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Attack Tree Analysis for hangfireio/hangfire

Objective: Achieve RCE or Significant DoS on Hangfire Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Achieve RCE or Significant DoS on Hangfire Application
├── 1. Exploit Hangfire Dashboard Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 1.1. Unauthorized Dashboard Access [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1.  Bypass Authentication (if misconfigured or weak)
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.1.1.  Default Credentials (if not changed) (M/VH/VL/N/E)
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.2.  Weak Password Guessing/Brute-forcing (M/VH/M-H/N-I/M)
│   │   └── 1.1.2.  Exploit Authorization Flaws (if IAuthorizationFilter is improperly implemented) (L-M/H-VH/M-H/I-A/H)
│   ├── 1.2.  Dashboard-Based Job Manipulation (after gaining access) [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1.  Enqueue Malicious Jobs [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   │   ├── 1.2.1.1.  Inject Malicious Code into Job Arguments (if deserialization is vulnerable) [CRITICAL] (M/VH/M-H/A/H)
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.2.  Call Existing, Dangerous Methods with Malicious Parameters [CRITICAL] (L-M/H-VH/M/I-A/M-H)
├── 2. Exploit Job Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 2.1.  Type Confusion Attacks (if using a vulnerable serializer like Newtonsoft.Json with TypeNameHandling) [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1.  Craft Malicious Payloads to Instantiate Arbitrary Types [CRITICAL] (H/VH/M-H/A/VH)
│   │   └── 2.1.2.  Trigger Unintended Code Execution via Deserialization Gadgets [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 2.2.  Exploit Vulnerabilities in Custom Deserializers (if used)
│   │   └── 2.2.1  Identify and exploit logic flaws in the custom deserialization process. [CRITICAL] (L-M/H-VH/H/A-E/VH)
│   └── 2.3.  Bypass `IDeserializationFilter` (if implemented, but flawed)
│       └── 2.3.1.  Find weaknesses in the filter's logic to allow malicious types. [CRITICAL] (L/VH/H-VH/E/VH)
└── 3. Exploit Storage Layer Vulnerabilities (Redis Only)
      └── 3.3.  Redis Exploitation (if using Redis and security is misconfigured) [HIGH-RISK]
          ├── 3.3.1.  Unauthorized Access to Redis Instance (L/H-VH/L-M/I/M)
          └── 3.3.2.  Execute Arbitrary Redis Commands (potentially leading to RCE) [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Hangfire Dashboard Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This path focuses on gaining unauthorized access to the Hangfire dashboard and then using that access to manipulate jobs, leading to RCE or DoS. The dashboard is a high-value target because it provides a user interface for managing Hangfire, making it easier for an attacker to interact with the system.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Unauthorized Dashboard Access [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: Gaining access to the dashboard without proper credentials.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Bypass Authentication

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. Default Credentials

  • Likelihood: Medium * Impact: Very High * Effort: Very Low * Skill Level: Novice * Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2. Weak Password Guessing/Brute-forcing

  • Likelihood: Medium * Impact: Very High * Effort: Medium to High * Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Exploit Authorization Flaws

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium * Impact: High to Very High * Effort: Medium to High * Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Dashboard-Based Job Manipulation [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: Once inside the dashboard, manipulating jobs to achieve malicious goals.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Enqueue Malicious Jobs [HIGH-RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1. Inject Malicious Code into Job Arguments [CRITICAL]

  • Likelihood: Medium * Impact: Very High * Effort: Medium to High * Skill Level: Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2. Call Existing, Dangerous Methods with Malicious Parameters [CRITICAL]

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium * Impact: High to Very High * Effort: Medium * Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Job Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities in how Hangfire deserializes job data. This is a very dangerous attack vector because it can lead directly to RCE without requiring any user interaction or dashboard access.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Type Confusion Attacks [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: Exploiting serializers that use type information (like Newtonsoft.Json with TypeNameHandling enabled) to trick the application into instantiating arbitrary types.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Craft Malicious Payloads to Instantiate Arbitrary Types [CRITICAL]

  • Likelihood: High * Impact: Very High * Effort: Medium to High * Skill Level: Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Trigger Unintended Code Execution via Deserialization Gadgets [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 2.2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Custom Deserializers

  • Description: If a custom deserializer is used, finding and exploiting flaws in its logic.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1. Identify and exploit logic flaws in the custom deserialization process. [CRITICAL]

  • Likelihood: Low to Medium * Impact: High to Very High * Effort: High * Skill Level: Advanced to Expert * Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Bypass IDeserializationFilter

  • Description: Circumventing the protections provided by an IDeserializationFilter implementation.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1. Find weaknesses in the filter's logic to allow malicious types. [CRITICAL]

  • Likelihood: Low * Impact: Very High * Effort: High to Very High * Skill Level: Expert * Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Storage Layer Vulnerabilities (Redis Only) [HIGH-RISK]

Overall Description: This path is specific to deployments using Redis as the Hangfire storage provider. It focuses on gaining unauthorized access to the Redis instance and executing commands.

Attack Tree Path: 3.3. Redis Exploitation [HIGH-RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 3.3.1. Unauthorized Access to Redis Instance

  • Likelihood: Low * Impact: High to Very High * Effort: Low to Medium * Skill Level: Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 3.3.2. Execute Arbitrary Redis Commands (potentially leading to RCE) [CRITICAL]

  • Impact: Very High (if RCE is possible)