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Attack Tree Analysis for duendesoftware/products

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise an application that uses Duende IdentityServer products by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the IdentityServer itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application via Duende IdentityServer [CRITICAL NODE]
    • A. Bypass Authentication [CRITICAL NODE]
      • A.1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Authentication Flows [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • A.1.a. Authorization Code Flow Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • A.1.a.1. Code Interception [HIGH RISK]
          • A.1.a.2. CSRF in Authorization Code Exchange [HIGH RISK]
          • A.1.a.3. Redirect URI Manipulation [HIGH RISK]
        • A.1.b.2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) to Steal Tokens [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • A.1.c. Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • A.1.c.1. Credential Stuffing/Brute Force Attacks [HIGH RISK]
          • A.1.c.2. Phishing for User Credentials [HIGH RISK]
        • A.2. Session Hijacking/Fixation [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • A.2.a. Session Cookie Theft (XSS, Network Sniffing) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • B. Gain Unauthorized Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]
      • B.4. Token Theft and Replay Attacks [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • B.4.a. Bearer Token Theft (Network Sniffing, XSS, Logging) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • B.4.b. Refresh Token Theft and Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • C. Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities in IdentityServer [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH RISK PATH]
      • C.1. SQL Injection (if using SQL-based persistence) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • C.3. Insecure Data Storage Practices [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • C.3.a. Weak Encryption of Sensitive Data at Rest [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • C.3.b. Insufficient Access Controls on Data Storage [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • D. Exploit Configuration Weaknesses in IdentityServer [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH RISK PATH]
      • D.1. Default Credentials/Weak Admin Passwords [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • D.2. Misconfigurations in OIDC/OAuth Settings [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • D.2.a. Insecure Grant Types Enabled (e.g., Resource Owner Password Credentials) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • D.2.b. Insecure Client Configurations (e.g., weak client secrets, public clients used inappropriately) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • D.3. Lack of Security Hardening [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • D.3.a. Outdated IdentityServer Version with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • D.3.b. Missing Security Headers (e.g., CSP, HSTS) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • D.3.c. Insecure Server Configuration (e.g., exposed ports, weak TLS configuration) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • E. Exploit Protocol Implementation Flaws in Duende IdentityServer
      • E.1. Vulnerabilities in Duende IdentityServer Codebase
        • E.1.b. Known Vulnerabilities in Older Versions (if not updated) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • G. Compromise the IdentityServer Admin Interface [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH RISK PATH]
      • G.1. Authentication Bypass on Admin Interface [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.1.a. Vulnerabilities in Admin Login Mechanism [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • G.2. Authorization Bypass on Admin Interface [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.2.a. Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • G.3. Vulnerabilities in Admin Interface Code [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.3.a. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.3.b. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.3.c. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • G.4. Lack of Admin Interface Security Hardening [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.4.a. Exposed Admin Interface to Public Network [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • G.4.b. Missing Security Headers on Admin Interface [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: A.1.a.1. Code Interception [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: During the Authorization Code flow, the authorization code is transmitted via the redirect URI. If HTTPS is not strictly enforced or if there are vulnerabilities in the network or client browser, an attacker could intercept this code.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Enforce HTTPS for all communication, use PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) to mitigate code interception risks, educate users about secure network practices.

Attack Tree Path: A.1.a.2. CSRF in Authorization Code Exchange [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: An attacker could craft a malicious website or link that tricks a user into initiating an authorization code flow to the attacker's controlled client. Without proper CSRF protection (like the state parameter), the attacker could potentially exchange the authorization code for an access token and impersonate the user.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement and validate the state parameter in authorization requests to prevent CSRF attacks, use secure session handling.

Attack Tree Path: A.1.a.3. Redirect URI Manipulation [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If the IdentityServer does not strictly validate redirect URIs, an attacker could manipulate the redirect_uri parameter in the authorization request to point to their own controlled domain. This could allow them to intercept the authorization code or access token (in implicit flow scenarios, though less relevant for Authorization Code flow with best practices).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Whitelist and strictly validate redirect URIs on the IdentityServer, avoid wildcard redirects, regularly review and audit allowed redirect URIs.

