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Attack Tree Analysis for aspnet/entityframeworkcore

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to or manipulation of data managed by Entity Framework Core.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Data via EF Core [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[1.0] Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[1.1.3] Leverage insecure raw SQL queries (FromSql, ExecuteSqlRaw) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.3.1] Inject into string interpolation or concatenation used in raw SQL [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[2.0] Bypass Authorization and Access Control [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[2.1] Query Manipulation to Access Unauthorized Data [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1] Modify query parameters to retrieve data outside intended scope [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1.1] Exploit weak authorization logic in application code using EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[3.0] Data Manipulation and Integrity Attacks │ ├───[3.1.2] Exploit vulnerabilities in custom update logic using EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[3.1.2.1] Target custom update methods that don't properly validate or sanitize input [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[3.3] Logic Flaws in Data Validation and Business Rules [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[3.3.1] Bypass or exploit weaknesses in validation logic implemented with EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[3.3.1.1] Find vulnerabilities in custom validation attributes or fluent validation rules [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[4.0] Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks related to EF Core [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[4.1] Resource Exhaustion via Complex Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[4.1.1] Craft excessively complex LINQ queries that overload database or application [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[4.1.1.1] Identify query patterns that lead to inefficient SQL execution [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[4.1.2] Trigger large data retrieval operations without proper pagination [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[4.1.2.1] Exploit endpoints that return large datasets without limits or pagination [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[4.2] Database Connection Starvation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[4.2.1] Exhaust database connection pool by making numerous requests [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[4.2.1.1] Launch attacks that rapidly open and hold database connections [HIGH-RISK PATH] └───[5.0] Information Disclosure via EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH] └───[5.1] Error Message Information Leakage [HIGH-RISK PATH] └───[5.1.1] Trigger detailed error messages that reveal database schema or internal paths [HIGH-RISK PATH] └───[5.1.1.1] Force errors by providing invalid input or exploiting edge cases [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: [1.0] Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • [1.0] Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • [1.1.3.1] Inject into string interpolation or concatenation used in raw SQL:
        • Description: When developers use FromSql or ExecuteSqlRaw and construct SQL queries by directly embedding user input using string interpolation or concatenation, it creates a direct pathway for SQL injection.
        • Example: context.Database.ExecuteSqlRaw($"SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = '{userInput}'"); If userInput contains malicious SQL, it will be executed.
        • Mitigation: Always use parameterized queries with FromSql and ExecuteSqlRaw. Use placeholders and pass parameters separately.

Attack Tree Path: [2.0] Bypass Authorization and Access Control [CRITICAL NODE]

  • [2.0] Bypass Authorization and Access Control [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • [2.1.1.1] Exploit weak authorization logic in application code using EF Core:
        • Description: If authorization checks are not correctly implemented in the application code that uses EF Core, attackers can manipulate requests to access data they are not authorized to see. This often happens when authorization is based solely on client-side logic or is missing entirely in certain parts of the application.
        • Example: An application might check user roles only for displaying a list of items but not when retrieving a specific item by ID, allowing an unauthorized user to access details.
        • Mitigation: Implement robust server-side authorization checks at every data access point. Use attribute-based authorization, policy-based authorization, and ensure checks are consistently applied across the application.

Attack Tree Path: [3.1.2.1] Target custom update methods that don't properly validate or sanitize input

  • [3.1.2.1] Target custom update methods that don't properly validate or sanitize input:
    • Description: When developers implement custom update logic using EF Core (e.g., custom repository methods or services), and they fail to properly validate or sanitize user input before updating entities, attackers can manipulate data in unintended ways.
    • Example: A custom update method might directly accept user-provided values for entity properties without validation, allowing an attacker to set properties to invalid or malicious values.
    • Mitigation: Always validate user input before updating entities. Use data transfer objects (DTOs) to control which properties can be updated and apply validation rules to DTOs before mapping them to entities.

Attack Tree Path: [3.3.1.1] Find vulnerabilities in custom validation attributes or fluent validation rules

  • [3.3.1.1] Find vulnerabilities in custom validation attributes or fluent validation rules:
    • Description: If custom validation logic (using Data Annotations, FluentValidation, or custom validation code) is flawed or incomplete, attackers can bypass validation rules and submit invalid or malicious data.
    • Example: A custom validation attribute might have a logic error, or a FluentValidation rule might be too lenient or have a bypassable condition.
    • Mitigation: Thoroughly test all validation rules and attributes. Use unit tests to verify validation logic under various conditions, including boundary cases and malicious inputs. Regularly review and update validation rules.

Attack Tree Path: [4.0] Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks related to EF Core [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • [4.0] Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks related to EF Core [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • [4.1.1.1] Identify query patterns that lead to inefficient SQL execution:
        • Description: Attackers can craft specific LINQ queries or API requests that translate into very inefficient SQL queries. These queries can consume excessive database resources (CPU, memory, I/O), leading to slow performance or database overload and application downtime.
        • Example: Complex joins, missing indexes, or queries retrieving large amounts of data without filtering can lead to inefficient SQL.
        • Mitigation: Optimize EF Core queries. Use eager loading judiciously, implement proper indexing in the database, use AsNoTracking() for read-only queries, and profile queries to identify performance bottlenecks. Implement query complexity limits if possible.
      • [4.1.2.1] Exploit endpoints that return large datasets without limits or pagination:
        • Description: If API endpoints or application features return large collections of data without proper pagination or limits, attackers can request these large datasets repeatedly, overwhelming the application and database with data retrieval and transfer operations.
        • Example: An API endpoint that returns all users without pagination.
        • Mitigation: Always implement pagination for endpoints that return lists of data. Set reasonable limits on the number of items returned per page.
      • [4.2.1.1] Launch attacks that rapidly open and hold database connections:
        • Description: Attackers can flood the application with requests that rapidly open database connections and then hold them open for an extended period. This can exhaust the database connection pool, preventing legitimate users from accessing the application.
        • Example: Rapidly sending requests to an endpoint that triggers database queries, without releasing connections quickly.
        • Mitigation: Configure database connection pool settings appropriately. Implement rate limiting and throttling on API endpoints to limit the number of requests from a single source. Ensure proper connection disposal in application code (using using statements or explicit disposal).

Attack Tree Path: [5.0] Information Disclosure via EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • [5.0] Information Disclosure via EF Core [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • [5.1.1.1] Force errors by providing invalid input or exploiting edge cases:
        • Description: Attackers can intentionally provide invalid input or exploit edge cases in the application to trigger errors. If the application's error handling is not properly configured, detailed error messages, including database schema information, internal file paths, or other sensitive details, might be exposed to the attacker.
        • Example: Providing invalid data types to API parameters, triggering database constraint violations, or exploiting unhandled exceptions.
        • Mitigation: Implement custom error handling to prevent detailed error messages from being displayed to users in production. Log detailed errors securely for debugging purposes. Use generic error messages for user-facing responses.