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Attack Tree Analysis for jbogard/mediatr

Objective: [[Gain Unauthorized Control (Data/Behavior)]]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [[Gain Unauthorized Control (Data/Behavior)]]
                                                    |||
                      =====================================================================
                      |||                                                                   
        [[Exploit Request Handling]]                                       
                      |||                                                                   
        ==============================                               
        |||             |||                                              
[[Bypass AuthZ]] [[Data Tampering]]          
        |||             |||             
  =======       =======      
  |||   |||       |||   |      
[[A1]] [[A2]] [[B1]]     
                      
                      |||
                      =======
                        |||
                      [[E2]]

Attack Tree Path: [[Gain Unauthorized Control (Data/Behavior)]]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker, encompassing both unauthorized access to sensitive data and the ability to alter the application's intended functionality.
  • Likelihood: N/A (This is the goal, not an attack step)
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: N/A
  • Skill Level: N/A
  • Detection Difficulty: N/A

Attack Tree Path: [[Exploit Request Handling]]

  • Description: This branch focuses on how an attacker might manipulate the core request/response mechanism of MediatR to achieve their goal. It's a high-risk area due to the potential for authorization bypasses and data tampering.
  • Likelihood: High (Aggregated likelihood of child nodes)
  • Impact: Very High (Aggregated impact of child nodes)
  • Effort: Varies (Depends on the specific attack vector)
  • Skill Level: Varies (Depends on the specific attack vector)
  • Detection Difficulty: Varies (Depends on the specific attack vector)

Attack Tree Path: [[Bypass AuthZ (Authorization)]]

  • Description: The attacker aims to execute requests that they should not be authorized to perform, gaining access to functionality or data they shouldn't have.
  • Likelihood: High (Aggregated likelihood of A1 and A2)
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: [[A1]] Incorrectly Configured Request Handlers

  • Description: A developer mistakenly associates a sensitive operation (e.g., DeleteUserCommand) with a handler that doesn't properly check authorization. The attacker sends a crafted request that triggers this handler.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common developer error)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Unauthorized access to sensitive operations)
  • Effort: Low (Simple request manipulation)
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires auditing request logs and handler logic)

Attack Tree Path: [[A2]] Bypassing Validation in Request

  • Description: The request object contains data used for authorization (e.g., a user ID). If validation of this data is weak or missing before the handler is invoked, the attacker can manipulate it to impersonate another user or bypass checks.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common developer error, especially with complex requests)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Impersonation, unauthorized data access)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Requires understanding the request structure)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires analyzing request data and validation logic)

Attack Tree Path: [[Data Tampering]]

  • Description: The attacker modifies the data within a request to achieve an unauthorized outcome, potentially altering application state or bypassing security controls.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (Aggregated likelihood of B1 and potential interactions with other vulnerabilities)
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: [[B1]] Mutable Request Objects

  • Description: If request objects are mutable, and a pre-processor or other part of the pipeline modifies the request object in an unintended way, an attacker might be able to leverage this. This is less likely if best practices (immutable objects) are followed, but the impact is high enough to warrant concern.
  • Likelihood: Low (If best practices are followed)
  • Impact: Medium to High (Unintended data modification, potential security bypass)
  • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding the pipeline and finding a point of modification)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Requires deep understanding of the application's pipeline)

Attack Tree Path: [[E2]] Logic Errors in Handlers

  • Description: The handler itself might contain flaws that allow an attacker to bypass security checks, manipulate data, or cause unintended behavior. This is not specific to MediatR, but the separation of concerns that MediatR encourages can sometimes lead to developers overlooking security implications within the handler.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (Most common type of application vulnerability)
  • Impact: Varies greatly (From low to very high, depending on the error)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the complexity of the handler)
  • Skill Level: Novice to Advanced (Depends on the complexity of the error)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires code review and testing)