Attack Tree Path: A.1.b.2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) to Steal Tokens [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If the IdentityServer or the application using it is vulnerable to XSS, an attacker could inject malicious JavaScript code into web pages served by the IdentityServer. This script could then steal access tokens or authorization codes from the user's browser and send them to the attacker.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access, Data Breach)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement robust input validation and output encoding across the IdentityServer and the application, use Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate XSS risks, conduct regular security scans for XSS vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: A.1.c.1. Credential Stuffing/Brute Force Attacks [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If the Resource Owner Password Credentials flow is enabled (discouraged), or if attackers target user login forms directly, they can attempt to guess user credentials through brute-force attacks or credential stuffing (using lists of compromised credentials from other breaches).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting on login attempts, enforce account lockout policies after multiple failed attempts, use strong password policies, consider Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to significantly reduce the effectiveness of credential-based attacks.

Attack Tree Path: A.1.c.2. Phishing for User Credentials [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Attackers can use phishing techniques (e.g., sending deceptive emails or creating fake login pages that mimic the IdentityServer's login page) to trick users into revealing their usernames and passwords.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authentication, Gain User Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Phishing emails can be sophisticated and hard to detect technically)
  • Mitigation: User education and awareness training on phishing attacks, implement MFA to add an extra layer of security even if credentials are compromised, monitor for suspicious login attempts and unusual user behavior.

Attack Tree Path: A.2.a. Session Cookie Theft (XSS, Network Sniffing) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If session cookies used by the IdentityServer are not properly secured, attackers can steal them through various methods:
    • XSS: As mentioned before, XSS vulnerabilities can allow attackers to execute JavaScript to steal cookies.
    • Network Sniffing: If HTTPS is not enforced, or if there are vulnerabilities in the network, attackers could potentially sniff network traffic and intercept session cookies transmitted in the clear.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Session Hijacking, Impersonation, Bypass Authentication)
  • Effort: Low-Medium
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure session cookies by setting HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite attributes, enforce HTTPS for all communication, rigorously mitigate XSS vulnerabilities, monitor for suspicious session activity.

Attack Tree Path: B.4.a. Bearer Token Theft (Network Sniffing, XSS, Logging) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Bearer tokens (like access tokens and refresh tokens) are used to authorize requests. If these tokens are stolen, attackers can impersonate the legitimate user. Token theft can occur through:
    • Network Sniffing: If HTTPS is not enforced, tokens transmitted over the network can be intercepted.
    • XSS: XSS vulnerabilities can allow attackers to steal tokens from the browser's memory or local storage.
    • Logging: Improper logging practices might inadvertently log tokens in server logs, making them accessible to attackers who gain access to the logs.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Bypass Authorization, Impersonation, Data Access)
  • Effort: Low-Medium
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Enforce HTTPS for all communication, mitigate XSS vulnerabilities, avoid logging tokens in server logs, use short-lived tokens to limit the window of opportunity for replay attacks, consider token binding techniques for enhanced security.

Attack Tree Path: B.4.b. Refresh Token Theft and Abuse [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Refresh tokens are long-lived credentials used to obtain new access tokens without requiring the user to re-authenticate. If a refresh token is stolen, an attacker can continuously obtain new access tokens and maintain unauthorized access for an extended period.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High (Persistent Unauthorized Access, Long-Term Impersonation)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Securely store refresh tokens (encrypted at rest), implement refresh token rotation to invalidate old tokens upon issuance of new ones, monitor for unusual refresh token usage patterns (e.g., token usage from different locations or devices).

Attack Tree Path: C.1. SQL Injection (if using SQL-based persistence) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If the IdentityServer uses a SQL database for persistence and input validation is insufficient, attackers can inject malicious SQL code into input fields. This can allow them to bypass authentication, extract sensitive data from the database (including user credentials, client secrets, configuration data), modify data, or even gain control of the database server.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical (Data Breach, Full System Compromise, Data Integrity Loss)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Use parameterized queries or an ORM (Object-Relational Mapper) to prevent SQL injection, perform thorough input validation on all user-supplied data, conduct regular security scans and penetration testing to identify SQL injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: C.3.a. Weak Encryption of Sensitive Data at Rest [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If sensitive data stored by the IdentityServer (like client secrets, user credentials, encryption keys) is not encrypted or is encrypted using weak algorithms or insecure key management practices, attackers who gain unauthorized access to the database or data storage can easily decrypt and compromise this sensitive information.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical (Data Breach, Credential Compromise, Full System Compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Difficult to detect without internal security audits and code review)
  • Mitigation: Use strong encryption algorithms (e.g., AES-256) for encrypting sensitive data at rest, implement secure key management practices (e.g., using a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or a secure key vault), regularly audit encryption configurations and key management procedures.

