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Threat Model Analysis for dotnet/eshop

Threat: Unsecured Inter-Service Communication

  • Description: Attackers could eavesdrop on network traffic between eShopOnContainers microservices (e.g., Catalog Service to Ordering Service) if communication channels are not encrypted. They could intercept sensitive data like customer orders, product details, or internal API keys. Attackers might also inject malicious requests to manipulate data or disrupt services.
  • Impact: Data breach (sensitive information disclosure), data manipulation, service disruption, unauthorized access to internal systems.
  • Affected eShop Component: Internal microservice communication channels (e.g., between Catalog API, Ordering API, Basket API, etc.), API Gateway (Ocelot) to backend services communication.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement mutual TLS (mTLS) for authentication and encryption of all inter-service communication within eShopOnContainers.
    • Enforce network policies to restrict communication between eShopOnContainers services to only necessary paths.
    • Utilize JWT (JSON Web Tokens) or similar mechanisms for service-to-service authentication and authorization within eShopOnContainers.
    • Regularly audit network configurations and communication patterns of eShopOnContainers services.

Threat: API Gateway Compromise

  • Description: Attackers could target vulnerabilities in the eShopOnContainers API Gateway (Ocelot) or its underlying infrastructure. Successful compromise could allow them to bypass authentication and authorization for the entire eShopOnContainers application, gain access to all backend services, intercept and modify requests, or launch denial-of-service attacks against the entire eShopOnContainers platform.
  • Impact: Full eShopOnContainers application compromise, data breach, service disruption, reputational damage.
  • Affected eShop Component: API Gateway (Ocelot), potentially all backend microservices exposed through the gateway in eShopOnContainers.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Harden the API Gateway infrastructure and operating system specifically for the eShopOnContainers deployment.
    • Keep the API Gateway software (Ocelot) and its dependencies up-to-date with security patches relevant to eShopOnContainers.
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization at the API Gateway level for eShopOnContainers traffic.
    • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the API Gateway to detect and block common web attacks targeting eShopOnContainers.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms for API Gateway access within eShopOnContainers.
    • Regularly perform security audits and penetration testing specifically focused on the eShopOnContainers API Gateway.

Threat: Compromised Message Bus (RabbitMQ)

  • Description: Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ or gain unauthorized access to the RabbitMQ server used by eShopOnContainers. This could allow them to intercept messages related to eShopOnContainers transactions, modify message content, inject malicious messages into eShopOnContainers workflows, or disrupt message delivery, leading to data inconsistencies, incorrect order processing within eShopOnContainers, or denial of service.
  • Impact: Data corruption within eShopOnContainers, inconsistent application state, service disruption, potential financial loss due to order manipulation in eShopOnContainers.
  • Affected eShop Component: RabbitMQ message broker used by eShopOnContainers, services relying on asynchronous communication via RabbitMQ (e.g., Ordering Service, Basket Service, Payment Service) within eShopOnContainers.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure RabbitMQ access with strong authentication and authorization specifically for eShopOnContainers access.
    • Encrypt communication channels to RabbitMQ (e.g., using TLS) for eShopOnContainers message traffic.
    • Harden the RabbitMQ server and operating system hosting eShopOnContainers message broker.
    • Regularly update RabbitMQ to the latest secure version in the eShopOnContainers environment.
    • Implement message signing or encryption to ensure message integrity and confidentiality for eShopOnContainers messages.
    • Monitor RabbitMQ for suspicious activity and unauthorized access related to eShopOnContainers message queues.

