Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
51 lines (42 loc) · 5.82 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

51 lines (42 loc) · 5.82 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for jbogard/mediatr

Attack Surface: 1. Handler Implementation Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws within request handler code (e.g., injection flaws, business logic errors) that can be directly exploited.
  • How MediatR contributes to the attack surface: MediatR dispatches requests directly to handlers. Vulnerable handlers become easily accessible attack vectors through MediatR's dispatch mechanism.
  • Example: A handler vulnerable to SQL injection allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries by sending crafted requests through MediatR, leading to data breaches.
  • Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access, data manipulation, privilege escalation, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Secure Coding: Enforce secure coding practices in all handlers (input validation, parameterized queries, output encoding).
    • Rigorous Security Testing: Implement comprehensive security testing (SAST, DAST, penetration testing) specifically targeting handlers.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant handlers only necessary permissions to minimize impact of compromise.

Attack Surface: 2. Pipeline Interception and Manipulation (Custom Pipelines)

  • Description: Custom pipeline behaviors, if insecurely designed, can bypass security controls, introduce new vulnerabilities, or modify requests/responses maliciously.
  • How MediatR contributes to the attack surface: MediatR's pipeline feature allows injecting custom logic into request processing. Insecure pipelines become part of the attack surface exposed via MediatR's request flow.
  • Example: A poorly written authorization pipeline behavior might incorrectly bypass intended authorization checks, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive handlers and data.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, security control bypass, data manipulation, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Pipeline Design Principles: Design custom pipelines with security as a primary concern. Follow secure coding guidelines.
    • Mandatory Pipeline Review: Require thorough security reviews for all custom pipeline behaviors before deployment.
    • Minimize Pipeline Complexity: Keep pipeline logic simple and focused to reduce potential for errors and vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: 3. Information Disclosure through Error Handling (Potentially Escalating to High Risk)

  • Description: Improper error handling in MediatR pipelines or handlers can leak sensitive information (stack traces, internal paths) to attackers.
  • How MediatR contributes to the attack surface: MediatR's error propagation can expose internal error details if not configured securely, providing valuable reconnaissance information to attackers.
  • Example: An exception in a handler reveals database connection strings or internal server paths in the error response propagated through MediatR, aiding attackers in further exploitation.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, aiding attacker reconnaissance, potential for privilege escalation or further exploitation based on revealed information.
  • Risk Severity: Medium, escalating to High in scenarios where disclosed information facilitates further critical attacks.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Generic Error Responses: Configure MediatR and application to return generic, non-revealing error messages to clients.
    • Secure Error Logging: Log detailed errors securely for debugging, but prevent exposure to users or external systems.
    • Centralized Exception Handling: Implement robust, centralized exception handling to sanitize error responses and prevent information leakage.

Attack Surface: 4. Notification Handling Misuse for Security-Sensitive Events (Potentially Escalating to High Risk)

  • Description: Misuse of MediatR's notification system for security-critical events can lead to unauthorized access or actions if handlers are compromised or notifications are not secured.
  • How MediatR contributes to the attack surface: MediatR's notification system broadcasts events. If used for security-sensitive events without proper controls, it can become a channel for unauthorized access or information leakage.
  • Example: A notification for successful user login containing user roles is published. A malicious or compromised handler subscribes and intercepts this notification to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, privilege escalation, information disclosure, data manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: Medium, escalating to High in scenarios where misuse leads to privilege escalation or unauthorized actions on sensitive data.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Sensitive Data in Notifications: Minimize or eliminate sensitive data in notification payloads. Use identifiers and retrieve details securely within handlers.
    • Restrict Notification Handlers: Strictly control which handlers can subscribe to security-sensitive notifications using authorization mechanisms.
    • Secure Notification Handlers: Apply secure coding practices to all notification handlers, especially those handling security-sensitive events.
    • Consider Alternatives: Evaluate if notifications are the most secure pattern for security-critical actions; consider direct command/query patterns for better control.