Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
111 lines (98 loc) · 12.3 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

111 lines (98 loc) · 12.3 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for elastic/elasticsearch-net

Objective: Compromise application using Elasticsearch-net by exploiting vulnerabilities within the library or its usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Elasticsearch-net └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2. Abuse Insecure Configuration/Usage of Elasticsearch-net ├─── 2.1. Connection String Manipulation/Exposure │ ├─── 2.1.1. Connection String Injection │ │ └─── 2.1.1.1. Redirect to Malicious Elasticsearch Instance │ └─── 2.1.1.2. Credential Theft via Logging/Error Messages │ └─── 2.1.2. Hardcoded Credentials in Connection String │ ├─── 2.1.2.1. Credential Exposure via Code Review/Reverse Engineering │ └─── 2.1.2.2. Credential Exposure via Configuration File Access ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.2. Insecure Query Construction (Elasticsearch Query Language Injection) │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] 2.2.1. Unsanitized User Input in Queries │ ├─── 2.2.1.1. Data Exfiltration via Query Injection │ └─── 2.2.1.2. Data Modification/Deletion via Query Injection │ └─── 2.2.1.3. Denial of Service via Resource Intensive Queries ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.3. Excessive Permissions for Elasticsearch-net User │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] 2.3.1. Elasticsearch User with Broad Privileges │ ├─── 2.3.1.1. Unauthorized Data Access due to Excessive Permissions │ └─── 2.3.1.2. Unauthorized Data Modification/Deletion due to Excessive Permissions │ └─── 2.3.1.3. Cluster Instability due to Excessive Permissions ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.4. Insecure Data Handling/Serialization in Application Code │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] 2.4.1. Exposing Sensitive Data in Elasticsearch Documents │ └─── 2.4.1.1. Data Breach via Elasticsearch Data Access │ └─── 2.4.2. Improper Sanitization of Data Before Indexing │ └─── 2.4.2.1. Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Attack Tree Path: 2. Abuse Insecure Configuration/Usage of Elasticsearch-net (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Description: This high-risk path encompasses vulnerabilities arising from how the application is configured to use Elasticsearch-net and how the library is used in the application code. Misconfigurations and insecure coding practices are common and easily exploitable.

    • 2.1. Connection String Manipulation/Exposure
      • Threat: Vulnerabilities related to the Elasticsearch connection string, including manipulation and exposure of sensitive information within it.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 2.1.1. Connection String Injection:
          • 2.1.1.1. Redirect to Malicious Elasticsearch Instance:
            • Threat: If the connection string is dynamically constructed using user input without proper validation, an attacker can inject malicious parameters to redirect the application to a rogue Elasticsearch instance.
            • Attack Scenario: Attacker manipulates input fields to inject connection string parameters, causing the application to connect to an attacker-controlled Elasticsearch server.
            • Actionable Insights: Parameterize connection string construction, validate all input used in connection string building, avoid dynamic construction if possible.
          • 2.1.1.2. Credential Theft via Logging/Error Messages:
            • Threat: Sensitive credentials within the connection string might be unintentionally logged or exposed in error messages.
            • Attack Scenario: Application logs or error pages inadvertently reveal the connection string, including credentials, allowing attackers to steal them.
            • Actionable Insights: Sanitize logs to remove sensitive information, implement secure error handling that doesn't expose internal details, avoid logging connection strings directly.
        • 2.1.2. Hardcoded Credentials in Connection String:
          • 2.1.2.1. Credential Exposure via Code Review/Reverse Engineering:
            • Threat: Hardcoding credentials directly in the code or configuration files makes them easily discoverable.
            • Attack Scenario: Attackers gain access to source code or compiled application (via code review, reverse engineering, or repository access) and extract hardcoded credentials.
            • Actionable Insights: Never hardcode credentials. Use secure credential management systems (environment variables, secrets vaults).
          • 2.1.2.2. Credential Exposure via Configuration File Access:
            • Threat: Storing credentials in configuration files without proper access controls can lead to exposure.
            • Attack Scenario: Attackers gain unauthorized access to configuration files (e.g., via web server misconfiguration, file inclusion vulnerabilities) and retrieve credentials.
            • Actionable Insights: Secure configuration files with appropriate file system permissions, use encrypted configuration where possible, avoid storing sensitive data in plain text configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2. Insecure Query Construction (Elasticsearch Query Language Injection) (HIGH-RISK PATH & CRITICAL NODE)

