attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/aspnetcore

Objective: Compromise the ASP.NET Core Application by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the ASP.NET Core framework and its ecosystem.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise ASP.NET Core Application [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND]─ Access Sensitive Configuration Data [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[OR]─ Misconfigured Access Control [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Weak File Permissions on Configuration Files (e.g., appsettings.json) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Insecure Secrets Management (e.g., secrets in code, environment variables without proper protection) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ Manipulate Configuration Settings [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Modify Configuration to Malicious Settings [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       ├─── Change Database Connection String to Attacker-Controlled Database [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       ├─── Disable Security Features via Configuration (e.g., CORS, HSTS, Authentication) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ Model Binding Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Unprotected Model Properties bound from request data, allowing modification of unintended properties. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Over-posting attacks by providing unexpected or additional input fields. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └───[AND]─ Injection via Model Binding [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       ├─── SQL Injection via Model Binding (if directly using raw SQL queries based on model input) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       ├─── Command Injection via Model Binding (if model input is used to execute system commands) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ Routing Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) via Route Parameters [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Predictable or guessable route parameters allowing access to resources belonging to other users. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Lack of authorization checks on route parameters. [HIGH RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Exploit Authentication and Authorization Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ Authentication Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Misconfigured Authentication Middleware [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Incorrect authentication scheme configuration in `Startup.cs`. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Missing or improperly configured authentication middleware for specific endpoints. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Vulnerabilities in Custom Authentication Handlers [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Security flaws in custom authentication logic (e.g., weak password hashing, insecure token generation, flawed session management). [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Session Management Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Session) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Session Fixation attacks due to predictable session IDs or insecure session ID generation. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Session Hijacking due to insecure session storage or transmission (e.g., session cookies without `HttpOnly` and `Secure` flags). [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └───[AND]─ Vulnerabilities in External Authentication Providers (if used) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       ├─── Exploiting vulnerabilities in OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, or other external authentication providers (e.g., misconfiguration, redirect URI manipulation). [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Misconfigured Authorization Policies [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Overly permissive or incorrectly defined authorization policies. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Logic flaws in custom authorization handlers. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Privilege escalation due to incorrect role assignments or role management flaws. [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Role manipulation vulnerabilities (if roles are stored insecurely or can be modified by unauthorized users). [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Server-Side Vulnerabilities (Kestrel - ASP.NET Core's Web Server) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ Kestrel Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ Exploiting Known Kestrel CVEs [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Using outdated versions of ASP.NET Core or Kestrel with known vulnerabilities. [HIGH RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Dependency Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core NuGet Packages) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND]─ Vulnerable ASP.NET Core NuGet Packages [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Using outdated or vulnerable ASP.NET Core packages or related Microsoft packages. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Using vulnerable third-party NuGet packages that integrate with ASP.NET Core. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

Attack Vectors:

• Access Sensitive Configuration Data [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Weak File Permissions on Configuration Files (e.g., appsettings.json) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker gains unauthorized access to the server's file system due to overly permissive file permissions on configuration files.
    • They can directly read sensitive information like database connection strings, API keys, and secrets stored in plaintext or easily decryptable formats.
  • Insecure Secrets Management (e.g., secrets in code, environment variables without proper protection) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Secrets are hardcoded in the application code, committed to version control, or stored in environment variables without proper encryption or access control.
    • Attacker can extract these secrets through code review, accessing version control history, or reading environment variables if they gain server access.
• Manipulate Configuration Settings [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Modify Configuration to Malicious Settings [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attacker gains write access to configuration files or configuration sources (e.g., through vulnerabilities in management interfaces or compromised credentials).
    • Change Database Connection String to Attacker-Controlled Database [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attacker modifies the database connection string to point to a database server they control.
      • The application connects to the attacker's database, sending sensitive data and potentially allowing the attacker to inject malicious data back into the application.
    • Disable Security Features via Configuration (e.g., CORS, HSTS, Authentication) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attacker disables security features like CORS, HSTS, or authentication mechanisms by modifying configuration settings.
      • This weakens the application's security posture, making it vulnerable to other attacks like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

Attack Vectors:

• Model Binding Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Unprotected Model Properties bound from request data, allowing modification of unintended properties. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • ASP.NET Core's model binding automatically maps request data to model properties. If not properly controlled, attackers can manipulate request parameters to modify properties that should not be directly accessible.
      • This can lead to unauthorized data modification, privilege escalation, or bypassing business logic.
    • Over-posting attacks by providing unexpected or additional input fields. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attackers send extra fields in the request that are not intended to be bound to the model. If model binding is not restricted, these extra fields might be processed and lead to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities.
  • Injection via Model Binding [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • SQL Injection via Model Binding (if directly using raw SQL queries based on model input) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • If the application constructs raw SQL queries by directly embedding data from model-bound properties without proper sanitization or parameterization, attackers can inject malicious SQL code.
      • This allows them to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the database, potentially leading to data breaches, data manipulation, or denial of service.
    • Command Injection via Model Binding (if model input is used to execute system commands) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • If the application uses model-bound input to construct system commands without proper sanitization, attackers can inject malicious commands.
      • This allows them to execute arbitrary commands on the server operating system, potentially leading to full system compromise.
• Routing Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:
  • Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) via Route Parameters [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Predictable or guessable route parameters allowing access to resources belonging to other users. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Route parameters (e.g., IDs) are predictable or sequential, allowing attackers to guess or enumerate IDs belonging to other users or resources they shouldn't access.
      • Without proper authorization checks, attackers can access and manipulate resources they are not authorized to view or modify.
    • Lack of authorization checks on route parameters. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Routes that access sensitive resources or perform privileged actions do not have proper authorization checks based on route parameters.
      • Attackers can directly access these routes by manipulating route parameters, bypassing intended access controls.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Authentication and Authorization Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

