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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for dotnet/eshop

Attack Surface: API Gateway Route Misconfiguration

  • Description: Incorrect or insecure configuration of routing rules in the API Gateway (Ocelot) can lead to unauthorized access to backend microservices or exposure of internal endpoints.
  • eShop Contribution: eShopOnContainers heavily relies on Ocelot as an API Gateway to route requests to various microservices. Misconfiguration in Ocelot's ocelot.json or dynamic configuration can directly expose backend services.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a request with a manipulated path that bypasses intended Ocelot routing rules and directly accesses the Catalog microservice's internal API endpoint, potentially gaining access to sensitive product data without proper authorization checks at the gateway.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to backend microservices, data breaches, service disruption, and potential for further exploitation of internal systems.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies (Developers):
    • Implement strict and well-defined route configurations in Ocelot, adhering to the principle of least privilege.
    • Thoroughly test routing rules to ensure they behave as expected and prevent unintended access.
    • Use a configuration validation process for Ocelot configurations to catch errors early.
    • Implement input validation and sanitization at the API Gateway level to prevent path traversal or injection attacks that could bypass routing.
  • Mitigation Strategies (Users/Operators):
    • Regularly review and audit Ocelot configuration files and routing rules.
    • Use infrastructure-as-code to manage Ocelot configuration and track changes.
    • Implement monitoring and alerting for unusual routing patterns or access attempts.

Attack Surface: Insecure Inter-Service Communication

  • Description: Lack of or weak authentication and authorization mechanisms between microservices can allow unauthorized lateral movement and access to sensitive data within the internal network.
  • eShop Contribution: eShopOnContainers is built on a microservices architecture where services communicate with each other to fulfill requests. If this communication is not secured, it becomes a significant attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the Catalog microservice. Without proper authentication between services, the attacker can then leverage this compromised service to access the Ordering microservice and potentially manipulate order data or gain access to customer information.
  • Impact: Lateral movement within the system, unauthorized access to sensitive data across microservices, data breaches, and potential compromise of the entire application.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies (Developers):
    • Implement Mutual TLS (mTLS) for secure communication between microservices to ensure both authentication and encryption.
    • Utilize service meshes like Istio or Linkerd to enforce secure service-to-service communication policies.
    • Implement robust authorization mechanisms (e.g., JWT-based authorization) for inter-service requests, ensuring each service verifies the identity and permissions of the calling service.
    • Avoid relying solely on network segmentation for security and implement application-level security controls.
  • Mitigation Strategies (Users/Operators):
    • Enforce network segmentation to limit the blast radius of a potential compromise.
    • Monitor inter-service communication for suspicious patterns or unauthorized access attempts.
    • Regularly audit and update security configurations for inter-service communication.

Attack Surface: Identity Server Misconfiguration and Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Misconfiguration of the Identity Server or vulnerabilities in its implementation can lead to authentication and authorization bypass, allowing unauthorized access to the entire application.
  • eShop Contribution: eShopOnContainers uses Identity Server for authentication and authorization. Weak configurations or vulnerabilities in Identity Server directly impact the security of all services relying on it.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in the version of Identity Server used by eShopOnContainers to bypass authentication and obtain valid access tokens without proper credentials. This allows them to impersonate legitimate users and access protected resources.
  • Impact: Complete bypass of authentication and authorization, unauthorized access to all parts of the application, data breaches, and potential account takeover.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies (Developers):
    • Follow security best practices when configuring Identity Server, including strong signing keys, secure token lifetimes, and proper client configurations.
    • Keep Identity Server updated to the latest version and apply security patches promptly to address known vulnerabilities.
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all Identity Server endpoints to prevent injection attacks.
    • Regularly audit Identity Server configurations and security settings.
  • Mitigation Strategies (Users/Operators):
    • Monitor Identity Server logs for suspicious activity and unauthorized access attempts.
    • Implement strong password policies and account lockout mechanisms in Identity Server.
    • Regularly review and update Identity Server configurations based on security best practices and vendor recommendations.

Attack Surface: Message Queue Injection and Manipulation

  • Description: If message queues (like RabbitMQ in eShopOnContainers) are not properly secured and message processing is not validated, attackers can inject malicious messages or manipulate existing messages to compromise application logic or gain unauthorized access.
  • eShop Contribution: eShopOnContainers uses RabbitMQ for asynchronous communication between services, particularly for order processing and integration events. Vulnerabilities in message handling can be exploited.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to the RabbitMQ management interface (due to weak credentials or exposure) and injects a malicious message into the ordering_queue. This message, when processed by the Ordering microservice, could exploit a vulnerability in message deserialization or processing logic, leading to code execution or data manipulation.
  • Impact: Data corruption, unauthorized actions triggered by malicious messages, denial of service, and potential for code execution within microservices processing messages.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies (Developers):
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all messages consumed from message queues.
    • Use message signing and encryption to ensure message integrity and confidentiality.
    • Design message processing logic to be resilient to malformed or unexpected messages.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege when granting permissions to services accessing message queues.
  • Mitigation Strategies (Users/Operators):
    • Secure the RabbitMQ management interface with strong credentials and restrict access to authorized personnel only.
    • Enforce authentication and authorization for access to RabbitMQ queues and exchanges.
    • Monitor RabbitMQ queues for unusual message patterns or suspicious activity.
    • Regularly review and update RabbitMQ security configurations.