Threat: Vulnerable Container Images

  • Description: Attackers could exploit known vulnerabilities in base images or application dependencies within Docker container images used for eShopOnContainers services. If vulnerable images are deployed for eShopOnContainers, attackers could gain unauthorized access to eShopOnContainers containers, escalate privileges within the eShopOnContainers environment, or compromise the underlying host system running eShopOnContainers.
  • Impact: Container compromise within eShopOnContainers, potential host system compromise, data breach related to eShopOnContainers data, service disruption of eShopOnContainers.
  • Affected eShop Component: Docker images for all microservices of eShopOnContainers (Catalog, Ordering, Basket, etc.), API Gateway, and supporting infrastructure components of eShopOnContainers.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly scan Docker images used for eShopOnContainers for vulnerabilities using image scanning tools (e.g., Clair, Trivy).
    • Use minimal and hardened base images for building eShopOnContainers container images.
    • Keep base images and application dependencies of eShopOnContainers up-to-date with security patches.
    • Implement a secure container image build pipeline with vulnerability scanning integrated for eShopOnContainers images.
    • Enforce image signing and verification to ensure integrity of eShopOnContainers images.

Threat: Secrets Hardcoded in Container Images

  • Description: Developers might inadvertently hardcode sensitive information like API keys, database passwords, or certificates directly into Docker images of eShopOnContainers services. If these images are compromised or inadvertently exposed, attackers could extract these secrets and use them to gain unauthorized access to backend systems, databases, or external services used by eShopOnContainers.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to backend systems of eShopOnContainers, data breach of eShopOnContainers data, potential compromise of external services integrated with eShopOnContainers.
  • Affected eShop Component: Docker images for all microservices of eShopOnContainers, potentially configuration files within images.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never hardcode secrets in Docker images or application code of eShopOnContainers.
    • Use secure secret management solutions (e.g., Kubernetes Secrets, HashiCorp Vault, Azure Key Vault) to manage and inject secrets at runtime for eShopOnContainers.
    • Implement a secure CI/CD pipeline that prevents secrets from being committed to source code repositories or embedded in images for eShopOnContainers.
    • Regularly scan container images and code repositories of eShopOnContainers for accidentally exposed secrets.

Threat: Insufficient Input Validation in Microservices

  • Description: Individual microservices within eShopOnContainers might lack proper input validation for API endpoints. Attackers could exploit this by sending malicious or malformed input to eShopOnContainers microservices, potentially leading to injection attacks (SQL injection, NoSQL injection, command injection) within eShopOnContainers, buffer overflows, or denial of service affecting eShopOnContainers services.
  • Impact: Service compromise within eShopOnContainers, data manipulation in eShopOnContainers databases, data breach of eShopOnContainers data, denial of service of eShopOnContainers services.
  • Affected eShop Component: API endpoints of all microservices of eShopOnContainers (Catalog API, Ordering API, Basket API, etc.).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization in all eShopOnContainers microservices API endpoints.
    • Use input validation libraries and frameworks appropriate for the programming language and framework used in each eShopOnContainers microservice.
    • Perform regular security testing, including fuzzing and penetration testing, to identify input validation vulnerabilities in eShopOnContainers.
    • Follow secure coding practices to prevent injection vulnerabilities in eShopOnContainers code.

Threat: Business Logic Flaws in Ordering Process

  • Description: Flaws in the business logic of the ordering process within eShopOnContainers (e.g., in the Ordering Service or Basket Service) could be exploited by attackers. This could include manipulating order quantities, prices, discounts, or payment information to gain unauthorized discounts, free items, or bypass payment processes within eShopOnContainers.
  • Impact: Financial loss for the eShopOnContainers store, inventory manipulation, reputational damage to the eShopOnContainers business.
  • Affected eShop Component: Ordering Service, Basket Service, Payment Service, potentially Catalog Service related to pricing and inventory within eShopOnContainers.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly review and test the business logic of the ordering process within eShopOnContainers for potential flaws and vulnerabilities.
    • Implement strong authorization and access control checks at each step of the ordering process in eShopOnContainers.
    • Use transactional operations to ensure data consistency and prevent race conditions in order processing within eShopOnContainers.
    • Implement fraud detection mechanisms to identify and prevent malicious orders in eShopOnContainers.
    • Regularly audit order data and financial transactions for anomalies within eShopOnContainers.