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Attack Surface Analysis for elastic/elasticsearch-net

Attack Surface: Query Injection

Description: Attackers manipulate Elasticsearch queries by injecting malicious input, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, or denial of service. This is the most significant risk. How elasticsearch-net Contributes: The library provides the mechanisms for constructing and executing queries. Improper use, especially direct string concatenation with user input or mishandling of strings within NEST query builders, creates the vulnerability. Example: * Vulnerable (Low-Level): csharp var userInput = "\"; DELETE *; //"; // Malicious var searchRequest = new SearchRequest("myindex") { Query = new QueryStringQuery { Query = userInput } }; var response = client.LowLevel.Search<StringResponse>(searchRequest); * Vulnerable (NEST - Incorrect): csharp var userInput = "value OR 1=1"; var response = client.Search<Doc>(s => s.Query(q => q.QueryString(qs => qs.Query(string.Format("field:{0}", userInput))))); * Safe (NEST): csharp var userInput = "value"; // Validate! var response = client.Search<Doc>(s => s.Query(q => q.Term(t => t.Field(f => f.Field).Value(userInput)))); Impact: * Data exfiltration. * Data modification/deletion. * Denial of service (DoS). * Information disclosure. * Bypassing security. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Prefer NEST's Fluent API: Use object-based query builders (e.g., TermQuery, MatchQuery, BoolQuery). * Input Validation: Always validate user input before using it in any query part. Validate type, length, format, and allowed characters. Use whitelisting. * Escaping (Last Resort): If raw strings are unavoidable (strongly discouraged), use library-provided or well-vetted escaping. Parameterization is always better. * Principle of Least Privilege: Grant the application only the minimum necessary Elasticsearch permissions. * Regular Security Audits: Code reviews and penetration testing.

Description: Misconfiguring the connection to Elasticsearch, exposing data and credentials. How elasticsearch-net Contributes: The library provides the connection configuration options. Incorrect use creates the vulnerability. Example: ```csharp // Insecure: HTTP, no cert validation var settings = new ConnectionSettings(new Uri("http://...")) .ServerCertificateValidationCallback((_, _, _, _) => true); // NEVER IN PRODUCTION! var client = new ElasticClient(settings);

// Weak: Default credentials
var settings2 = new ConnectionSettings(new Uri("https://..."))
    .BasicAuthentication("elastic", "changeme"); // Default password - BAD!
var client2 = new ElasticClient(settings2);
```

Impact: * Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. * Unauthorized access to the cluster. * Data breaches. Risk Severity: Critical (HTTP or no cert validation) / High (weak credentials) Mitigation Strategies: * Always Use HTTPS: https:// for all connections. * Enable Certificate Validation: Never disable certificate validation in production. Use default validation or a proper ServerCertificateValidationCallback. * Strong Credentials: Strong, unique passwords or API keys. Avoid defaults. * API Key Management: Use API keys with least privilege. Rotate keys regularly. Store them securely (environment variables, secrets management – never hardcoded). * Network Security: Firewalls, network segmentation to restrict access.

Description: The application, using elasticsearch-net, overwhelms itself or the Elasticsearch cluster. How elasticsearch-net Contributes: The library sends requests. Improper use leads to DoS. Example: ```csharp // Many clients, no disposal for (int i = 0; i < 10000; i++) { var client = new ElasticClient(new ConnectionSettings(new Uri("https://..."))); // No disposal! }

// Huge result set, no pagination
var response = client.Search<Doc>(s => s.Size(1000000).Query(q => q.MatchAll()));
```

Impact: * Application crashes (client-side). * Cluster instability/unavailability (server-side). * Service disruption. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Connection Pooling: Use the library's connection pooling. Configure the pool size correctly. * Resource Management: Dispose of ElasticClient instances (using statements or Dispose()). * Pagination: Use Scroll API or SearchAfter for large results. Use Size and From appropriately. * Request Timeouts: Configure timeouts to prevent long-running requests. * Rate Limiting: Implement client-side rate limiting. * Circuit Breakers: Prevent cascading failures. * Asynchronous Operations: Use asynchronous methods (e.g., SearchAsync).

Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in dependencies of elasticsearch-net. How elasticsearch-net Contributes: The library relies on external dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies are exploitable through the library. Example: A vulnerable version of Newtonsoft.Json used by elasticsearch-net could be exploited, even if the application code doesn't directly use Newtonsoft.Json. Impact: Varies, but could range from DoS to remote code execution. Risk Severity: High to Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Regular Updates: Keep elasticsearch-net and dependencies up-to-date. Use a dependency manager (NuGet). * Vulnerability Scanning: Use a vulnerability scanner (OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk). * Software Composition Analysis (SCA): Use SCA tools for a comprehensive understanding of dependencies.