Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
165 lines (109 loc) · 13.3 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

165 lines (109 loc) · 13.3 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/orleans

Objective: Gain unauthorized access, disrupt service, or exfiltrate data from an application built using Orleans, by targeting weaknesses inherent in the Orleans framework itself or its common usage patterns.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Orleans Application (CRITICAL NODE)

├─── 1. Disrupt Application Availability (DoS)
│   └─── 1.1. Silo Resource Exhaustion
│       ├─── 1.1.1. Grain Activation Flooding
│       │   └─── 1.1.1.a. External Client Driven Activation Flood **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│       └─── 1.1.4. Network Saturation
│           └─── 1.1.4.b. Client-to-Grain Communication Flood **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   └─── 1.2. Silo Cluster Disruption
│       └─── 1.2.3. Configuration Exploitation **(CRITICAL NODE)**
│           ├─── 1.2.3.a. Misconfigured Membership Provider (e.g., insecure storage) **(HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE)**
│           └─── 1.2.3.b. Misconfigured Silo Ports/Firewall Rules **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**

├─── 2. Gain Unauthorized Access/Control
│   └─── 2.1. Grain Logic Exploitation **(CRITICAL NODE)**
│       └─── 2.1.1. Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Grain Methods **(HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE)**
│           └─── 2.1.1.a. Injection Attacks (SQL, NoSQL, Command Injection via Grain Input) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│       └─── 2.1.2. Business Logic Flaws in Grain Interactions
│           └─── 2.1.2.b. Insecure Grain Authorization Logic (Bypass Checks) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│       └─── 2.1.3. Grain State Manipulation (If Persistence Compromised - See 3.2)
│           └─── 2.1.3.a. Direct Modification of Persistent State Store **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   └─── 2.2. Orleans Control Plane Exploitation (Less Direct, but possible) **(CRITICAL NODE)**
│       └─── 2.2.1. Management Interface Vulnerabilities (If Exposed) **(CRITICAL NODE)**
│           └─── 2.2.1.a. Unsecured Management Endpoints (No Authentication/Authorization) **(HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE)**

└─── 3. Data Breach/Exfiltration
    └─── 3.1. Grain State Data Theft **(CRITICAL NODE)**
        └─── 3.1.1. Direct Access to Persistent Storage **(HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE)**
            └─── 3.1.1.a. Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Persistence Provider (SQL Injection, etc.) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
            └─── 3.1.1.b. Unauthorized Access to Storage Credentials/Keys **(HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE)**
        └─── 3.1.2. Grain State Interception in Transit (Less likely if using encryption)
        │   └─── 3.1.2.b. Eavesdropping on Network Traffic (Unencrypted Channels) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
        └─── 3.1.3. Grain Logic Exploitation for Data Extraction
            └─── 3.1.3.b. Exploiting Logging/Telemetry to Extract Data **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    └─── 3.2. Backup Data Theft (If Backups are Insecure)
        └─── 3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backup Storage **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
        └─── 3.2.2. Weak Encryption/Protection of Backup Data **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Orleans Application

This is the ultimate objective. Success at any of the leaf nodes in the high-risk paths contributes to achieving this goal.

  • Impact: Full compromise of the application, potentially leading to data breach, service disruption, and reputational damage.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Exploitation (1.2.3)

Misconfigurations in Orleans setup can directly lead to cluster instability, unauthorized access, or data breaches.

  • Impact: High, as misconfiguration can have wide-ranging consequences across the entire Orleans application.

Attack Tree Path: Grain Logic Exploitation (2.1)

Vulnerabilities within the application-specific grain code are direct pathways for attackers to manipulate application behavior, gain unauthorized access, or steal data.

  • Impact: High, as grain logic is the core of the application's functionality and data handling.

Attack Tree Path: Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Grain Methods (2.1.1)

Failure to properly validate inputs to grain methods is a very common and easily exploitable vulnerability, leading to various attack types.

  • Impact: High, as input validation flaws can be exploited for injection attacks, data manipulation, and DoS.

Attack Tree Path: Orleans Control Plane Exploitation (2.2)

Compromising the Orleans control plane (management interfaces, configuration) can grant attackers broad control over the entire Orleans cluster and application.

  • Impact: Very High, as control plane access can lead to complete system takeover.

Attack Tree Path: Management Interface Vulnerabilities (If Exposed) (2.2.1)

Exposed and vulnerable management interfaces provide a direct entry point for attackers to control the Orleans cluster.

  • Impact: Very High, as management interfaces often offer powerful administrative capabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Unsecured Management Endpoints (No Authentication/Authorization) (2.2.1.a)

Exposing management endpoints without authentication is a critical security flaw, allowing anyone to potentially access and control the Orleans cluster.

  • Impact: Very High, immediate and direct access to administrative functions.

