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Attack Tree Analysis for egametang/et

Objective: Compromise Application Using et

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Application Using et ├── (AND) │ ├── Exploit Network Communication [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── (OR) │ │ │ ├── KCP Protocol Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ │ ├── (AND) │ │ │ │ │ ├── Send Malformed KCP Packets [CRITICAL] │ │ │ │ │ ├── ... (Other KCP steps) │ │ │ │ ├── (AND) │ │ │ │ │ ├── Inject Fake KCP Packets [CRITICAL] │ │ │ │ │ ├── ... (Other KCP steps) │ │ │ ├── WebSocket Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ │ ├── (AND) │ │ │ │ │ ├── Send Malformed WebSocket Messages [CRITICAL] │ │ │ │ │ ├── ... (Other WebSocket steps) │ │ │ ├── Message Handling Vulnerabilities (Protobuf) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ │ ├── (AND) │ │ │ │ │ ├── Send Malformed Protobuf Messages [CRITICAL] │ │ │ │ │ ├── ... (Other Protobuf steps) │ ├── Exploit Hot Reloading [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── (AND) │ │ │ ├── Inject Malicious Code During Hot Reload [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── ... (Other Hot Reloading steps) Goal: Compromise Application Using et (Focus: Denial of Service) [HIGH RISK] ├── (OR) │ ├── Exploit Network Communication [HIGH RISK] │ ├── ... (KCP/WebSocket/Protobuf DoS steps)

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Network Communication

This is the most significant attack surface due to the framework's reliance on network communication for client-server and server-server interactions.

  • KCP Protocol Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

    • Send Malformed KCP Packets [CRITICAL]

      • Description: An attacker sends specially crafted KCP packets that violate the KCP protocol specification. This could include invalid header fields, incorrect checksums, or oversized payloads.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: High (Can lead to crashes, DoS, or potentially code execution if a buffer overflow is triggered)
      • Effort: Low (Fuzzing tools are readily available)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of KCP and fuzzing)
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Network monitoring can detect unusual traffic, but interpreting it requires expertise)
      • Mitigation: Rigorous input validation of all KCP packet fields. Fuzz testing of the KCP handling code.

    • Inject Fake KCP Packets [CRITICAL]

      • Description: An attacker injects KCP packets that appear to be legitimate but are not authorized. This requires bypassing any authentication or session management mechanisms used by et for KCP.
      • Likelihood: Low (If authentication is robust) to High (If weak or absent)
      • Impact: High (Can lead to unauthorized actions and game state manipulation)
      • Effort: Medium (Requires bypassing authentication)
      • Skill Level: Advanced (Requires understanding of authentication mechanisms)
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard (If authentication is bypassed, the traffic may look legitimate)
      • Mitigation: Strong authentication and session management for KCP connections. Consider using cryptographic signatures for KCP packets.

  • WebSocket Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

    • Send Malformed WebSocket Messages [CRITICAL]
      • Description: An attacker sends WebSocket messages that violate the WebSocket protocol specification (RFC 6455). This could include invalid framing, incorrect opcodes, or oversized payloads.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: High (Can lead to server-side errors, crashes, or potentially code execution)
      • Effort: Low (Fuzzing tools are readily available)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Strict adherence to the WebSocket protocol specification. Robust input validation of all WebSocket frames and message payloads. Fuzz testing.

  • Message Handling Vulnerabilities (Protobuf) [HIGH RISK]

    • Send Malformed Protobuf Messages [CRITICAL]
      • Description: An attacker sends Protobuf messages that are syntactically valid (according to the .proto schema) but contain semantically incorrect or malicious data. This exploits weaknesses in the application's handling of Protobuf data after deserialization.
      • Likelihood: Medium (If et relies solely on Protobuf schema validation)
      • Impact: High (Can lead to logic errors and game state manipulation)
      • Effort: Low (Fuzzing tools can generate malformed Protobuf messages)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of Protobuf and fuzzing)
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires application-level logging and monitoring)
      • Mitigation: Application-level validation of all Protobuf data after deserialization. Don't rely solely on the schema. Implement checks for data ranges, consistency, and expected values. Fuzz testing.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Hot Reloading

This feature, while convenient for development, introduces a significant security risk if not implemented carefully.

  • Inject Malicious Code During Hot Reload [CRITICAL]
    • Description: An attacker replaces legitimate code with malicious code during a hot reload operation. This bypasses any security checks that might be in place during normal deployment.
    • Likelihood: Low (If code signing is used) to High (If no security measures)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete server compromise)
    • Effort: Medium (If code signing is bypassed) to Very High (If no security)
    • Skill Level: Advanced (Requires bypassing security mechanisms)
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (If successful, the attacker has full control)
    • Mitigation: Code signing and verification for all hot-reloaded code. Restricted execution environment (sandboxing) for hot-reloaded code. Auditing of all hot-reloading events.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application Using et (Focus: Denial of Service)

Denial of Service attacks are generally easier to execute and have a high likelihood of success.

  • Exploit Network Communication [HIGH RISK]
    • This includes all the network-based attacks mentioned above (KCP, WebSocket, Protobuf), but with the goal of causing a denial of service rather than game state manipulation or code execution. Flooding attacks are particularly relevant here.
    • Mitigation: Rate limiting on network connections and message processing. Resource limits (e.g., connection timeouts, buffer sizes). Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).