Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
101 lines (82 loc) · 11.4 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

101 lines (82 loc) · 11.4 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/docfx

Objective: Execute arbitrary code on the server hosting the application or its documentation generation environment, leading to data breach, service disruption, or further system compromise.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using Docfx *** (Critical Node - Root)** ├── OR │ ├── Exploit Docfx Configuration Vulnerabilities *** (Critical Node - High-Risk Path Root)** │ │ ├── AND │ │ │ ├── Gain Access to Docfx Configuration Files (docfx.json, etc.) *** (Critical Node)** │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ ├── Compromise Version Control System (e.g., Git repository) *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ │ │ ├── Exploit Server Misconfiguration (e.g., exposed .git folder, insecure file permissions) *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ │ │ └── Social Engineering/Phishing developers *** (High-Risk Path & Critical Node)** │ │ │ ├── Modify Docfx Configuration to Execute Malicious Code *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ ├── Inject Malicious Scripts via postProcessors or plugins configuration *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ ├── Exploit Docfx Plugin Vulnerabilities *** (Critical Node - High-Risk Path Root)** │ │ │ ├── AND │ │ │ │ ├── Identify Vulnerable Docfx Plugins *** (Critical Node)** │ │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Popular Docfx Plugins *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ │ ├── Inject Malicious Plugin into Docfx Environment *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ ├── Exploit Docfx Templating Engine Vulnerabilities (LiquidJS) *** (Critical Node - High-Risk Path Root)** │ │ │ ├── AND │ │ │ │ ├── Identify Injection Points in Docfx Templates *** (Critical Node)** │ │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── User-Controlled Data in Documentation Content (Markdown, YAML) Processed by Templates *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ ├── Exploit Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in LiquidJS *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ ├── Exploit Docfx Dependency Vulnerabilities *** (Critical Node - High-Risk Path Root)** │ │ │ ├── AND │ │ │ │ ├── Identify Vulnerable Dependencies *** (Critical Node)** │ │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Docfx Dependencies *** (High-Risk Path & Critical Node)** │ │ │ ├── Trigger Vulnerability during Docfx Execution *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ ├── Exploit Input Processing Vulnerabilities in Docfx Parsers *** (Critical Node - High-Risk Path Root)** │ │ │ ├── AND │ │ │ │ ├── Identify Vulnerabilities in Docfx Parsers *** (Critical Node)** │ │ │ │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Markdown, YAML, or Code Parsers used by Docfx *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ ├── Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Parser Vulnerability *** (High-Risk Path)** │ │ │ ├── Achieve Code Execution or Denial of Service *** (High-Risk Path - Outcome)**

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Version Control System -> Gain Access to Docfx Configuration Files -> Modify Docfx Configuration to Execute Malicious Code -> Inject Malicious Scripts via postProcessors or plugins configuration

  • Attack Vector: Attacker compromises the Version Control System (e.g., Git repository) where the Docfx project and configuration files are stored. This could be through exploiting VCS vulnerabilities or weak credentials.
    • Impact: Successful VCS compromise grants access to sensitive configuration files, including docfx.json.
    • Next Step: Attacker gains access to docfx.json and other configuration files.
    • Further Step: Attacker modifies the Docfx configuration to inject malicious scripts. This is achieved by configuring postProcessors or plugins in docfx.json to load and execute attacker-controlled scripts during the documentation generation process.
    • Final Impact: Code execution on the server during documentation build, leading to potential data breach, service disruption, or further system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Server Misconfiguration -> Gain Access to Docfx Configuration Files -> Modify Docfx Configuration to Execute Malicious Code -> Inject Malicious Scripts via postProcessors or plugins configuration

  • Attack Vector: Attacker exploits server misconfigurations, such as exposed .git folders or insecure file permissions on the web server hosting the Docfx project.
    • Impact: Server misconfiguration allows direct access to Docfx configuration files from the web.
    • Next Step: Attacker gains access to docfx.json and other configuration files through the server misconfiguration.
    • Further Step: Attacker modifies the Docfx configuration to inject malicious scripts via postProcessors or plugins as described in path 1.
    • Final Impact: Code execution on the server during documentation build, leading to potential data breach, service disruption, or further system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering/Phishing developers -> Gain Access to Docfx Configuration Files -> Modify Docfx Configuration to Execute Malicious Code -> Inject Malicious Scripts via postProcessors or plugins configuration