Attack Tree Path: Grain State Data Theft (3.1)

Theft of sensitive data stored within grain state is a primary concern for data breaches.

  • Impact: High, direct data confidentiality breach.

Attack Tree Path: Direct Access to Persistent Storage (3.1.1)

Gaining direct access to the underlying persistent storage bypasses Orleans security and allows for direct data manipulation or theft.

  • Impact: Very High, direct access to all persisted data.

Attack Tree Path: Unauthorized Access to Storage Credentials/Keys (3.1.1.b)

Compromised storage credentials provide easy and direct access to the persistent storage and all grain state data.

  • Impact: Very High, trivial access to sensitive data with compromised credentials.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.a. External Client Driven Activation Flood

  • Attack Vector: Attackers send a large volume of client requests targeting grains, causing excessive grain activations and resource exhaustion on silos, leading to DoS.
  • Impact: Medium, application unavailability, service disruption.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4.b. Client-to-Grain Communication Flood

  • Attack Vector: Attackers flood the network with client requests to grains, saturating network bandwidth and potentially overwhelming silos, causing DoS.
  • Impact: Medium, application unavailability, service disruption.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.a. Misconfigured Membership Provider (e.g., insecure storage)

  • Attack Vector: Using an insecure or misconfigured membership provider allows attackers to manipulate cluster membership, potentially injecting malicious silos or disrupting cluster operations.
  • Impact: High, cluster instability, potential for data corruption, unauthorized access if malicious silos are injected.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.b. Misconfigured Silo Ports/Firewall Rules

  • Attack Vector: Opening unnecessary ports or misconfiguring firewall rules exposes silos to unauthorized network access, potentially allowing attackers to directly interact with silos or the cluster network.
  • Impact: Medium, increased attack surface, potential for DoS or further exploitation of silo services.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.a. Injection Attacks (SQL, NoSQL, Command Injection via Grain Input)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious code (SQL, NoSQL queries, system commands) through grain method parameters due to lack of input validation, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, or system command execution.
  • Impact: High, data breach, data manipulation, potential for system compromise depending on the injection type.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2.b. Insecure Grain Authorization Logic (Bypass Checks)

  • Attack Vector: Flaws in grain authorization logic allow attackers to bypass access controls and execute grain methods or access data they are not authorized to, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive functionality or data.
  • Impact: High, unauthorized access to application features and data.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3.a. Direct Modification of Persistent State Store

  • Attack Vector: If the persistence layer is compromised (e.g., due to weak access controls or vulnerabilities), attackers can directly modify the persistent storage, manipulating grain state and potentially application behavior or data integrity.
  • Impact: High, data corruption, data manipulation, potential for unauthorized actions by manipulating grain state.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.a. Unsecured Management Endpoints (No Authentication/Authorization)

  • Attack Vector: Management endpoints are exposed without proper authentication, allowing attackers to directly access and use management functions to control the Orleans cluster, potentially leading to full compromise.
  • Impact: Very High, full control over the Orleans cluster, ability to disrupt service, exfiltrate data, or manipulate the application.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Direct Access to Persistent Storage

  • Attack Vector: Attackers gain direct access to the persistent storage (e.g., database, storage account) by exploiting vulnerabilities in the persistence provider or misconfigurations, allowing them to directly read or modify grain state data.
  • Impact: Very High, direct data breach, data manipulation, potential for data integrity compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1.b. Unauthorized Access to Storage Credentials/Keys

  • Attack Vector: Attackers compromise storage credentials or access keys used by the persistence provider, granting them unauthorized access to the persistent storage and all grain state data.
  • Impact: Very High, trivial access to sensitive data, data breach.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2.b. Eavesdropping on Network Traffic (Unencrypted Channels)

  • Attack Vector: If grain communication channels are not encrypted, attackers can eavesdrop on network traffic to intercept and steal sensitive grain state data being transmitted between silos or between clients and silos.
  • Impact: High, data breach, interception of sensitive information in transit.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.3.b. Exploiting Logging/Telemetry to Extract Data

  • Attack Vector: Excessive or insecure logging or telemetry configurations might inadvertently log sensitive grain state data. Attackers can exploit this by accessing logs or telemetry data to extract sensitive information.
  • Impact: Low to Medium, data leakage through logs, potential for sensitive information exposure.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backup Storage

  • Attack Vector: Attackers gain unauthorized access to the storage location where backups of the Orleans application or its persistent state are stored, allowing them to access and potentially steal backup data.
  • Impact: High, data breach from backup data, exposure of historical data.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.2. Weak Encryption/Protection of Backup Data

  • Attack Vector: Backups are not properly encrypted or protected, allowing attackers who gain access to the backup storage to easily extract and access sensitive data from the backups.
  • Impact: High, data breach from backup data, exposure of historical data due to weak backup security.