Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
224 lines (186 loc) · 17.7 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

224 lines (186 loc) · 17.7 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/eshop

Objective: Gain unauthorized access and control over the eShopOnContainers application and its underlying resources by exploiting vulnerabilities within the eShopOnContainers project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise eShopOnContainers Application [CRITICAL]
    ├── OR 1: Exploit Vulnerabilities in eShop Services [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── OR 1.1: Exploit Vulnerabilities in API Gateway (Ocelot)
    │   │   ├── 1.1.1: Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Gateway Routing [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── OR 1.2: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Backend Microservices [CRITICAL]
    │   │   ├── 1.2.1: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in APIs [HR]
    │   │   ├── 1.2.2: Injection Vulnerabilities (SQL, NoSQL, Command) [CRITICAL]
    │   │   │   ├── 1.2.2.1: SQL Injection in Catalog/Ordering/Basket/Identity Services [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   │   ├── 1.2.3: Business Logic Flaws in Ordering/Basket/Payment Flows [HR]
    │   │   │   ├── 1.2.3.1: Price Manipulation during Checkout [HR]
    │   │   │   ├── 1.2.3.2: Coupon/Discount Abuse [HR]
    │   │   ├── 1.2.4: Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if applicable) [CRITICAL]
    │   │   ├── 1.2.5: Information Disclosure via API Endpoints [HR]
    │   ├── OR 1.3: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Identity Service (IdentityServer4) [CRITICAL]
    │   │   ├── 1.3.1: Misconfiguration of IdentityServer4 [CRITICAL]
    │   │   │   ├── 1.3.1.1: Weak or Default Secrets/Keys [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   │   │   ├── 1.3.1.2: Open or Misconfigured Endpoints [HR]
    │   │   ├── 1.3.3: Token Theft or Replay [HR]
    ├── OR 2: Exploit Infrastructure Vulnerabilities Related to eShop Deployment [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 2.1: Container Escape (Less likely to be eShop specific, but consider if misconfigurations exist) [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 2.2: Docker API Exposure (Deployment/Configuration issue, but relevant to eShop deployment) [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 2.3: Kubernetes/Orchestration Vulnerabilities (If deployed on Kubernetes, general K8s security) [CRITICAL]
    ├── OR 3: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (Less directly eShop specific, but worth mentioning) [HR]
    │   ├── 3.1: Compromised Dependencies [HR] [CRITICAL]
    ├── OR 4: Misconfigurations in Deployment and Infrastructure (General Deployment Security) [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 4.1: Insecure Secrets Management [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 4.2: Default Credentials [HR] [CRITICAL]
    │   ├── 4.3: Exposed Management Interfaces [HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1: Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Gateway Routing [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Misconfiguration of Ocelot routes allowing unauthorized access to backend services.
  • Description: Attacker exploits improperly configured routing rules in the API Gateway (Ocelot) to bypass authentication and authorization checks. This allows direct access to backend microservices that should be protected.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner/Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Review Ocelot configuration for proper authentication and authorization rules on all routes, especially those leading to sensitive backend services.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in APIs [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Manipulate API requests to access resources belonging to other users or entities by guessing or brute-forcing resource IDs.
  • Description: Attacker manipulates resource identifiers (e.g., order IDs, user IDs) in API requests to access data or perform actions on resources that they are not authorized to access.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium/High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement proper authorization checks in backend services to ensure users can only access resources they are permitted to. Use GUIDs or UUIDs instead of predictable sequential IDs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2.1: SQL Injection in Catalog/Ordering/Basket/Identity Services [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Inject malicious SQL queries through input fields in API requests to manipulate database operations.
  • Description: Attacker crafts malicious SQL queries and injects them into input fields of API requests. If the backend services do not properly sanitize or parameterize database queries, the injected SQL can be executed, leading to data exfiltration, modification, deletion, or even complete database compromise.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement parameterized queries or ORM frameworks to prevent SQL injection vulnerabilities in database interactions. Regularly scan code for potential injection points.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.1: Price Manipulation during Checkout [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Tamper with request parameters during checkout to modify prices or quantities.
  • Description: Attacker intercepts or modifies API requests during the checkout process to alter the price or quantity of items being purchased. This can result in purchasing items at significantly reduced prices or even for free.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement server-side validation of prices and quantities at each step of the checkout process. Use digital signatures or MACs to ensure data integrity during checkout.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.2: Coupon/Discount Abuse [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit vulnerabilities in coupon or discount code logic to gain unauthorized discounts or apply multiple coupons.
  • Description: Attacker finds flaws in the coupon or discount code system, allowing them to apply invalid coupons, use coupons multiple times when they should be single-use, or combine coupons in unintended ways to maximize discounts.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Low/Medium
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement robust coupon validation logic, limit coupon usage, and monitor for suspicious coupon activity.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.4: Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if applicable) [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit deserialization vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code by providing malicious serialized objects.
  • Description: If backend services use insecure deserialization of data (e.g., for inter-service communication or data storage), an attacker can craft malicious serialized objects. When these objects are deserialized by the application, they can trigger arbitrary code execution on the server.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: High
  • Mitigation Insight: Avoid deserializing untrusted data. If necessary, use secure serialization libraries and implement input validation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.5: Information Disclosure via API Endpoints [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Access API endpoints that expose sensitive information without proper authorization or through verbose error messages.
  • Description: Attacker discovers and accesses API endpoints that are not properly secured and inadvertently expose sensitive information such as user data, internal system details, or configuration parameters. Verbose error messages can also leak sensitive information.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement proper authorization for all API endpoints. Minimize information leakage in error messages. Regularly review API documentation and endpoints for sensitive data exposure.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.1: Weak or Default Secrets/Keys [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Weak or default secrets/keys are used for signing tokens or encryption in IdentityServer4.
  • Description: If IdentityServer4 is configured with weak or default cryptographic keys or secrets, an attacker can potentially forge valid access tokens, decrypt sensitive data, or impersonate users.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate/Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: High
  • Mitigation Insight: Ensure strong, randomly generated secrets and keys are used for IdentityServer4 and securely managed (e.g., using Azure Key Vault or HashiCorp Vault). Rotate keys regularly.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.2: Open or Misconfigured Endpoints [HR]