Attack Tree Path: C.3.b. Insufficient Access Controls on Data Storage [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If access controls to the database or data storage used by the IdentityServer are not properly configured, attackers who compromise the server or gain unauthorized network access might be able to directly access the data store and bypass application-level security controls.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical (Data Breach, Full System Compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Difficult to detect without internal security audits and infrastructure review)
  • Mitigation: Implement strict access controls to the database or data store, follow the principle of least privilege, regularly review and audit access control configurations, use network segmentation to isolate the database server.

Attack Tree Path: D.1. Default Credentials/Weak Admin Passwords [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: If default administrator credentials are not changed after deployment or if weak passwords are used for administrator accounts, attackers can easily gain administrative access to the IdentityServer.
  • Likelihood: Low (If basic security practices are followed, but still a common mistake)
  • Impact: Critical (Full Admin Access, Complete System Compromise)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (If default credentials are used, easily detectable through automated scans or known default credential lists)
  • Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies for all administrator accounts, change default credentials immediately upon deployment, implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for administrator accounts to add an extra layer of protection.

Attack Tree Path: D.2.a. Insecure Grant Types Enabled (e.g., Resource Owner Password Credentials) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Enabling insecure grant types like Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) increases the attack surface. ROPC, in particular, directly exposes user credentials to the client application and makes the system more vulnerable to credential theft, brute-force attacks, and phishing.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If insecure grant types are enabled unnecessarily)
  • Impact: Medium-High (Increased Risk of Credential Compromise, Authentication Bypass)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Configuration review)
  • Mitigation: Disable insecure grant types unless absolutely necessary and after careful risk assessment, understand the security implications of each grant type, prefer more secure flows like Authorization Code Flow with PKCE.

Attack Tree Path: D.2.b. Insecure Client Configurations (e.g., weak client secrets, public clients used inappropriately) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Misconfiguring clients can introduce vulnerabilities:
    • Weak Client Secrets: Using weak or default client secrets makes client authentication easier to bypass.
    • Public Clients Used Inappropriately: Using public clients (which don't use secrets) when confidential clients should be used can weaken security, especially if sensitive operations are performed by the client.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Configuration errors are common)
  • Impact: Medium-High (Client Impersonation, Authorization Bypass, Data Access)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Configuration review)
  • Mitigation: Enforce strong, randomly generated client secrets, use confidential clients whenever possible (especially for server-side applications), properly configure client authentication methods, regularly review and audit client configurations.

Attack Tree Path: D.3.a. Outdated IdentityServer Version with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Running an outdated version of Duende IdentityServer with known security vulnerabilities exposes the application to exploitation using publicly available exploit code.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If patching and updates are not regularly performed)
  • Impact: High (Full System Compromise, Data Breach, Depending on the vulnerability)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium (Exploiting known vulnerabilities often requires less skill)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Vulnerability scanning tools can easily identify outdated versions and known vulnerabilities)
  • Mitigation: Regularly update Duende IdentityServer to the latest stable version, subscribe to security advisories from Duende Software, implement a vulnerability management program, perform regular vulnerability scanning.

Attack Tree Path: D.3.b. Missing Security Headers (e.g., CSP, HSTS) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Missing security headers weakens the application's defenses against common web attacks:
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Without CSP, the application is more vulnerable to XSS attacks.
    • HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS): Without HSTS, users might be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if they initially access the site over HTTP.
    • Other headers like X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, X-Content-Type-Options also contribute to overall security.
  • Likelihood: High (Missing headers are common in default configurations)
  • Impact: Medium (Increased vulnerability to various web attacks, including XSS and MITM)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Automated security scanners easily detect missing headers)
  • Mitigation: Implement recommended security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, X-Content-Type-Options), configure headers appropriately for the application's needs, regularly scan for missing or misconfigured security headers.

Attack Tree Path: D.3.c. Insecure Server Configuration (e.g., exposed ports, weak TLS configuration) [HIGH RISK]

  • Attack Vector: Insecure server configurations can create vulnerabilities:
    • Exposed Ports: Unnecessary ports open to the public network increase the attack surface.
    • Weak TLS Configuration: Using outdated TLS protocols or weak cipher suites makes communication vulnerable to interception and decryption.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Configuration errors are common in server deployments)
  • Impact: Medium-High (Network-level attacks, MITM attacks, Information Disclosure)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Port scanning and configuration review are straightforward)
  • Mitigation: Harden the server environment by following security best practices (e.g., CIS benchmarks), close unnecessary ports, configure strong TLS protocols and cipher suites, regularly scan for open ports and server misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Path: E.1.b. Known Vulnerabilities in Older Versions (if not updated) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Similar to D.3.a, but specifically focusing on vulnerabilities in the Duende IdentityServer codebase itself. If the IdentityServer version is outdated, it might contain known vulnerabilities in its code that attackers can exploit.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If patching and updates are not regularly performed)
  • Impact: High (Full System Compromise, Data Breach, Depending on the vulnerability)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium (Exploiting known vulnerabilities often requires less skill)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Vulnerability scanning tools can easily identify outdated versions and known vulnerabilities)
  • Mitigation: Regularly update Duende IdentityServer to the latest stable version, subscribe to security advisories from Duende Software, implement a vulnerability management program, perform regular vulnerability scanning.

