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Attack Tree Analysis for graphql-dotnet/graphql-dotnet

Objective: Compromise an application using GraphQL-dotnet by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the GraphQL implementation or its usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise GraphQL-dotnet Application [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit GraphQL-Specific Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ Authorization/Authentication Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND]─ Identify Weak or Missing Authorization Checks in Resolvers [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Exploit Inconsistent Authorization Across Schema [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Bypass Authentication Mechanisms (if GraphQL endpoint is exposed without proper auth) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Resolvers [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Injection Attacks (SQL, NoSQL, Command Injection etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Exploit Lack of Input Sanitization in Resolvers [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Implementation Weaknesses (Developer Errors using GraphQL-dotnet) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Insecure Resolver Implementation [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Direct Database Access in Resolvers without Sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Exploit SQL Injection or NoSQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Hardcoded Credentials or Secrets in Resolver Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Misconfiguration of GraphQL-dotnet Middleware/Server [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Missing Rate Limiting or Request Limits [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Outdated GraphQL-dotnet Library Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Vulnerable Dependencies of GraphQL-dotnet [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • This is the root goal and represents the overall objective of the attacker. Success here means the attacker has achieved some level of compromise within the application utilizing GraphQL-dotnet.
  • This path focuses on vulnerabilities inherent to the nature of GraphQL and its implementation. It encompasses attack vectors that specifically target GraphQL features or weaknesses.

    • 2.1. Authorization/Authentication Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • This is a critical vulnerability category. If successful, it allows attackers to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to data and functionality.
        • 2.1.1. Identify Weak or Missing Authorization Checks in Resolvers [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Attackers analyze resolver code or probe the API to find resolvers where authorization checks are either weak, improperly implemented, or completely missing.
          • Impact: Unauthorized access to data or actions that should be restricted based on user roles or permissions.
          • Mitigation: Implement robust and consistent authorization logic in all resolvers, based on user roles and permissions. Use GraphQL-dotnet's authorization features and policies.
        • 2.1.2. Exploit Inconsistent Authorization Across Schema [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Attackers identify inconsistencies in authorization rules across different parts of the GraphQL schema. They target queries or mutations where authorization is lax or missing compared to other parts of the API.
          • Impact: Unauthorized access to specific data or actions due to inconsistent security enforcement.
          • Mitigation: Ensure consistent application of authorization policies across the entire GraphQL schema. Conduct thorough reviews to identify and rectify inconsistencies.
        • 2.1.3. Bypass Authentication Mechanisms (if GraphQL endpoint is exposed without proper auth) [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to bypass or exploit weaknesses in the authentication mechanisms protecting the GraphQL endpoint. This could involve exploiting missing authentication, weak authentication schemes, or vulnerabilities in the authentication implementation.
          • Impact: Complete bypass of authentication, granting full access to the GraphQL API and potentially the entire application without valid credentials.
          • Mitigation: Implement strong and properly configured authentication mechanisms for the GraphQL endpoint. Regularly review and test authentication implementation for weaknesses.
    • 2.2. Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Resolvers [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • This path targets vulnerabilities arising from improper handling of user inputs within GraphQL resolvers.
        • 2.2.1. Injection Attacks (SQL, NoSQL, Command Injection etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Attackers craft malicious input payloads within GraphQL queries or mutations and inject them into input fields. If resolvers fail to properly sanitize these inputs before using them in backend operations (like database queries or system commands), injection vulnerabilities can be triggered.

          • Impact: Critical impact, including full database compromise (SQL/NoSQL Injection), remote code execution (Command Injection), and other severe consequences depending on the injection type and backend systems.

          • Mitigation: Implement robust input validation and sanitization in all resolvers. Use parameterized queries or ORMs to prevent SQL/NoSQL injection.

          • 2.2.1.1. Exploit Lack of Input Sanitization in Resolvers [CRITICAL NODE]:

            • Attack Vector: Attackers specifically target the lack of input sanitization in resolver code. They rely on developers failing to properly sanitize user-provided input before using it in backend operations.
            • Impact: Triggers injection vulnerabilities in backend data access, leading to critical impacts as described above.
            • Mitigation: Enforce strict input sanitization practices in all resolvers. Use appropriate sanitization functions or libraries relevant to the backend systems being accessed.
  • This path focuses on vulnerabilities introduced due to common developer mistakes when using GraphQL-dotnet. These are often coding errors or misconfigurations that weaken the application's security.

    • 3.1. Insecure Resolver Implementation [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • This highlights the risks associated with poorly written resolver code.
        • 3.1.1. Direct Database Access in Resolvers without Sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

          • Attack Vector: Developers directly access databases within resolvers without using proper input sanitization or parameterized queries. This directly exposes the application to injection attacks.

          • Impact: High risk of SQL or NoSQL injection vulnerabilities, leading to critical database compromise.

          • Mitigation: Avoid direct database access in resolvers. Use ORMs or data access layers that provide built-in security features like parameterized queries. If direct access is unavoidable, implement rigorous input sanitization.

          • 3.1.1.1. Exploit SQL Injection or NoSQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

            • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit the direct database access and lack of sanitization to inject malicious SQL or NoSQL queries through GraphQL input fields.
            • Impact: Critical impact, including data breaches, data manipulation, data deletion, and potentially gaining control over the database server.
            • Mitigation: As mentioned above, prevent direct database access in resolvers or enforce strict input sanitization and parameterized queries.
        • 3.1.2. Hardcoded Credentials or Secrets in Resolver Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

          • Attack Vector: Developers mistakenly hardcode sensitive information like API keys, database passwords, or other secrets directly into resolver code.
          • Impact: Critical impact if attackers can access the code or extract these hardcoded credentials. This can lead to full system compromise, unauthorized access to external services, and data breaches.
          • Mitigation: Never hardcode credentials or secrets in code. Use secure configuration management and secret storage mechanisms (e.g., environment variables, dedicated secret management services).
    • 3.2. Misconfiguration of GraphQL-dotnet Middleware/Server [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • This highlights risks arising from incorrect or insecure configuration of the GraphQL-dotnet middleware or the server hosting the GraphQL endpoint.
        • 3.2.1. Missing Rate Limiting or Request Limits [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: The GraphQL endpoint lacks proper rate limiting or request limits. This allows attackers to easily launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by sending a high volume of requests, complex queries, or large batches.
          • Impact: High risk of DoS attacks, leading to service disruption, performance degradation, and potential service outages.
          • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting and request limits at the application or infrastructure level to prevent DoS attacks. Configure GraphQL-dotnet's complexity analysis and limits as well.
    • 3.3. Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • This path highlights the risks associated with using vulnerable dependencies.
        • 3.3.1. Outdated GraphQL-dotnet Library Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

          • Attack Vector: The application uses an outdated version of the GraphQL-dotnet library that contains known security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these known vulnerabilities.
          • Impact: Critical impact, depending on the specific vulnerability. Could include Remote Code Execution (RCE), DoS, or other severe consequences.
          • Mitigation: Regularly update GraphQL-dotnet to the latest stable version to patch known vulnerabilities. Monitor security advisories for GraphQL-dotnet.
        • 3.3.2. Vulnerable Dependencies of GraphQL-dotnet [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

          • Attack Vector: GraphQL-dotnet relies on other libraries. If these dependencies have known vulnerabilities, they can indirectly affect the GraphQL application. Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in these underlying libraries.
          • Impact: Critical impact, depending on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. Could include RCE, DoS, or other severe consequences.
          • Mitigation: Regularly scan dependencies for vulnerabilities and update them to patched versions. Use dependency management tools that provide vulnerability scanning and alerts.