Attack Vectors:

• Authentication Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Misconfigured Authentication Middleware [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Incorrect authentication scheme configuration in Startup.cs. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Authentication schemes are incorrectly configured in the Startup.cs file, leading to authentication middleware not functioning as intended or being bypassed entirely.
      • This can result in some or all parts of the application becoming accessible without proper authentication.
    • Missing or improperly configured authentication middleware for specific endpoints. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Authentication middleware is not applied to all protected endpoints, or is configured incorrectly for certain routes.
      • Attackers can access these unprotected endpoints without authenticating, bypassing intended access controls.
  • Vulnerabilities in Custom Authentication Handlers [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Security flaws in custom authentication logic (e.g., weak password hashing, insecure token generation, flawed session management). [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Custom authentication handlers are implemented with security flaws, such as using weak password hashing algorithms, generating predictable tokens, or having insecure session management.
      • Attackers can exploit these flaws to bypass authentication, steal credentials, or hijack sessions.
  • Session Management Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core Session) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Session Fixation attacks due to predictable session IDs or insecure session ID generation. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Session IDs are predictable or generated insecurely, allowing attackers to fixate a session ID for a victim user.
      • The attacker can then hijack the victim's session after they authenticate using the fixated session ID.
    • Session Hijacking due to insecure session storage or transmission (e.g., session cookies without HttpOnly and Secure flags). [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Session cookies are not configured with HttpOnly and Secure flags, or session data is stored insecurely.
      • Attackers can steal session cookies through Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or network sniffing (if HTTPS is not used), allowing them to hijack user sessions.
  • Vulnerabilities in External Authentication Providers (if used) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, or other external authentication providers (e.g., misconfiguration, redirect URI manipulation). [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • External authentication providers (like OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect) are misconfigured, or vulnerabilities exist in their implementation or integration.
      • Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities, such as redirect URI manipulation, to bypass authentication or gain unauthorized access to user accounts.
• Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Misconfigured Authorization Policies [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Overly permissive or incorrectly defined authorization policies. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Authorization policies are defined too broadly or with logical errors, granting access to resources or actions that should be restricted.
      • Attackers can exploit these overly permissive policies to bypass authorization checks and access unauthorized resources.
    • Logic flaws in custom authorization handlers. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Custom authorization handlers contain logic flaws that can be exploited to bypass authorization checks.
      • Attackers can craft requests or manipulate conditions to circumvent the intended authorization logic.
  • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Privilege escalation due to incorrect role assignments or role management flaws. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Users are assigned incorrect roles, or flaws exist in the role management system, allowing attackers to gain elevated privileges.
      • Attackers can exploit these flaws to escalate their privileges and perform actions they are not authorized to do.
    • Role manipulation vulnerabilities (if roles are stored insecurely or can be modified by unauthorized users). [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • User roles are stored insecurely (e.g., in cookies without integrity protection) or can be modified by unauthorized users.
      • Attackers can directly manipulate their roles to gain elevated privileges and bypass authorization controls.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Server-Side Vulnerabilities (Kestrel - ASP.NET Core's Web Server) [HIGH RISK PATH]:

Attack Vectors:

• Kestrel Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:
  • Exploiting Known Kestrel CVEs [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Using outdated versions of ASP.NET Core or Kestrel with known vulnerabilities. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • The application is running on outdated versions of ASP.NET Core or Kestrel that contain known security vulnerabilities (CVEs).
      • Attackers can exploit these known vulnerabilities to perform various attacks, including remote code execution, denial of service, or information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Dependency Vulnerabilities (ASP.NET Core NuGet Packages) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

Attack Vectors:

• Vulnerable ASP.NET Core NuGet Packages [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Using outdated or vulnerable ASP.NET Core packages or related Microsoft packages. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • The application uses outdated versions of ASP.NET Core NuGet packages or related Microsoft packages that contain known security vulnerabilities.
    • Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities in the dependencies to compromise the application.
  • Using vulnerable third-party NuGet packages that integrate with ASP.NET Core. [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • The application uses vulnerable third-party NuGet packages that integrate with ASP.NET Core.
    • Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in these third-party dependencies to compromise the application through supply chain attacks.