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Attack Tree Analysis for hangfireio/hangfire

Objective: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Hangfire [CRITICAL]
├── 1. Exploit Hangfire Dashboard Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 1.1. Authentication and Authorization Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 1.1.2. Weak or Misconfigured Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.2.1. Brute-force/Credential Stuffing Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── 1.1.4. Lack of Authentication/Authorization (Misconfiguration) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2. Web Application Vulnerabilities in Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 1.2.1.1. Stored XSS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.2. Reflected XSS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 1.2.2. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── 1.2.2.1. CSRF to perform administrative actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── 1.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) via Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └── 1.2.6.1. Resource exhaustion DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 1.3. Insecure Dashboard Deployment [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 1.3.1. Dashboard Exposed to Public Internet [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 1.3.2. Dashboard outdated Hangfire version [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 2. Exploit Job Execution Context [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 2.1. Malicious Job Injection/Manipulation [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1. Direct Job Creation via Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── 2.1.1.1. Injecting malicious code jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 2.1.2. Indirect Job Creation via Application Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 2.1.3. Job Parameter Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── 2.1.3.1. Modifying malicious job parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 2.1.4. Job Queue Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └── 2.1.4.1. Flooding queues with malicious jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 2.3. Exploiting Job Processing Logic [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 2.3.1. Vulnerabilities in job code [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           ├── 2.3.1.1. Command Injection within job logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│           ├── 2.3.1.2. SQL Injection within job logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
│           └── 2.3.1.3. File system access vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 2.3.2. Resource Exhaustion via Job Execution [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           └── 2.3.2.1. Triggering resource-intensive jobs DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 3. Exploit Hangfire Infrastructure [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 3.1. Database Compromise (Hangfire Storage) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 3.1.2. Database Credential Compromise [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           ├── 3.1.2.1. Weak database passwords [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           └── 3.1.2.2. Exposed database credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]
└── 4. Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └── 4.1. Vulnerabilities in Hangfire Dependencies [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └── 4.1.1. Exploiting known dependency vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Hangfire Dashboard Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Authentication and Authorization Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 1.1.2. Weak or Misconfigured Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 1.1.2.1. Brute-force/Credential Stuffing Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attacker attempts to guess user credentials through repeated login attempts or using lists of compromised credentials from data breaches.
        • 1.1.4. Lack of Authentication/Authorization (Misconfiguration) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: Dashboard is misconfigured and accessible without any login requirements, or authorization checks are not properly implemented, allowing unauthorized access to administrative functions.
    • Web Application Vulnerabilities in Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 1.2.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 1.2.1.1. Stored XSS [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Malicious JavaScript code is injected and stored within the dashboard (e.g., in job parameters or logs). When other users view the dashboard, the malicious script executes in their browsers, potentially leading to session hijacking, account takeover, or further attacks.
        • 1.2.1.2. Reflected XSS [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Malicious JavaScript code is injected into the dashboard via URL parameters or form inputs. The server reflects this script back to the user's browser in the response, causing it to execute. This can be used for session hijacking or redirection to malicious sites.
      • 1.2.2. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 1.2.2.1. CSRF to perform administrative actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attacker tricks an authenticated dashboard user into unknowingly sending malicious requests to the server. This can be used to perform administrative actions like deleting jobs, pausing queues, or modifying settings without the user's consent.
      • 1.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) via Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 1.2.6.1. Resource exhaustion DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attacker floods the dashboard with excessive requests or submits a large number of jobs through the dashboard interface, overwhelming server resources and making the dashboard unavailable to legitimate users, potentially impacting job processing.
    • Insecure Dashboard Deployment [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 1.3.1. Dashboard Exposed to Public Internet [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The Hangfire dashboard is directly accessible from the public internet without any access restrictions (VPN, IP whitelisting). This exposes all dashboard vulnerabilities to a wider range of attackers.
      • 1.3.2. Dashboard outdated Hangfire version [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The application is running an outdated version of Hangfire with known security vulnerabilities in the dashboard. Attackers can exploit these publicly disclosed vulnerabilities to compromise the application.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Job Execution Context [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Malicious Job Injection/Manipulation [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 2.1.1. Direct Job Creation via Dashboard [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 2.1.1.1. Injecting malicious code jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: If the dashboard is accessible to an attacker (due to compromised authentication or lack of authorization), they can directly create new Hangfire jobs with malicious code or commands embedded within the job logic or parameters. When these jobs are processed by Hangfire workers, the malicious code is executed on the server.
      • 2.1.2. Indirect Job Creation via Application Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the main application (e.g., API endpoints, web forms) to indirectly trigger the creation of malicious Hangfire jobs. For example, a vulnerable API endpoint might allow an attacker to inject data that, when processed by the application, results in the creation of a Hangfire job with malicious parameters or logic.
      • 2.1.3. Job Parameter Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 2.1.3.1. Modifying malicious job parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: Attackers may be able to intercept or manipulate job parameters before they are processed by Hangfire workers. By modifying job parameters, they can alter the intended behavior of the job to execute malicious commands, access sensitive files (path traversal), or inject code.
      • 2.1.4. Job Queue Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 2.1.4.1. Flooding queues with malicious jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers flood the Hangfire job queues with a large number of malicious jobs. This can lead to a Denial of Service by overwhelming worker resources, disrupting the processing of legitimate jobs, and potentially masking the execution of specific malicious jobs within the noise.
    • Exploiting Job Processing Logic [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 2.3.1. Vulnerabilities in job code [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 2.3.1.1. Command Injection within job logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: The code within Hangfire jobs is vulnerable to command injection. If job logic constructs OS commands using external input (e.g., job parameters), an attacker can inject malicious commands that will be executed by the server when the job runs.
        • 2.3.1.2. SQL Injection within job logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: The code within Hangfire jobs is vulnerable to SQL injection. If job logic constructs SQL queries using external input, an attacker can inject malicious SQL code to manipulate database queries, potentially leading to data breaches, data modification, or even code execution depending on the database system.
        • 2.3.1.3. File system access vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Job logic improperly handles file paths based on external input, leading to vulnerabilities like path traversal or arbitrary file read/write. Attackers can exploit these to access sensitive files or overwrite critical system files.
      • 2.3.2. Resource Exhaustion via Job Execution [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 2.3.2.1. Triggering resource-intensive jobs DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers trigger the execution of legitimate or specially crafted Hangfire jobs that are intentionally resource-intensive (CPU, memory, I/O). By repeatedly triggering these jobs, they can exhaust server resources, leading to a Denial of Service and impacting the application's performance and availability.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Hangfire Infrastructure [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Database Compromise (Hangfire Storage) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 3.1.2. Database Credential Compromise [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 3.1.2.1. Weak database passwords [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The database used by Hangfire for storage is protected by weak or easily guessable passwords. Attackers can brute-force or dictionary attack these passwords to gain unauthorized access to the database.
        • 3.1.2.2. Exposed database credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]: Database credentials (usernames, passwords, connection strings) are inadvertently exposed in configuration files, code repositories, or other accessible locations. Attackers can discover these exposed credentials and use them to directly access the Hangfire database.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Vulnerabilities in Hangfire Dependencies [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • 4.1.1. Exploiting known dependency vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Hangfire relies on third-party libraries and dependencies. If these dependencies have known security vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit them to compromise the application. This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in libraries like Newtonsoft.Json, database drivers, or other components used by Hangfire.