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Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/docfx

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Execute Code via DocFX

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Execute Code via DocFX
├── 1.  Exploit DocFX Build Process Vulnerabilities
│   ├── 1.1  Template Injection (Conceptual) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Inject malicious code into custom templates.
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.2  Bypass input validation/sanitization in template processing. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2  Plugin Vulnerabilities (Conceptual) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Exploit vulnerabilities in custom-developed plugins.
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.1  Poor input validation in plugin code. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.3  Configuration File Manipulation (docfx.json) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.3.1  Modify `docfx.json` to include malicious build steps or configurations.
│   │   │   └── 1.3.1.1  Gain write access to `docfx.json` (e.g., through compromised source control, CI/CD pipeline, or server access). [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.5 Dependency Vulnerabilities in DocFX Itself [HIGH RISK]
│       └── 1.5.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in libraries used by DocFX.
│           └── 1.5.1.1 Identify outdated or vulnerable dependencies through dependency analysis. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Template Injection

1. Template Injection (1.1 & 1.1.1.2):

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious code into custom templates used by DocFX. This code is then executed during the build process, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution on the build server. The critical vulnerability is the lack of proper input validation and sanitization.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Identify custom templates used by the DocFX project.
    • Craft malicious code that exploits the template engine (e.g., Mustache, Liquid) or bypasses input validation.
    • Submit the malicious template or modify an existing template (requires write access to the template files).
    • Trigger the DocFX build process.
  • Impact: High-Very High (Code execution on the build server, potential for complete system compromise).
  • Likelihood: Medium (if input validation is weak or absent).
  • Effort: Medium (crafting the exploit).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (understanding of template engines and input validation bypass techniques).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard (requires careful code review, monitoring of build logs, and potentially dynamic analysis of the template engine).
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all data used in templates.
    • Use a secure template engine and keep it updated to the latest version.
    • Consider using a template engine with built-in sandboxing capabilities.
    • Regularly audit custom templates for vulnerabilities.
    • Encode output appropriately to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the generated documentation (although this is a general web security concern, it's relevant here).

Attack Tree Path: Plugin Vulnerabilities

2. Plugin Vulnerabilities (1.2 & 1.2.1.1):

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in custom-developed DocFX plugins. The critical vulnerability is often poor input validation within the plugin code, allowing attackers to inject malicious input that leads to code execution or other undesirable behavior.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Identify custom plugins used by the DocFX project.
    • Analyze the plugin code for vulnerabilities, focusing on input validation and handling of external resources.
    • Craft malicious input that exploits the identified vulnerability.
    • Provide the malicious input to the plugin (this might involve modifying input files or interacting with the plugin in some way).
    • Trigger the DocFX build process or the plugin's functionality.
  • Impact: High-Very High (Code execution, potential for complete system compromise).
  • Likelihood: Medium-High (depends on the quality of the plugin code).
  • Effort: Low-Medium (if vulnerabilities are obvious).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (understanding of plugin development and common vulnerability patterns).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires code review, monitoring of build logs, and potentially dynamic analysis of the plugin).
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strict input validation and sanitization in all plugin code.
    • Follow secure coding practices for handling file paths, external resources, and user input.
    • Regularly audit custom plugin code for vulnerabilities.
    • Keep plugin dependencies up-to-date.
    • Use a linter and static analysis tools to identify potential security issues.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration File Manipulation

3. Configuration File Manipulation (1.3 & 1.3.1.1):

  • Description: Attackers gain write access to the docfx.json configuration file and modify it to include malicious build steps, configurations, or load untrusted plugins/templates. Gaining write access is the critical step.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Compromise the source control system (e.g., Git repository), CI/CD pipeline, or the server hosting the docfx.json file.
    • Modify the docfx.json file to:
      • Include malicious commands in build scripts.
      • Configure DocFX to load untrusted plugins or templates.
      • Change output paths to overwrite critical system files (if DocFX is running with excessive privileges).
    • Trigger the DocFX build process.
  • Impact: Very High (Full control over the build process, potential for complete system compromise).
  • Likelihood: Low-Medium (requires compromising other systems first).
  • Effort: High (requires multiple steps and potentially exploiting other vulnerabilities).
  • Skill Level: Advanced (requires understanding of system administration, CI/CD pipelines, and source control security).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard (requires monitoring file integrity, access logs, and CI/CD pipeline activity).
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strong access controls for the source control system, CI/CD pipeline, and the server hosting docfx.json.
    • Use multi-factor authentication for all access.
    • Regularly monitor access logs and file integrity.
    • Validate the integrity of docfx.json before running the build process (e.g., using checksums).
    • Run DocFX with the least necessary privileges.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities

4. Dependency Vulnerabilities (1.5 & 1.5.1.1):

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in libraries used by DocFX itself. Identifying outdated or vulnerable dependencies is the critical first step.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Use dependency analysis tools (e.g., dotnet list package --vulnerable, OWASP Dependency-Check) to identify outdated or vulnerable dependencies in the DocFX project.
    • Research known exploits for the identified vulnerabilities.
    • Craft an exploit targeting the specific vulnerability.
    • Trigger the vulnerable code path within DocFX (this might involve providing specific input or interacting with DocFX in a particular way).
  • Impact: High-Very High (Code execution, depending on the vulnerability).
  • Likelihood: Medium (ongoing threat, as new vulnerabilities are discovered regularly).
  • Effort: Low-Medium (for identifying vulnerabilities), Medium-High (for crafting exploits).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (for identifying vulnerabilities), Advanced (for crafting exploits).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires dependency analysis and vulnerability monitoring), Hard (for detecting exploitation attempts).
  • Mitigation:
    • Regularly run dependency analysis tools and update outdated or vulnerable dependencies.
    • Subscribe to security advisories for DocFX and its dependencies.
    • Consider using a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool for continuous monitoring.
    • Implement a robust patching process.

This detailed breakdown provides a clear and actionable plan for addressing the most critical security risks associated with using DocFX. By focusing on these high-risk paths and critical nodes, the development team can significantly improve the security posture of their documentation generation process.