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Attack Tree Analysis for dotnet/reactive

Objective: To compromise the application by exploiting vulnerabilities arising from the implementation and usage of Reactive Extensions, leading to data breaches, denial of service, or unauthorized access/actions.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using Reactive Extensions

└─── [CRITICAL NODE] 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Rx Operators & Logic [HIGH RISK PATH] ├─── 1.1. Operator Misuse/Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.1.1. Logic Flaws in Custom Operators │ │ ├─── 1.1.1.1. Bypass Security Checks in Custom Operators [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Bypass Security Checks in Custom Operators [HIGH RISK PATH] ├─── 1.1.2. Exploit Built-in Operator Behavior [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.1.2.2. Resource Exhaustion via Buffer, Window, GroupBy [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 1.1.2.2.1. Send Large Volumes of Data to Trigger Excessive Buffering/Windowing [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Send Large Volumes of Data to Trigger Excessive Buffering/Windowing [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.1.2.3. Error Handling Bypass via Catch, Retry [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 1.1.2.3.1. Trigger Errors that Mask Underlying Issues or Bypass Security Logic [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Trigger Errors that Mask Underlying Issues or Bypass Security Logic [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.3. Vulnerabilities in 3rd-Party Rx Operator Libraries [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.1.3.1. Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in External Rx Operator Packages [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in External Rx Operator Packages [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.3.2. Supply Chain Attacks via Malicious Rx Operator Packages [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── [Attack Step] Supply Chain Attacks via Malicious Rx Operator Packages [HIGH RISK PATH]

├─── 1.2.  Observable Stream Manipulation **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├─── 1.2.1.  Data Injection into Observable Streams **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├─── 1.2.1.1.  Exploit Vulnerable Data Source Feeding Observable **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├─── 1.2.1.1.1.  Inject Malicious Data into API Endpoint that is source of Observable **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └─── **[Attack Step]** Inject Malicious Data into API Endpoint source of Observable **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├─── 1.2.1.1.2.  Compromise Database feeding Observable stream **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └─── **[Attack Step]** Compromise Database feeding Observable stream **[HIGH RISK PATH]**

├─── 1.3.  Backpressure & Resource Exhaustion **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    ├─── 1.3.1.  Backpressure Exploitation **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │   └─── 1.3.1.1.  Overwhelm Subscriber with Data without Proper Backpressure Handling **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │       ├─── 1.3.1.1.1.  Cause Subscriber to Crash or Become Unresponsive **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │       │   └─── **[Attack Step]** Cause Subscriber to Crash or Become Unresponsive **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │       └─── 1.3.1.1.2.  Trigger Denial of Service by Exhausting Subscriber Resources **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │           └─── **[Attack Step]** Trigger Denial of Service by Exhausting Subscriber Resources **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    ├─── 1.3.2.  Memory Leaks due to Unmanaged Subscriptions **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │   └─── 1.3.2.1.  Create Observables and Subscriptions without Proper Disposal **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │       └─── 1.3.2.1.1.  Repeatedly Trigger Actions that Create Observables leading to Memory Accumulation **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
    │           └─── **[Attack Step]** Repeatedly Trigger Actions that Create Observables leading to Memory Accumulation **[HIGH RISK PATH]**

└─── 2. Vulnerabilities in Application Logic Interacting with Rx [HIGH RISK PATH] ├─── 2.1. Security Logic Implemented in Rx Pipelines [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 2.1.1. Flaws in Authorization/Authentication within Rx Streams [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 2.1.1.1. Bypass Authorization Checks due to Asynchronous Nature of Rx [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Bypass Authorization Checks due to Asynchronous Nature of Rx [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 2.1.1.2. Race Conditions in Authorization Logic within Rx Pipelines [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Race Conditions in Authorization Logic within Rx Pipelines [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 2.1.2. Data Validation/Sanitization Issues in Rx Streams [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 2.1.2.1. Improper Sanitization of Data within Observable Streams [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── 2.1.2.1.1. Inject Malicious Payloads that Bypass Sanitization in Rx Operators [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Inject Malicious Payloads that Bypass Sanitization in Rx Operators [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── 2.1.3. Sensitive Data Handling in Rx Streams [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── 2.1.3.1. Unintended Logging or Exposure of Sensitive Data within Rx Pipelines [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── [Attack Step] Unintended Logging or Exposure of Sensitive Data within Rx Pipelines [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── 2.1.3.2. Storing Sensitive Data in Observables or Subscriptions without Proper Protection [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── [Attack Step] Storing Sensitive Data in Observables or Subscriptions without Proper Protection [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Security Checks in Custom Operators [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Authorization Bypass, Data Breach)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium (Development Knowledge, Rx Understanding)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Code Review, Dynamic Analysis)
    • Description: Attackers exploit logic flaws in custom Rx operators to bypass security checks implemented within or outside the operator, leading to unauthorized actions or data access.

Attack Tree Path: Send Large Volumes of Data to Trigger Excessive Buffering/Windowing [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (DoS)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic Network Knowledge)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Resource Monitoring, Anomaly Detection)
    • Description: Attackers send a large volume of data to an application that uses Buffer, Window, or similar operators without proper limits or backpressure, causing excessive memory consumption and leading to Denial of Service.