  • Attack Vector: Attacker uses social engineering or phishing techniques to target developers who have access to the Docfx project and configuration files.
    • Impact: Successful social engineering can trick developers into revealing credentials, modifying configuration files directly, or downloading and executing malicious payloads that compromise their systems and potentially grant access to configuration files.
    • Next Step: Attacker gains access to docfx.json and other configuration files through compromised developer accounts or systems.
    • Further Step: Attacker modifies the Docfx configuration to inject malicious scripts via postProcessors or plugins as described in path 1.
    • Final Impact: Code execution on the server during documentation build, leading to potential data breach, service disruption, or further system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Popular Docfx Plugins -> Identify Vulnerable Docfx Plugins -> Exploit Docfx Plugin Vulnerabilities -> Inject Malicious Plugin into Docfx Environment

  • Attack Vector: Attacker identifies known vulnerabilities in popular Docfx plugins by searching vulnerability databases (e.g., CVE, NVD).
    • Impact: If the application uses a vulnerable plugin, it becomes a target for exploitation.
    • Next Step: Attacker identifies that the target application uses a vulnerable Docfx plugin.
    • Further Step: Attacker exploits the known vulnerability in the plugin. This might involve crafting specific input or requests that trigger the vulnerability in the plugin code.
    • Final Impact: Code execution via the vulnerable plugin, potentially leading to full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: User-Controlled Data in Documentation Content (Markdown, YAML) Processed by Templates -> Identify Injection Points in Docfx Templates -> Exploit Docfx Templating Engine Vulnerabilities (LiquidJS) -> Exploit Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in LiquidJS

  • Attack Vector: Attacker identifies that Docfx templates process user-controlled data from documentation content (Markdown, YAML).
    • Impact: User-controlled data processed by templates creates potential injection points for Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI).
    • Next Step: Attacker identifies injection points in Docfx templates where user-controlled data is processed without proper sanitization.
    • Further Step: Attacker crafts malicious LiquidJS code and injects it into documentation content (e.g., Markdown files).
    • Final Impact: When Docfx generates documentation, the malicious LiquidJS code is processed by the LiquidJS templating engine, leading to Server-Side Template Injection and potential code execution on the server.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Docfx Dependencies -> Identify Vulnerable Dependencies -> Exploit Docfx Dependency Vulnerabilities -> Trigger Vulnerability during Docfx Execution

  • Attack Vector: Attacker identifies known vulnerabilities in Docfx's dependencies (Node.js, npm packages) using vulnerability scanning tools or public vulnerability databases.
    • Impact: If Docfx uses vulnerable dependencies, it becomes susceptible to exploitation through these dependencies.
    • Next Step: Attacker identifies that Docfx project uses vulnerable dependencies.
    • Further Step: Attacker exploits the known vulnerability in a Docfx dependency. This might be triggered automatically when Docfx executes code that utilizes the vulnerable dependency.
    • Final Impact: Code execution or Denial of Service due to the exploited dependency vulnerability during Docfx execution.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Markdown, YAML, or Code Parsers used by Docfx -> Identify Vulnerabilities in Docfx Parsers -> Exploit Input Processing Vulnerabilities in Docfx Parsers -> Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Parser Vulnerability -> Achieve Code Execution or Denial of Service

  • Attack Vector: Attacker identifies known vulnerabilities in the parsers used by Docfx to process input formats like Markdown, YAML, or code files.
    • Impact: Parser vulnerabilities can be exploited to achieve code execution or Denial of Service.
    • Next Step: Attacker identifies that Docfx uses a parser with known vulnerabilities for a specific input format.
    • Further Step: Attacker crafts malicious input (e.g., a specially crafted Markdown file) designed to trigger the parser vulnerability.
    • Final Impact: When Docfx parses the malicious input, the parser vulnerability is triggered, potentially leading to code execution on the server or Denial of Service of the documentation generation process.