Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
79 lines (57 loc) · 6.1 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

79 lines (57 loc) · 6.1 KB

Threat Model Analysis for dotnet/aspnetcore

Threat: Middleware Ordering Bypass

  • Threat: Middleware Ordering Bypass

    • Description: An attacker crafts a request that bypasses authentication or authorization middleware due to incorrect ordering in the ASP.NET Core request pipeline. For example, static file serving middleware placed before authentication could expose protected files.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected resources, data leakage, potential for privilege escalation.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core Request Pipeline (Middleware configuration in Program.cs or Startup.cs).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Carefully review and document the middleware order. Place security-critical middleware (authentication, authorization) early. Use tests to verify correct order and behavior.

Threat: Custom Middleware Logic Flaw

  • Threat: Custom Middleware Logic Flaw

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability (logic error, improper input validation, etc.) within a custom-built ASP.NET Core middleware component. This allows them to bypass security controls, leak data, or potentially gain control.
    • Impact: Varies; could include authentication/authorization bypass, data leakage, denial of service, or code execution (depending on the flaw).
    • Affected Component: Custom Middleware Components (classes implementing IMiddleware or using Use... extensions).
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the flaw)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Rigorous code review and testing of custom middleware. Apply secure coding principles. Consider using established middleware if possible.

Threat: Configuration Secret Exposure

  • Threat: Configuration Secret Exposure

    • Description: An attacker gains access to sensitive configuration data (API keys, database credentials) because they are stored insecurely (e.g., in appsettings.json committed to source control, or in plain text on a server). This is a direct threat because ASP.NET Core's configuration system is how these secrets are managed.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of connected services, data breaches, potential for full system compromise.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core Configuration System (appsettings.json, environment variables, other providers).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Never store secrets in source control. Use environment variables, a secure configuration provider (Azure Key Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), or the .NET Secret Manager (for development only).

Threat: SignalR Hub Unauthorized Access

  • Threat: SignalR Hub Unauthorized Access

    • Description: An attacker connects to an ASP.NET Core SignalR hub without authentication/authorization. They can send malicious messages, receive sensitive data, or cause a denial-of-service. This is specific to the SignalR component of ASP.NET Core.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to real-time data, message spoofing, denial of service, data manipulation.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core SignalR Hubs (classes inheriting from Hub).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Implement authentication and authorization for SignalR hubs. Validate all messages. Use secure protocols (WebSockets over HTTPS). Implement rate limiting.

Threat: Blazor Server-Side State Manipulation

  • Threat: Blazor Server-Side State Manipulation

    • Description: An attacker exploits the persistent connection in a Blazor Server application (an ASP.NET Core feature) to hijack a connection, manipulate application state, or send crafted events.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to data, data manipulation, denial of service, potential privilege escalation.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core Blazor Server-Side Applications (components and server-side logic).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Strong authentication/authorization. Protect against XSS/CSRF. Validate input on the server. Limit circuit lifetime. Monitor connections. Consider Blazor WebAssembly with a secure API.

Threat: gRPC Service Data Interception

  • Threat: gRPC Service Data Interception

    • Description: An attacker intercepts gRPC communication (an ASP.NET Core supported framework) because TLS encryption is not enforced, allowing them to eavesdrop on sensitive data or perform man-in-the-middle attacks.
    • Impact: Data leakage, man-in-the-middle attacks, data manipulation.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core gRPC Services (service implementations and client configurations).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Enforce TLS encryption for all gRPC communication. Use strong authentication and authorization. Validate input.

Threat: Minimal API Missing Authorization

  • Threat: Minimal API Missing Authorization

    • Description: An attacker accesses a Minimal API endpoint (a specific ASP.NET Core feature) that lacks proper authorization checks. The simplified structure of Minimal APIs can make it easier to overlook these checks.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to data or functionality, potential for data manipulation or privilege escalation.
    • Affected Component: ASP.NET Core Minimal API Endpoints (defined using MapGet, MapPost, etc.).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Explicitly implement authorization using middleware (app.UseAuthorization()) or endpoint filters. Use attributes like [Authorize].