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Attack Tree Analysis for egametang/et

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to sensitive application configuration data managed by et and/or manipulate this data to compromise the application's functionality or security.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Exploit et Server Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Authentication and Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Default/Weak Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.1.1. Use default credentials if not changed (e.g., for etcd or et server itself if any) (CRITICAL NODE)
      • No/Weak Authentication Implemented [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.4.1. Access et server API without any authentication if not enforced by default or misconfigured (CRITICAL NODE)
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly via et) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Vulnerabilities in etcd [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 4.1.1. Exploit known vulnerabilities in the etcd version used by et (if et doesn't enforce secure etcd setup) (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Exploit et Configuration Weaknesses (Deployment/Operational Issues) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Insecure et Server Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Exposed et Server API [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 5.1.1. et server API accessible from the public internet without proper network segmentation or firewall rules (CRITICAL NODE)
      • Weak etcd Configuration (via et deployment) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 5.3.1. et deployment leads to insecure etcd setup (e.g., default ports exposed, no authentication on etcd itself) (CRITICAL NODE)
    • Misuse of et by Application Developers [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Storing Highly Sensitive Data in et without Proper Encryption [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 6.1.1. Developers store secrets (API keys, database passwords) in plain text in et configuration, increasing risk of exposure (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Exploit et Client-Side Issues (Less Direct, but Possible)
    • Compromised et Client Application
      • Stored Credentials in et Client Application [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 7.2.1. Hardcoded or insecurely stored credentials in the application code used to connect to et server (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Authentication and Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Default/Weak Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.1.1. Use default credentials if not changed (e.g., for etcd or et server itself if any) (CRITICAL NODE)
    • No/Weak Authentication Implemented [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.4.1. Access et server API without any authentication if not enforced by default or misconfigured (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly via et) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Vulnerabilities in etcd [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 4.1.1. Exploit known vulnerabilities in the etcd version used by et (if et doesn't enforce secure etcd setup) (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Insecure et Server Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Exposed et Server API [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 5.1.1. et server API accessible from the public internet without proper network segmentation or firewall rules (CRITICAL NODE)
    • Weak etcd Configuration (via et deployment) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 5.3.1. et deployment leads to insecure etcd setup (e.g., default ports exposed, no authentication on etcd itself) (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Misuse of et by Application Developers [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Storing Highly Sensitive Data in et without Proper Encryption [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 6.1.1. Developers store secrets (API keys, database passwords) in plain text in et configuration, increasing risk of exposure (CRITICAL NODE)
  • Compromised et Client Application
    • Stored Credentials in et Client Application [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 7.2.1. Hardcoded or insecurely stored credentials in the application code used to connect to et server (CRITICAL NODE)