Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
141 lines (105 loc) · 10.9 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

141 lines (105 loc) · 10.9 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for dotnet/eshop

Mitigation Strategy: Mutual TLS (mTLS) for Inter-Service Communication (eShop-Specific)

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Mutual TLS (mTLS) between all eShop services.

Description:

  1. Generate Certificates: (This step can be done outside of eShop, but the artifacts are used within) Generate a root CA and individual client/server certificates for each microservice.
  2. Configure Services (eShop Code): Modify each service's appsettings.json (or equivalent configuration source) to:
    • Specify the path to its client certificate and private key (these would likely be mounted into the container).
    • Specify the path to the trusted root CA certificate.
    • Enable client certificate validation within the service's HTTPS setup.
  3. Configure Docker Compose (eShop Deployment): Update docker-compose.yml to:
    • Mount the certificates into the correct containers.
    • Ensure services are configured to use HTTPS and require client certificates.
  4. Code Changes (eShop Code): In the .NET code, use HttpClient with HttpClientHandler to attach the client certificate to outgoing requests. On the server-side (within each service), validate the client certificate in the request pipeline. This involves using the X509Certificate2 class and related APIs.
  5. Testing (eShop-Specific): Write integration tests within the eShop solution to verify mTLS is functioning correctly between services.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: (Severity: High) Prevents attackers from intercepting/modifying traffic between eShop services.
  • Service Impersonation: (Severity: High) Prevents an attacker from pretending to be a legitimate eShop service.
  • Unauthorized Access: (Severity: High) Ensures only authorized eShop services can communicate.

Impact:

  • MITM Attacks: Risk significantly reduced (near elimination).
  • Service Impersonation: Risk significantly reduced (near elimination).
  • Unauthorized Access: Risk significantly reduced.

Currently Implemented: Partially. HTTPS is used, but full mTLS is not consistently enforced.

Missing Implementation: Needs to be applied to all inter-service communication within eShop. Specifically check and modify code and configuration for communication between: * Ordering.API and Basket.API * Ordering.API and Catalog.API * All other service-to-service calls, including gRPC.

Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege (Within eShop Application Code)

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce the Principle of Least Privilege within the eShop application code.

Description:

  1. Code Review (eShop Code): Review the code of each eShop service to identify the minimum permissions it needs.
  2. Database Access (eShop Code/Config):
    • Use separate database users/roles for each service.
    • Grant only the necessary permissions (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE) on specific tables to each user/role. Avoid granting broad permissions like db_owner. This involves changes to database scripts and potentially to connection strings within eShop.
    • Review and refactor code to ensure services are not requesting more data than needed.
  3. Message Queue Access (eShop Code/Config):
    • If using a message broker, ensure each service has credentials that only allow it to publish to/subscribe from the specific topics it needs.
    • Review code to ensure services are not subscribing to unnecessary topics.
  4. Inter-Service Communication (eShop Code): Ensure that services are only calling the specific endpoints they need on other services.
  5. Refactor (eShop Code): If a service has excessive permissions, refactor the code to reduce its requirements.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Privilege Escalation: (Severity: High) Limits the damage if a service is compromised.
  • Data Breaches: (Severity: High) Reduces the amount of data accessible after a compromise.
  • Insider Threats: (Severity: Medium) Limits the damage a malicious insider can do.

Impact:

  • Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced.
  • Data Breaches: Risk reduced.
  • Insider Threats: Risk reduced.

Currently Implemented: Partially. Some separation of concerns exists, but a rigorous application of least privilege is likely not fully implemented.

Missing Implementation: Requires a thorough code review and potential refactoring of all eShop services, focusing on database access, message queue access, and inter-service communication.

Mitigation Strategy: Robust Secret Management (eShop Configuration)

Mitigation Strategy: Use a dedicated secret management solution for eShop secrets.

Description:

  1. Choose a Secret Store: (This is an external dependency, but its use is within eShop) Select a secret store (Azure Key Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault).
  2. Store Secrets: Store all eShop secrets (connection strings, API keys, etc.) in the chosen secret store.
  3. Modify eShop Configuration:
    • Remove secrets from appsettings.json and environment variables.
    • Add code to each eShop service to retrieve secrets from the secret store at runtime. This involves using the appropriate client library for the chosen secret store and authenticating to it (likely using a managed identity or service principal).
    • Update docker-compose.yml or Kubernetes manifests to provide the necessary configuration for accessing the secret store (e.g., mounting secrets as files or setting environment variables that point to the secret store).
  4. Rotate Secrets: Implement a process to rotate secrets.