  • Description: This is a critical vulnerability where user input is directly incorporated into Elasticsearch queries without proper sanitization, leading to Elasticsearch Query Language Injection. * Critical Node: 2.2.1. Unsanitized User Input in Queries * Threat: Attackers can inject malicious Elasticsearch query clauses, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, deletion, or denial of service. * Attack Vectors: * 2.2.1.1. Data Exfiltration via Query Injection: * Threat: Attackers can craft queries to extract sensitive data they are not authorized to access. * Attack Scenario: Attacker injects query clauses to bypass access controls and retrieve data from Elasticsearch. * Actionable Insights: Use parameterized queries, sanitize user input rigorously, implement allow-lists for query parameters, apply principle of least privilege for Elasticsearch user. * 2.2.1.2. Data Modification/Deletion via Query Injection: * Threat: Attackers can inject queries to modify or delete data in Elasticsearch, compromising data integrity. * Attack Scenario: Attacker injects query clauses to update or delete documents in Elasticsearch. * Actionable Insights: Use parameterized queries, sanitize user input, implement strict access controls on data modification operations, enable audit logging for data changes. * 2.2.1.3. Denial of Service via Resource Intensive Queries: * Threat: Attackers can inject queries that consume excessive Elasticsearch resources, leading to denial of service. * Attack Scenario: Attacker crafts complex or resource-intensive queries that overload the Elasticsearch server. * Actionable Insights: Implement query complexity limits, set timeouts for queries, monitor Elasticsearch performance, sanitize user input to prevent injection of resource-intensive clauses.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Excessive Permissions for Elasticsearch-net User (HIGH-RISK PATH & CRITICAL NODE)

  • Description: Granting overly broad permissions to the Elasticsearch user used by the application amplifies the impact of other vulnerabilities. * Critical Node: 2.3.1. Elasticsearch User with Broad Privileges * Threat: If the Elasticsearch user has excessive privileges, attackers can leverage these permissions to cause significant damage if they compromise the application or exploit query injection. * Attack Vectors: * 2.3.1.1. Unauthorized Data Access due to Excessive Permissions: * Threat: User can access data beyond their intended scope due to overly permissive roles. * Attack Scenario: Compromised application or query injection allows access to sensitive data because the Elasticsearch user has broad read permissions. * Actionable Insights: Apply principle of least privilege, grant only necessary permissions to the Elasticsearch user, use role-based access control in Elasticsearch. * 2.3.1.2. Unauthorized Data Modification/Deletion due to Excessive Permissions: * Threat: User can modify or delete data due to overly permissive roles, leading to data integrity issues. * Attack Scenario: Compromised application or query injection allows data modification or deletion because the Elasticsearch user has write/delete permissions. * Actionable Insights: Apply principle of least privilege, grant only necessary permissions, strictly control write/delete permissions, implement audit logging. * 2.3.1.3. Cluster Instability due to Excessive Permissions: * Threat: In extreme cases (e.g., granting cluster admin rights to application user - less likely but possible misconfiguration), excessive permissions could lead to cluster-wide instability. * Attack Scenario: Compromised application or malicious actions via application user could destabilize the entire Elasticsearch cluster. * Actionable Insights: Never grant cluster admin rights to application users unless absolutely necessary and with extreme caution, strictly limit permissions, monitor cluster health.

Attack Tree Path: 2.4. Insecure Data Handling/Serialization in Application Code (HIGH-RISK PATH & CRITICAL NODE)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in how the application handles data before sending it to Elasticsearch or after retrieving it can lead to security issues, especially concerning sensitive data. * Critical Node: 2.4.1. Exposing Sensitive Data in Elasticsearch Documents * Threat: Storing sensitive data in Elasticsearch without proper protection (masking, encryption) makes it vulnerable to data breaches. * Attack Vectors: * 2.4.1.1. Data Breach via Elasticsearch Data Access: * Threat: Sensitive data stored in Elasticsearch documents is exposed if Elasticsearch is compromised or accessed without proper authorization. * Attack Scenario: Attackers gain access to Elasticsearch data (via application vulnerability, Elasticsearch server vulnerability, or misconfiguration) and retrieve sensitive information. * Actionable Insights: Minimize sensitive data indexed, mask or encrypt sensitive data before indexing, implement access controls within Elasticsearch to restrict data access. * 2.4.2. Improper Sanitization of Data Before Indexing: * 2.4.2.1. Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): * Threat: Indexing unsanitized user input can lead to Stored XSS if this data is later displayed in the web application. * Attack Scenario: Attacker injects malicious scripts into user input, which is indexed into Elasticsearch. When the application retrieves and displays this data, the XSS payload is executed in users' browsers. * Actionable Insights: Sanitize user input before indexing, especially if it will be displayed in a web context, use output encoding when displaying data retrieved from Elasticsearch.