Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
141 lines (122 loc) · 10.4 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

141 lines (122 loc) · 10.4 KB

Threat Model Analysis for duendesoftware/products

Threat: Client Impersonation

  • Description: An attacker obtains or forges credentials (e.g., client ID and secret, or a client assertion) for a legitimate client application. They then use these credentials to make requests to the IdentityServer token endpoint, masquerading as the legitimate client. This leverages the core client authentication mechanism of IdentityServer.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected resources, data breaches, potential for further attacks (e.g., privilege escalation).
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: Token Endpoint (specifically, the code handling client authentication).
    • IdentityServer: Client Configuration Store (if secrets are stored insecurely within the IdentityServer's storage).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strong client authentication methods: Prefer private_key_jwt or Mutual TLS (mTLS).
    • Securely store client secrets: Use a dedicated secrets management solution integrated with IdentityServer. Never hardcode secrets.
    • Rotate client secrets regularly: Implement automated rotation within IdentityServer's configuration.
    • Enforce PKCE: Require PKCE for all client types via IdentityServer's configuration.
    • Monitor client authentication attempts: Leverage IdentityServer's logging to detect failed attempts.
    • Client Assertion Validation: Rigorously validate client assertions (signature, issuer, audience, expiration) within IdentityServer's token endpoint logic.

Threat: User Impersonation via Token Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker intercepts a token issued by IdentityServer and modifies its contents (e.g., changing the sub or roles claims). The vulnerability lies in insufficient validation of the token signature by the resource server, but the token origination is from IdentityServer.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to resources, data breaches, privilege escalation.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: (Indirectly, as the issuer of the token, and if signing keys are compromised). The primary vulnerability is on the resource server, but IdentityServer's key management is crucial.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Signing Algorithms: Use strong algorithms (RS256, ES256) within IdentityServer's configuration.
    • Key Management: Securely manage IdentityServer's signing keys using an HSM or key management service.
    • Nonce Validation: For ID tokens, ensure IdentityServer enforces and validates the nonce claim (in the implicit/hybrid flows).
    • Consider JWE: Use JWE in addition to signing if the token contains highly sensitive data, configured within IdentityServer.

Threat: Identity Provider (IdP) Spoofing (Federation)

  • Description: In a federated setup, an attacker sets up a malicious IdP or compromises a legitimate one, then tricks IdentityServer into trusting tokens from this malicious IdP. This directly exploits IdentityServer's federation capabilities.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, data breaches, potential system compromise.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: External Authentication Handlers (code handling interactions with external IdPs).
    • IdentityServer: Federation Gateway (if used).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict IdP Whitelisting: Configure IdentityServer to only trust a pre-approved list of IdPs.
    • Issuer Validation: Rigorously validate the iss claim within IdentityServer's external authentication handlers.
    • Signature Validation: Validate signatures using the IdP's correct public key within IdentityServer.
    • Secure Backchannel Communication: Use HTTPS and certificate validation for all communication with external IdPs, configured within IdentityServer.
    • Mutual TLS (mTLS): Use mTLS for communication with external IdPs, configured within IdentityServer.
    • Metadata Validation: Regularly validate IdP metadata within IdentityServer.

Threat: Configuration Tampering

  • Description: An attacker gains access to and modifies the IdentityServer configuration (database, files, etc.) to weaken security. This directly targets the configuration mechanisms of IdentityServer.
  • Impact: Wide-ranging, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: Configuration Store (database, files, etc.).
    • IdentityServer: Startup/Configuration Code.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Access Control: Strictly limit access to the IdentityServer configuration.
    • Secure Configuration Management: Use a secure system (environment variables, secrets management) integrated with IdentityServer.
    • Change Control: Implement a formal change control process for IdentityServer configuration.
    • Auditing: Enable auditing of all configuration changes within IdentityServer.
    • Regular Backups: Regularly back up the IdentityServer configuration.
    • Monitoring: Monitor for unauthorized configuration changes.

Threat: Token Leakage

  • Description: Although tokens can be leaked in many ways, IdentityServer's configuration and choices directly impact the risk. For example, using the implicit flow (which IdentityServer can be configured to allow or disallow) directly increases the risk of token leakage.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected resources.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: (As the issuer of tokens, its configuration choices influence leakage risk).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Short-Lived Access Tokens: Configure IdentityServer to issue short-lived access tokens.
    • Secure Refresh Token Handling:
      • Use refresh token rotation: Configure IdentityServer to issue new refresh tokens.
      • Bind refresh tokens: Use sender-constrained tokens or refresh token binding within IdentityServer's configuration.
      • Limit refresh token lifetime: Set limits within IdentityServer.
    • Avoid URL-Based Tokens: Disable the implicit flow in IdentityServer's configuration.
    • HTTPS Everywhere: Enforce HTTPS usage within IdentityServer's configuration.
    • HSTS: Configure IdentityServer to use HSTS.
    • Cache Control: Configure IdentityServer to set appropriate Cache-Control headers.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) - Token Endpoint Overload

  • Description: An attacker floods IdentityServer's token endpoint, preventing legitimate users from obtaining tokens. This directly targets a core component of IdentityServer.
  • Impact: Service unavailability.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: Token Endpoint.
    • IdentityServer: Authorization Endpoint.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the token and authorization endpoints within IdentityServer's configuration or using a middleware.
    • Client Throttling: Implement client-specific throttling policies within IdentityServer.
    • CAPTCHA/Challenges: Consider using CAPTCHAs for suspicious requests to the token endpoint, integrated with IdentityServer.

Threat: Incorrect Claim Mapping

  • Description: Claims are incorrectly mapped within IdentityServer, leading to unintended privileges. This is a direct configuration issue within IdentityServer.
  • Impact: Privilege escalation, unauthorized access.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: Claim Mapping Configuration (within external authentication handlers or custom user stores).
    • IdentityServer: Profile Service (if custom claims are added).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Careful Review: Thoroughly review claim mapping rules within IdentityServer's configuration.
    • Least Privilege: Apply the principle of least privilege when configuring claims in IdentityServer.
    • Input Validation: Validate claims received from external IdPs within IdentityServer's handlers.
    • Testing: Implement tests to verify claim mapping within IdentityServer.
    • Documentation: Document all claim mapping rules within IdentityServer.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Custom Code

  • Description: Custom code added to IdentityServer (e.g., custom grant types, user stores) introduces vulnerabilities. This is specific to extensions made to the IdentityServer product.
  • Impact: Wide-ranging, depending on the vulnerability.
  • Affected Component:
    • IdentityServer: Any custom component added to the system.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices when extending IdentityServer.
    • Security Testing: Thoroughly test any custom code added to IdentityServer.
    • Regular Updates: Keep custom code updated.
    • Code Review: Review custom code for security issues.
    • Input Validation: Validate all input within custom IdentityServer components.
    • Output Encoding: Encode output within custom IdentityServer components.

Threat: Duende.BFF Misconfiguration

  • Description: The Duende.BFF component is misconfigured, allowing unauthorized access. This is specific to the configuration of the Duende.BFF product.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to backend APIs.
  • Affected Component:
    • Duende.BFF: Routing Configuration.
    • Duende.BFF: Authorization Policies.
    • Duende.BFF: Middleware.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Routing: Carefully configure the BFF's routing.
    • Robust Authorization: Implement authorization checks within the BFF.
    • Input Validation: Validate input within the BFF.
    • Least Privilege: Ensure the BFF has minimal permissions.
    • Regular Review: Regularly review the BFF's configuration.
    • Use provided security features: Utilize Duende.BFF's built-in security features.