Attack Tree Path: G.1.a. Vulnerabilities in Admin Login Mechanism [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities in the authentication mechanism of the IdentityServer's admin interface (e.g., authentication bypass bugs, SQL injection in login forms, etc.) could allow attackers to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the admin interface.
  • Likelihood: Low (Assuming standard security practices are followed in development, but vulnerabilities can still exist)
  • Impact: Critical (Full Admin Access, Complete System Compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High (Depends on the type of vulnerability, may require code review or penetration testing)
  • Mitigation: Securely implement admin authentication, use strong authentication methods, regularly audit the admin login process, conduct security code reviews and penetration testing specifically targeting the admin interface.

Attack Tree Path: G.2.a. Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Even if an attacker gains access to the admin interface with limited privileges, privilege escalation vulnerabilities could allow them to elevate their privileges to administrator level, granting them full control over the IdentityServer.
  • Likelihood: Low (Assuming proper RBAC implementation, but logic flaws can exist)
  • Impact: Critical (Full Admin Access, Complete System Compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High (Requires thorough authorization logic review and penetration testing)
  • Mitigation: Implement robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for the admin interface, thoroughly test authorization logic to prevent privilege escalation, conduct security code reviews and penetration testing focusing on authorization controls.

Attack Tree Path: G.3.a. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Similar to A.1.b.2, but specifically targeting the admin interface. XSS vulnerabilities in the admin interface could allow attackers to execute malicious JavaScript in an administrator's browser session. This could be used to steal admin session cookies, perform actions on behalf of the administrator, or compromise the admin account.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Admin Account Compromise, Full System Compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement robust input validation and output encoding in the admin interface, use Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate XSS risks, conduct regular security scans for XSS vulnerabilities in the admin interface.

Attack Tree Path: G.3.b. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: CSRF vulnerabilities in the admin interface could allow attackers to trick an authenticated administrator into performing unintended actions (e.g., creating new users, changing configurations, deleting data) without their knowledge.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium-High (Unauthorized Admin Actions, Configuration Changes, Data Manipulation)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement CSRF protection mechanisms (e.g., anti-CSRF tokens) in the admin interface for all state-changing operations, ensure proper validation of CSRF tokens on the server-side.

Attack Tree Path: G.3.c. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: IDOR vulnerabilities in the admin interface occur when the application exposes internal object IDs directly in URLs or requests without proper authorization checks. Attackers could manipulate these IDs to access or modify resources they are not authorized to access (e.g., viewing or modifying other users' data, client configurations, etc.).
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Medium-High (Unauthorized Access to Admin Data, Data Manipulation)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium
  • Mitigation: Implement proper authorization checks for all admin actions, avoid exposing internal object IDs directly in URLs or requests, use indirect references or access control lists to manage access to resources.

Attack Tree Path: G.4.a. Exposed Admin Interface to Public Network [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exposing the IdentityServer's admin interface directly to the public internet significantly increases the attack surface. It makes the admin interface accessible to anyone, including attackers, making it easier to discover and exploit vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Configuration mistake, especially in cloud deployments)
  • Impact: Critical (Increased Risk of Admin Compromise, Full System Compromise)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Port scanning, network analysis)
  • Mitigation: Restrict access to the admin interface to trusted networks only (e.g., internal network, VPN), use a firewall to block public access to the admin interface ports, implement strong authentication and authorization for the admin interface.

Attack Tree Path: G.4.b. Missing Security Headers on Admin Interface [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Similar to D.3.b, but specifically for the admin interface. Missing security headers on the admin interface weakens its defenses against web attacks, making it more vulnerable to XSS, clickjacking, and other attacks that could lead to admin account compromise.
  • Likelihood: High (If security headers are not explicitly configured for the admin interface)
  • Impact: Medium (Increased vulnerability of the admin interface to web attacks)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Automated scanning)
  • Mitigation: Apply security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, X-Content-Type-Options) to the admin interface as well, ensure consistent security header configuration across the entire application, including the admin interface.