Attack Tree Path: Trigger Errors that Mask Underlying Issues or Bypass Security Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Authorization Bypass, Logic Errors)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium (Application Logic Understanding, Error Handling Knowledge)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Logging Analysis, Code Review)
    • Description: Attackers craft inputs or trigger conditions that cause errors handled by Catch or Retry operators in a way that masks underlying security issues or bypasses intended security logic in error paths.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in External Rx Operator Packages [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Low (Requires Vulnerable Package & Known Exploit)
    • Impact: High (Depends on Vulnerability - RCE, DoS, Data Breach)
    • Effort: Low (If Exploit Exists) to High (If 0-day)
    • Skill Level: Low (If Exploit Exists) to High (If 0-day)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Vulnerability Scanners) to Hard (0-day)
    • Description: Attackers exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in third-party Rx operator libraries used by the application.

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Attacks via Malicious Rx Operator Packages [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Very Low (Requires Compromised Package Registry/Developer Account)
    • Impact: Critical (Full Application Compromise)
    • Effort: High (Package Registry/Developer Account Compromise)
    • Skill Level: High (Supply Chain Attack Expertise)
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Code Review, Anomaly Detection in Dependencies)
    • Description: Attackers compromise the supply chain by injecting malicious code into Rx operator packages used by the application, potentially gaining full control over the application.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Data into API Endpoint source of Observable [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (If API Endpoint is Vulnerable - e.g., Injection Flaws)
    • Impact: High (Data Corruption, Logic Errors, XSS, etc.)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Depending on API Vulnerability)
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium (Web Application Security Skills)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Input Validation, WAF, Anomaly Detection)
    • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities (like injection flaws) in API endpoints that serve as data sources for Observables, injecting malicious data that is then processed by the Rx pipeline, leading to various application-level attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Database feeding Observable stream [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Low (Requires Database Vulnerability or Credential Compromise)
    • Impact: Critical (Data Breach, Full Application Compromise)
    • Effort: Medium to High (Database Exploitation)
    • Skill Level: Medium to High (Database Security Skills)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Database Auditing, Security Monitoring)
    • Description: Attackers compromise the database that is the source of data for an Observable stream, allowing them to manipulate or exfiltrate data, potentially leading to full application compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Cause Subscriber to Crash or Become Unresponsive [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (If Backpressure is not Properly Implemented)
    • Impact: High (DoS)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic Network Knowledge)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Resource Monitoring, Anomaly Detection)
    • Description: Attackers overwhelm the subscriber of an Observable stream by sending data at a rate faster than it can process, without proper backpressure handling, leading to subscriber crash or unresponsiveness and causing Denial of Service.

Attack Tree Path: Trigger Denial of Service by Exhausting Subscriber Resources [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (If Backpressure is not Properly Implemented)
    • Impact: High (DoS)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic Network Knowledge)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Resource Monitoring, Anomaly Detection)
    • Description: Similar to the previous point, but focuses on exhausting resources (CPU, memory) of the subscriber due to lack of backpressure, leading to a Denial of Service condition.

Attack Tree Path: Repeatedly Trigger Actions that Create Observables leading to Memory Accumulation [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (Common Developer Mistake)
    • Impact: Medium (Performance Degradation, DoS over time)
    • Effort: Low (Repeatedly Triggering Application Features)
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic Application Usage)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Memory Profiling, Performance Monitoring over time)
    • Description: Attackers repeatedly trigger application features that create Observables and subscriptions without proper disposal, leading to memory leaks over time, eventually causing performance degradation and potentially Denial of Service.

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Authorization Checks due to Asynchronous Nature of Rx [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on Complexity of Authorization Logic)
    • Impact: High (Authorization Bypass, Unauthorized Access)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium (Concurrency Knowledge, Rx Understanding)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Code Review, Security Auditing)
    • Description: Attackers exploit timing windows or race conditions introduced by the asynchronous nature of Rx pipelines to bypass authorization checks, gaining unauthorized access to resources or functionalities.

Attack Tree Path: Race Conditions in Authorization Logic within Rx Pipelines [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on Complexity of Authorization Logic)
    • Impact: High (Authorization Bypass, Unauthorized Access)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium (Concurrency Knowledge, Race Condition Exploitation)
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Intermittent Issues, Race Condition Debugging)
    • Description: Attackers trigger race conditions in the authorization logic implemented within Rx pipelines, leading to inconsistent authorization decisions and potential bypasses.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Payloads that Bypass Sanitization in Rx Operators [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (If Sanitization is Not Thorough or Incorrectly Placed)
    • Impact: High (XSS, Injection Attacks, Data Corruption)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Input Crafting)
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium (Web Application Security Skills)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Input Validation, WAF, Penetration Testing)
    • Description: Attackers inject malicious payloads into data streams that are processed by Rx operators, exploiting insufficient or improperly placed sanitization logic within the Rx pipeline, leading to vulnerabilities like XSS or injection attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Unintended Logging or Exposure of Sensitive Data within Rx Pipelines [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Medium (Common Logging Practices, Debugging)
    • Impact: High (Data Breach, Privacy Violation)
    • Effort: Very Low (Passive Observation of Logs)
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic Access to Logs)
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (If Logs are Not Regularly Audited) to Easy (If Logging is Monitored)
    • Description: Sensitive data is unintentionally logged or exposed through debugging mechanisms within Rx pipelines, leading to potential data breaches if logs are accessible to attackers.

Attack Tree Path: Storing Sensitive Data in Observables or Subscriptions without Proper Protection [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Likelihood: Low (Poor Practice, but Developers Might Do It)
    • Impact: High (Data Breach, Privacy Violation)
    • Effort: Medium (Code Analysis, Memory Dump Analysis)
    • Skill Level: Medium (Code Analysis, Memory Analysis)
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Code Review, Static Analysis, Memory Inspection)
    • Description: Sensitive data is stored directly within Observables or subscriptions without proper encryption or protection, making it vulnerable to exposure through code analysis or memory dumps.