module (or a custom module within the application). The attacker then tricks the application into loading their malicious module instead of the legitimate one. This can be achieved through dependency confusion (exploiting misconfigured NuGet feeds), typosquatting, or compromising a legitimate module's source repository. The malicious module mimics the legitimate module's API but contains harmful code.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the functionality provided by the impersonated module. This can range from data theft to arbitrary code execution, depending on the module's purpose. The attacker could introduce backdoors or modify data.
  • ABP Component Affected: Module loading system, Dependency Injection container, NuGet package management.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Private NuGet Feeds: Use private NuGet feeds for internal modules and strictly control access.
    • Package Signing: Digitally sign all modules (internal and third-party) to verify authenticity and integrity. Configure ABP to only load signed modules.
    • Dependency Pinning: Specify exact versions of all module dependencies to prevent accidental upgrades to malicious versions.
    • Source Code Control: Maintain strict control over source code repositories for all modules. Implement strong access controls and code review processes.
    • Regular Audits: Regularly audit the list of loaded modules and their versions.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanners to identify known vulnerabilities in third-party modules.

Threat: Tenant Impersonation (Multi-Tenancy)

  • Description: In a multi-tenant ABP application, an attacker authenticated in one tenant gains unauthorized access to data or functionality belonging to another tenant. This could involve manipulating tenant IDs in requests, exploiting flaws in ABP's tenant isolation, or bypassing custom tenant-specific logic.
  • Impact: Data breach – unauthorized access to sensitive data of other tenants. Potential for cross-tenant attacks. Loss of confidentiality and integrity.
  • ABP Component Affected: ICurrentTenant, Multi-Tenancy module, Data Filtering (tenant filters), Authorization system.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Tenant Isolation Testing: Rigorously test ABP's built-in tenant isolation mechanisms. Use automated tests to simulate cross-tenant access attempts.
    • Strong Authorization: Implement strong authorization checks within each tenant, verifying user permissions even with a valid tenant ID.
    • Data Filtering Validation: Ensure ABP's data filtering (especially tenant filters) is correctly applied to all database queries. Test for bypasses.
    • Input Validation: Validate all input that could specify a tenant ID.
    • Separate Databases (Optional): For maximum isolation, consider separate databases per tenant.
    • ICurrentTenant Usage: Always use ABP's ICurrentTenant service. Never hardcode tenant IDs or obtain them from untrusted sources.
    • Audit Tenant Access: Log all tenant-related actions to detect suspicious activity.

Threat: Data Tampering via ABP's Data Filtering Bypass

  • Description: An attacker exploits a flaw in custom data filters or bypasses ABP's built-in data filters (e.g., soft-delete, multi-tenancy) to access or modify data they shouldn't. This might involve crafting specific queries or manipulating input.
  • Impact: Data integrity violations – unauthorized modification or deletion. Data leakage – unauthorized access. Potential for privilege escalation.
  • ABP Component Affected: Data Filtering system, IRepository, Entity Framework Core integration.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Custom Filter Testing: Thoroughly test all custom data filters for bypasses.
    • Built-in Filter Enforcement: Avoid disabling ABP's built-in filters unless absolutely necessary.
    • Repository Pattern Adherence: Ensure all data access goes through ABP's IRepository. Avoid direct database access.
    • Input Validation: Validate all input that could influence data filtering.
    • Code Review: Review code interacting with data filtering.

Threat: Bypassing ABP's Authorization System

  • Description: An attacker bypasses ABP's authorization checks, gaining unauthorized access to functionality or data. This could be due to misconfiguration, custom code errors circumventing ABP's mechanisms, or vulnerabilities in ABP itself.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data and functionality. Potential for privilege escalation and system compromise.
  • ABP Component Affected: Authorization module, IAuthorizationService, Permission system, [Authorize] attribute, policy-based authorization.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Authorization Testing: Rigorously test all authorization checks.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only minimum necessary permissions.
    • Policy-Based Authorization: Use ABP's policy-based authorization for fine-grained control.
    • Code Review: Review custom code interacting with authorization.
    • Avoid Bypassing: Avoid disabling or weakening ABP's authorization.
    • Regular Audits: Regularly audit user roles and permissions.

Threat: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in ABP Modules (Core or Third-Party)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known or zero-day vulnerability in an ABP module (core or third-party) to gain unauthorized access, execute code, or compromise the application.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, but could range from data breaches to complete system compromise.
  • ABP Component Affected: Any vulnerable module.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical, depending on the module and vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Updated: Keep ABP Framework and all modules up-to-date.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan for known vulnerabilities.
    • Third-Party Module Vetting: Carefully vet third-party modules.
    • Security Advisories: Monitor ABP security advisories.
    • Penetration Testing: Conduct regular penetration testing.

Threat: Improper Use of ABP's IAbpSession

  • Description: Developers incorrectly handle IAbpSession (e.g., not checking for nulls, assuming authentication, relying solely on it for authorization without ABP's services).
  • Impact: Unauthorized access. Potential privilege escalation. Incorrect tenant context (data leakage or cross-tenant access).
  • ABP Component Affected: IAbpSession, Authentication and Authorization modules.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Null Checks: Always check IAbpSession.UserId and IAbpSession.TenantId for nulls.
    • ABP Authorization: Use ABP's authorization attributes/services, not just IAbpSession.
    • Code Review: Review code using IAbpSession.
    • Unit Tests: Test authorization logic with null/unexpected IAbpSession values.

Threat: Tampering with ABP's Dynamic API Controllers

  • Description: ABP's automatic API controller generation from application services is exploited. Attackers might try to influence the generation process (e.g., injecting malicious code into a service marked for API exposure) or expose unintended services.
  • Impact: Exposure of unintended functionality. Potential for remote code execution. Unauthorized data access/modification.
  • ABP Component Affected: Dynamic API Controller generation, Application Services, AbpServiceConvention.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies: * Explicit Exposure: Carefully control which services are exposed. Use [RemoteService(IsEnabled = false)]. * Input Validation: Strong input validation and authorization within all application services. * Code Review: Regularly review generated API controllers and application services. * Principle of Least Privilege: Design services with least privilege.