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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for elastic/elasticsearch-net

Threat: Elasticsearch Query Injection

  • Description: An attacker could manipulate Elasticsearch queries by injecting malicious code through user-controlled input that is not properly sanitized or parameterized when constructing queries using elasticsearch-net. This is achieved by crafting input that alters the intended query logic, potentially bypassing access controls or extracting sensitive data.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized data access: Attackers could retrieve data they are not authorized to see.
    • Data modification or deletion: Attackers might be able to modify or delete data within Elasticsearch.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Malicious queries could overload Elasticsearch, causing performance degradation or service disruption.
  • Affected Component:
    • elasticsearch-net Query DSL (e.g., QueryStringQuery, MatchQuery, etc.)
    • Input handling logic within the application using elasticsearch-net
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Parameterize Queries: Utilize elasticsearch-net's parameterized query features or strongly-typed query DSL to avoid direct string concatenation of user input.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Implement robust input validation and sanitization on all user-provided data before incorporating it into Elasticsearch queries.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Elasticsearch): Grant Elasticsearch users used by the application only the minimum necessary permissions.

Threat: Insecure Credential Management

  • Description: Attackers could gain unauthorized access to Elasticsearch if the credentials (username/password, API keys, certificates) used by elasticsearch-net to authenticate are stored insecurely. This could involve extracting credentials from application code, configuration files, logs, or memory dumps.
  • Impact:
    • Complete compromise of Elasticsearch data: Attackers could read, modify, or delete any data within Elasticsearch.
    • System compromise: Depending on Elasticsearch configuration and network access, attackers might be able to pivot to other systems.
    • Reputational damage and data breach penalties.
  • Affected Component:
    • elasticsearch-net client configuration (e.g., ConnectionSettings, ElasticClient)
    • Application configuration management
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Credential Storage: Utilize secure vaults (e.g., Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault), environment variables, or encrypted configuration files for storing Elasticsearch credentials. Avoid hardcoding credentials in application code.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Application User): Use dedicated service accounts with minimal necessary permissions for elasticsearch-net to connect to Elasticsearch.
    • Regular Credential Rotation: Implement a process for regularly rotating Elasticsearch credentials.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in elasticsearch-net Library

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities might be discovered in the elasticsearch-net library itself. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities if the application is using a vulnerable version of the library. Exploits could range from information disclosure to remote code execution, depending on the nature of the vulnerability.
  • Impact:
    • Application compromise: Potential for remote code execution, data breaches, or denial of service.
    • Elasticsearch cluster compromise (in some scenarios).
    • Reputational damage and data breach penalties.
  • Affected Component:
    • elasticsearch-net library code itself (various modules and functions depending on the vulnerability)
  • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to High depending on the vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep elasticsearch-net Updated: Regularly update the elasticsearch-net library to the latest stable version to patch known security vulnerabilities.
    • Vulnerability Scanning (Dependencies): Incorporate dependency vulnerability scanning into the development and deployment pipeline to identify and address vulnerabilities in elasticsearch-net and its dependencies.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Dependencies of elasticsearch-net

  • Description: elasticsearch-net relies on other .NET libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies could indirectly affect the security of applications using elasticsearch-net. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities through the application's dependency on elasticsearch-net.
  • Impact:
    • Application compromise: Potential for remote code execution, data breaches, or denial of service, depending on the vulnerability in the dependency.
    • Indirect impact through vulnerable dependency.
  • Affected Component:
    • Dependencies of elasticsearch-net (e.g., networking libraries, JSON libraries)
    • Indirectly affects elasticsearch-net usage in the application.
  • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to High depending on the vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Management: Use a robust dependency management system (e.g., NuGet) and regularly audit and update dependencies of elasticsearch-net.
    • Vulnerability Scanning (Dependencies): Include scanning of transitive dependencies in vulnerability assessments to identify and mitigate risks from vulnerabilities in indirect dependencies.

Threat: Insecure Communication Channel (HTTP instead of HTTPS)

  • Description: If the connection between the application using elasticsearch-net and Elasticsearch is established over HTTP instead of HTTPS, all communication, including sensitive data and credentials, is transmitted in plaintext. Attackers on the network could intercept this traffic and steal sensitive information.
  • Impact:
    • Credential theft: Attackers could capture Elasticsearch credentials transmitted over HTTP.
    • Data interception: Sensitive data exchanged between the application and Elasticsearch could be intercepted and read by attackers.
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: Attackers could intercept and modify communication between the application and Elasticsearch.
  • Affected Component:
    • elasticsearch-net client configuration (connection URI scheme)
    • Network communication between application and Elasticsearch
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce HTTPS: Always configure elasticsearch-net to communicate with Elasticsearch over HTTPS (https://).
    • TLS Configuration (Elasticsearch): Ensure Elasticsearch is configured to enforce HTTPS connections and disable HTTP access if possible.

Threat: Misconfigured TLS/SSL Settings

  • Description: Even when using HTTPS, misconfiguration of TLS/SSL settings in elasticsearch-net can weaken the security of the communication channel. This could involve disabling certificate validation, using weak ciphers, or outdated TLS protocols, making the connection vulnerable to attacks.
  • Impact:
    • Weakened encryption: Communication might be encrypted using weak or broken ciphers, making it easier to decrypt.
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: Disabling certificate validation or using outdated protocols can make the connection vulnerable to MitM attacks.
    • Data interception and potential credential theft.
  • Affected Component:
    • elasticsearch-net client TLS/SSL configuration (e.g., certificate validation, cipher suites, TLS protocol versions)
    • Elasticsearch server TLS/SSL configuration
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Proper TLS Configuration: Follow security best practices for TLS/SSL configuration on both the client and server sides. Enable certificate validation, use strong ciphers, and enforce modern TLS protocols (TLS 1.2 or higher).
    • Regular Security Audits (TLS): Periodically audit TLS/SSL configurations to ensure they remain secure and compliant with security standards.