Threats Mitigated: * Secret Exposure: (Severity: High) Prevents secrets from being exposed in eShop code, configuration, or environment variables. * Credential Theft: (Severity: High) Makes it harder to steal credentials. * Configuration Errors: (Severity: Medium) Reduces misconfiguration risks.

Impact: * Secret Exposure: Risk significantly reduced. * Credential Theft: Risk significantly reduced. * Configuration Errors: Risk reduced.

Currently Implemented: Partially. The project uses environment variables and appsettings.json, which is not ideal. Some Azure Key Vault integration might exist, but it's not consistently used.

Missing Implementation: Requires modifying all eShop services to retrieve all secrets from a dedicated secret store. Remove secrets from appsettings.json and environment variables used in production.

Mitigation Strategy: Message Validation (eShop Code - Event-Driven Architecture)

Mitigation Strategy: Implement strict message validation within eShop services.

Description:

  1. Define Message Schemas (eShop Code): Define clear schemas (e.g., using JSON Schema, Avro, or Protobuf) for all messages exchanged between eShop services. These schemas should be part of the eShop codebase.
  2. Validate Messages (eShop Code): In each eShop service that consumes messages (e.g., event handlers), add code to validate the incoming message against its defined schema before any processing occurs. Use a library appropriate for the chosen schema format.
  3. Reject Invalid Messages (eShop Code): If a message is invalid, reject it, log an error, and potentially move it to a dead-letter queue. Do not process invalid messages.
  4. Input Sanitization (eShop Code): After validating the schema, sanitize any data extracted from the message before using it in database queries, API calls, or other operations.

Threats Mitigated: * Injection Attacks: (Severity: High) Prevents attackers from injecting malicious data via messages. * Poison Pill Messages: (Severity: High) Prevents malformed messages from crashing eShop services. * Data Corruption: (Severity: Medium) Ensures data integrity within the eShop event-driven system.

Impact: * Injection Attacks: Risk significantly reduced. * Poison Pill Messages: Risk significantly reduced. * Data Corruption: Risk reduced.

Currently Implemented: Partially. Some basic validation might exist, but comprehensive schema-based validation for all messages is likely not fully implemented.

Missing Implementation: Requires adding schema definitions and validation logic to all eShop services that consume messages. This is crucial for the IntegrationEvent handling.

Mitigation Strategy: gRPC Security (eShop Code)

Mitigation Strategy: Secure gRPC communication within eShop.

Description:

  1. Enable TLS (eShop Configuration/Code): Configure gRPC to use TLS for all communication. This involves obtaining and configuring server certificates (similar to mTLS, but potentially just server-side TLS). This impacts appsettings.json and potentially the Program.cs or startup code.
  2. Implement Authentication (eShop Code): Implement authentication (e.g., JWT tokens or client certificates) to verify client identity. This involves adding authentication middleware to the gRPC service pipeline.
  3. Implement Authorization (eShop Code): Implement authorization logic to control which clients can access which gRPC methods. This involves adding authorization checks within the gRPC method implementations.
  4. Input Validation (eShop Code): Validate all input data received from gRPC clients within the method implementations to prevent injection attacks. This is similar to message validation but applies to gRPC method parameters.
  5. Update Libraries (eShop Dependencies): Keep gRPC libraries up-to-date (via NuGet).

Threats Mitigated: * Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: (Severity: High) TLS prevents interception. * Unauthorized Access: (Severity: High) Authentication and authorization prevent unauthorized access. * Injection Attacks: (Severity: High) Input validation prevents malicious data.

Impact: * MITM Attacks: Risk significantly reduced (with TLS). * Unauthorized Access: Risk significantly reduced (with authentication/authorization). * Injection Attacks: Risk significantly reduced (with input validation).

Currently Implemented: Partially. TLS is likely used, but comprehensive authentication, authorization, and input validation for all gRPC methods need verification.

Missing Implementation: Review all gRPC service implementations within eShop and ensure that authentication, authorization, and input validation are consistently applied.