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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for jbogard/mediatr

Objective: Compromise Application Using MediatR

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via MediatR [CRITICAL NODE: Entry Point - MediatR Usage]
├───[AND] Exploit MediatR Specific Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE: MediatR Weaknesses]
│   ├───[OR] 1. Request Manipulation Attacks [HIGH RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├───[AND] 1.1. Malicious Request Payload [CRITICAL NODE: Payload Manipulation]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] 1.1.2. Command/Query Injection [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: Injection Vulnerabilities in Handlers]
│   │   │   │   ├─── 1.1.2.1. Inject Malicious Code/Commands via Request Parameters [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: SQL/Command Injection]
│   │   │   │   └─── 1.1.2.2. Manipulate Request Data to Bypass Authorization/Validation in Handlers [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: Authorization/Validation Bypass]
│   ├───[OR] 3. Handler Exploitation (Indirectly related to MediatR's structure) [HIGH RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├───[AND] 3.1. Leverage MediatR's Decoupling for Wider Attack Surface [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: Decoupling & Validation Gaps]
│   │   │   ├─── 3.1.1. Exploit Lack of Centralized Input Validation due to Decoupling [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: Missing Input Validation]
│   │   │   └─── 3.1.2. Target Individual Handlers with Specific Vulnerabilities (SQL Injection, Business Logic Errors) [HIGH RISK PATH CONTINUES] [CRITICAL NODE: Handler-Specific Vulns]
│   ├───[OR] 4. Information Disclosure via MediatR
│   │   ├───[AND] 4.1. Verbose Error Handling in MediatR Pipeline [CRITICAL NODE: Verbose Error Handling]
│   │   └───[OR] 4.2. Logging Sensitive Data in Pipeline Components [CRITICAL NODE: Insecure Logging]

Attack Tree Path: Request Manipulation -> Command/Query Injection & Authorization Bypass

  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1.2.1. Inject Malicious Code/Commands via Request Parameters [CRITICAL NODE: SQL/Command Injection]:
      • Threat: Attacker crafts malicious input within request parameters (e.g., query string, form data, JSON body) that are processed by a MediatR handler. If the handler uses this input to construct database queries, operating system commands, or other dynamic code execution without proper sanitization or parameterization, injection vulnerabilities arise.
      • Impact: Can lead to:
        • Data Breach: Access to sensitive data in the database.
        • Data Manipulation: Modification or deletion of data.
        • System Compromise: Execution of arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to full system takeover.
      • Mitigation:
        • Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements: Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for database interactions to prevent SQL injection.
        • Input Sanitization/Validation: Strictly validate and sanitize all user inputs before using them in dynamic operations.
        • Principle of Least Privilege: Run database accounts and application processes with minimal necessary permissions.
    • 1.1.2.2. Manipulate Request Data to Bypass Authorization/Validation in Handlers [CRITICAL NODE: Authorization/Validation Bypass]:
      • Threat: Attacker crafts requests with specific data values designed to circumvent authorization or validation logic implemented within MediatR handlers. This exploits flaws in the handler's logic, not necessarily injection vulnerabilities, but logic errors that lead to unintended access or actions.
      • Impact: Can lead to:
        • Unauthorized Access: Gaining access to resources or functionalities that should be restricted.
        • Privilege Escalation: Performing actions with higher privileges than intended.
        • Data Manipulation: Modifying data without proper authorization.
      • Mitigation:
        • Robust Authorization Logic: Implement comprehensive and well-tested authorization checks within handlers, considering various access control models (RBAC, ABAC, etc.).
        • Thorough Input Validation: Validate all inputs against expected formats, ranges, and business rules to prevent unexpected data from bypassing validation logic.
        • Security Testing: Conduct thorough security testing, including penetration testing and code reviews, to identify and fix logic flaws in handlers.

