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Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/eshop

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data AND/OR Disrupt Service

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                      |  Attacker Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access to     |
                                      |  Sensitive Data AND/OR Disrupt Service          |
                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
          +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                                                |
+-------------------------+                                      +--------------------------------+
|  1. Compromise          |                                      |  2. Disrupt Service            |
|     Microservice(s)     |                                      |     Availability               |
+-------------------------+                                      +--------------------------------+
          |                                                                |
+---------------------+                                          +---------------------+
| 1.1 Exploit         |                                          | 2.1.1 Target        | [HR]
|     Vulnerable      |                                          |       Ordering      |
|     API Endpoint    |                                          |       Service       | [CN]
+---------------------+                                          +---------------------+
          |                                                                |
+---------------------+                                          +---------------------+
| 1.1.1 Bypass        |                                          | 2.1.1.1 Flood       | [HR]
|       AuthN/AuthZ   |                                          |       API           |
|       in API GW     |                                          |       Requests      |
+---------------------+                                          +---------------------+
          |
+---------------------+
| 1.1.1.1 Exploit     |
|       Ocelot        |
|       Config        |
+---------------------+
          | [HR]
+---------------------+
| 1.1.1.1.1 Find      |
|       Exposed      |
|       Sensitive    |
|       Routes       |
| L: Medium           |
| I: High             |
| E: Low              |
| S: Intermediate      |
| D: Medium           |
+---------------------+ [CN]
          | [HR]
+---------------------+
| L: Medium           |
| I: High             |
| E: Medium           |
| S: Advanced         |
| D: Hard             |
+---------------------+ [CN]

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 1: Ocelot Misconfiguration Leading to Exposed Routes

  • Overall Description: This attack path exploits weaknesses in the configuration of the Ocelot API Gateway to gain direct access to backend microservices, bypassing authentication and authorization.

  • Steps:

    1. 1.1.1.1 Exploit Ocelot Config [CN]:

      • Description: The attacker identifies and exploits a misconfiguration in the Ocelot API Gateway. This could involve finding weaknesses in routing rules, authentication settings, or other configuration parameters.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard

    2. 1.1.1.1.1 Find Exposed Sensitive Routes [CN]:

      • Description: Due to the Ocelot misconfiguration, the attacker is able to discover and access sensitive API endpoints that should be protected. This might involve using automated scanning tools or manual exploration.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Regularly audit and review Ocelot configuration: Employ a "least privilege" approach, ensuring only necessary routes are exposed and strong authentication is enforced.
    • Use automated configuration scanning tools: Detect misconfigurations proactively.
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization: Protect against injection attacks even if the gateway is bypassed.
    • Monitor API Gateway logs: Look for suspicious activity, such as unauthorized access attempts.
    • Penetration testing: Regularly test the API Gateway for vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 2: DDoS Attack on Ordering Service

  • Overall Description: This attack path focuses on disrupting the availability of the eShop application by overwhelming the Ordering microservice with a flood of requests.

  • Steps:

    1. 2.1.1 Target Ordering Service [CN]:

      • Description: The attacker identifies the Ordering service as a critical component and targets it for a denial-of-service attack.
      • Likelihood: High
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    2. 2.1.1.1 Flood API Requests [HR]:

      • Description: The attacker sends a massive number of requests to the Ordering service's API, exceeding its capacity and making it unavailable to legitimate users.
      • Likelihood: High
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Implement rate limiting and throttling: Configure the API Gateway (Ocelot) and the Ordering service to limit the number of requests from a single source.
    • Use a Content Delivery Network (CDN): Distribute content and absorb some of the attack traffic.
    • Implement circuit breakers: Prevent cascading failures if the Ordering service becomes overloaded.
    • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF): Detect and block malicious traffic patterns.
    • Monitor network traffic: Look for unusual spikes in requests to the Ordering service.
    • Have a DDoS response plan: Define procedures for mitigating and recovering from a DDoS attack.