  • Attack Vector: IdentityServer4 endpoints are misconfigured or exposed without proper protection.
  • Description: Misconfiguration of IdentityServer4 endpoints can lead to vulnerabilities such as open authorization endpoints, allowing attackers to bypass authentication flows or gain unauthorized access to protected resources.
  • Likelihood: Low/Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low/Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Review IdentityServer4 configuration to ensure endpoints are properly secured and only necessary endpoints are exposed. Follow IdentityServer4 security best practices.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.3: Token Theft or Replay [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Steal or intercept access tokens or refresh tokens and replay them to gain unauthorized access to resources.
  • Description: Attacker steals or intercepts valid access or refresh tokens (e.g., through network sniffing, malware, or phishing). They can then replay these tokens to impersonate legitimate users and gain unauthorized access to protected resources.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low/Medium
  • Skill Level: Beginner/Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Implement secure token storage and transmission (HTTPS). Use short-lived access tokens and refresh tokens with proper rotation and revocation mechanisms. Implement token binding if possible.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1: Container Escape (Less likely to be eShop specific, but consider if misconfigurations exist) [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit vulnerabilities in the container runtime or kernel to escape the container and gain access to the host system.
  • Description: Attacker exploits security vulnerabilities in the container runtime environment (e.g., Docker, containerd) or the underlying host kernel to break out of the container's isolation. Successful container escape grants access to the host system and potentially other containers running on the same host.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: High
  • Mitigation Insight: Keep container runtime and kernel up-to-date with security patches. Implement container security best practices (least privilege, resource limits, etc.).

Attack Tree Path: 2.2: Docker API Exposure (Deployment/Configuration issue, but relevant to eShop deployment) [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Docker API is exposed without proper authentication.
  • Description: If the Docker API is exposed without proper authentication and authorization (e.g., listening on a public network interface without TLS and client certificate authentication), an attacker can gain full control over the Docker daemon. This allows them to manage containers, images, and potentially compromise the host system.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner/Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Mitigation Insight: Ensure Docker API is not exposed publicly. If remote access is needed, use secure authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., TLS and client certificates).

Attack Tree Path: 2.3: Kubernetes/Orchestration Vulnerabilities (If deployed on Kubernetes, general K8s security) [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit vulnerabilities in Kubernetes itself or its configuration.
  • Description: If eShopOnContainers is deployed on Kubernetes, vulnerabilities in Kubernetes components (API server, kubelet, etc.) or misconfigurations in the Kubernetes cluster (RBAC, network policies) can be exploited to gain control over the cluster and all deployed applications, including eShopOnContainers.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium/High
  • Mitigation Insight: Follow Kubernetes security best practices. Regularly update Kubernetes and its components. Implement RBAC and network policies to restrict access within the cluster.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1: Compromised Dependencies [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit vulnerabilities in third-party libraries or dependencies used by eShopOnContainers.
  • Description: eShopOnContainers, like most modern applications, relies on numerous third-party libraries and dependencies. If these dependencies contain known vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit them to compromise the application. This can range from remote code execution to data breaches, depending on the vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High/Critical
  • Effort: Low/Medium
  • Skill Level: Beginner/Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Low/Medium
  • Mitigation Insight: Regularly scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities using tools like OWASP Dependency-Check or Snyk. Keep dependencies updated to the latest secure versions.

Attack Tree Path: 4.1: Insecure Secrets Management [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Secrets are stored in plaintext or easily accessible locations.
  • Description: Sensitive information like database passwords, API keys, and encryption keys are not properly secured and are stored in plaintext configuration files, environment variables, or even directly in code. This makes it easy for attackers to access these secrets and use them to compromise backend services and data.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Mitigation Insight: Use secure secrets management solutions (Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets with encryption at rest). Avoid storing secrets directly in code or configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2: Default Credentials [HR] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Default credentials are used for databases, message queues, or other services.
  • Description: Services like databases, message queues, and management consoles are deployed with default usernames and passwords. Attackers can easily find these default credentials and use them to gain unauthorized access to these services, potentially leading to full system compromise.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Mitigation Insight: Change default credentials for all services immediately upon deployment. Enforce strong password policies.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3: Exposed Management Interfaces [HR]

  • Attack Vector: Management interfaces are exposed without proper authentication or publicly accessible.
  • Description: Management interfaces for services like databases (e.g., phpMyAdmin), message queues (e.g., RabbitMQ management UI), or Redis (Redis CLI) are exposed without proper authentication or are accessible from the public internet. This allows attackers to gain administrative access to these services and potentially compromise the entire application.
  • Likelihood: Low/Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Mitigation Insight: Secure management interfaces with strong authentication and restrict access to authorized personnel only. Consider disabling or removing unnecessary management interfaces in production.