Attack Tree Path: Handler Exploitation via Decoupling -> Lack of Validation & Handler-Specific Vulns

  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.1.1. Exploit Lack of Centralized Input Validation due to Decoupling [CRITICAL NODE: Missing Input Validation]:
      • Threat: MediatR's decoupling can lead to a distributed approach to handling requests. If developers assume validation is handled centrally (e.g., in a pipeline behavior) and neglect to implement validation within individual handlers, or if centralized validation is insufficient, vulnerabilities can arise. The decoupling can create blind spots where validation is missed.
      • Impact: Can lead to:
        • Vulnerabilities due to missing validation: Injection vulnerabilities, business logic errors, data integrity issues, and other flaws that could have been prevented by proper input validation.
      • Mitigation:
        • Mandatory Validation Policy: Establish a clear policy that input validation is required in all handlers, regardless of any centralized validation mechanisms.
        • Code Reviews and Static Analysis: Use code reviews and static analysis tools to ensure that all handlers perform adequate input validation.
        • Validation Pipeline Behaviors (Complementary, not Replacement): Use pipeline behaviors for cross-cutting validation concerns (e.g., common format checks), but ensure handlers still perform specific business rule validation.
    • 3.1.2. Target Individual Handlers with Specific Vulnerabilities (SQL Injection, Business Logic Errors) [CRITICAL NODE: Handler-Specific Vulns]:
      • Threat: MediatR encourages the creation of many small, focused handlers. If developers are not vigilant, individual handlers can contain common web application vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection, command injection, cross-site scripting (if handlers generate output), business logic flaws, or other coding errors. The sheer number of handlers can increase the surface area for these vulnerabilities.
      • Impact: Can lead to:
        • Data Breach, Data Manipulation, System Compromise (SQL/Command Injection): As described in 1.1.2.1.
        • Business Logic Disruption: Exploiting flaws in business logic within handlers to cause unintended application behavior or financial loss.
      • Mitigation:
        • Secure Coding Practices in Handlers: Emphasize secure coding practices for all handlers, including input validation, output encoding, error handling, and avoiding common vulnerability patterns.
        • Regular Security Training: Provide regular security training to developers focusing on common web application vulnerabilities and secure coding techniques.
        • Vulnerability Scanning and Penetration Testing: Regularly scan and penetration test the application, specifically targeting individual handlers to identify vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Verbose Error Handling in MediatR Pipeline

  • 4.1. Verbose Error Handling in MediatR Pipeline [CRITICAL NODE: Verbose Error Handling]:
    • Threat: If the MediatR pipeline's error handling is not properly configured, it can expose sensitive information in error responses or logs. This includes stack traces, internal paths, database connection strings, or other details that can aid attackers in reconnaissance or further attacks.
    • Impact:
      • Information Disclosure: Leakage of sensitive technical details about the application.
      • Reconnaissance Aid: Provides attackers with valuable information to plan more targeted attacks.
    • Mitigation:
      • Generic Error Responses: Return generic, user-friendly error messages to external clients. Avoid exposing technical details in responses.
      • Secure Error Logging: Log detailed error information securely for debugging purposes, but ensure logs are not publicly accessible and are protected with appropriate access controls.
      • Centralized Exception Handling: Implement centralized exception handling within the MediatR pipeline to control error responses and logging consistently.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Logging in Pipeline Components

  • 4.2. Logging Sensitive Data in Pipeline Components [CRITICAL NODE: Insecure Logging]:
    • Threat: Pipeline components, especially logging behaviors, might inadvertently log sensitive data that is processed by MediatR requests and responses. If logs are not properly secured, attackers who gain access to these logs can obtain sensitive information.
    • Impact:
      • Information Disclosure: Leakage of sensitive user data, credentials, API keys, or other confidential information stored in logs.
      • Compliance Violations: Potential violation of data privacy regulations (GDPR, CCPA, etc.) if sensitive personal data is logged insecurely.
    • Mitigation:
      • Minimize Sensitive Data Logging: Avoid logging sensitive data whenever possible. Log only necessary information for debugging and auditing.
      • Data Masking/Redaction: If sensitive data must be logged, implement data masking or redaction techniques to protect it in logs.
      • Secure Log Storage and Access: Store logs securely, encrypt them at rest and in transit, and implement strict access controls to limit who can access logs.
      • Regular Log Audits: Periodically audit logs to ensure they do not contain unintended sensitive data and that logging practices are secure.